Bartholomeus van der Helst (1613–1670), "The celebration of the peace of Münster, 18 June 1648, in the headquarters of the crossbowmen’s civic guard (St George guard)"
The following abstracts have not been edited or revised in any way and are the full responsibility of their authors.
Prof. Simon Cabulea May

Country: United Kingdom
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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 15, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:
Simon Cabulea May is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University where he teaches courses in political philosophy and jurisprudence. His present research concerns conflicts of moral convictions in politics, particularly as they bear on the legitimacy and authority of democratic law, the justifiability of public policies, and norms of public deliberation and political engagement. He holds an M.A. from Rhodes University, South Africa, and a Ph.D. from Stanford University. He also created the international political philosophy group blog Public Reason in 2007.

Title: The Epistemology of Political Compromise
Keywords: Moral Compromise, Peer Disagreement, Epistemology of Disagreement

Abstract:
Simon May (2005) defends the claim that there are no principled (or non-instrumental) reasons for moral compromise in politics, although there may such reasons in private life (May 2011). In particular, epistemic considerations of the complexity of a moral issue or the fallibility of our moral judgments do not provide reasons for moral compromise. May's position has been criticized by (e.g.) Klemens Kappel (2017), Daniel Weinstock (2013), and Eric Beerbohm (2012), who separately appeal to the burgeoning literature on the epistemology of peer disagreement (see, e.g., Christensen and Lackey, 2013), especially the conciliationist view that rational
agents ought to reduce the extent of disagreement between them by adjusting their beliefs or their degree of confidence in their beliefs.

In this paper, I defend May's position by arguing that even if conciliationism were true, it could not provide any reason for moral compromise. If disagreement generates epistemic reasons to modify one's position, these would be first-order reasons for correction, rather than second-order reasons for compromise. Moreover, I argue that although the complexity of moral problems is sometimes thought to support a conciliationist view, it is precisely the fact of this complexity that undermines the epistemic significance of the resulting disagreement. Thus, conciliationism is actually least plausible in exactly those contexts that are typically thought to provide the best candidates for moral compromise in politics.

**References**


PARTICIPANTS
Abramovich, Nicolai

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Affiliation: Paris-Sorbonne University, France  
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 5, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio:  
Currently finishing my Ph.D. dissertation. I seek for an answer to overcome the tension between the fact of pluralism and the liberal quest for political universalism. I study the way that the asymmetry between good and evil and the priority of negative entities over positive entities might be used as an epistemic and a normative justification for political liberalism. This seems a stronger justification than the rawlsian and the communitarian approaches. My fields of research are ethics and political philosophy.

Title: **Negative liberalism versus Radical liberalism**  
Keywords: Political Liberalism Negative Moral Asymmetry Evil

Abstract:  
One of the greatest difficulties of every political system aspiring to be universal is the articulation with the fact of pluralism. The latter establishes the empirical existence of plural moral systems and of diverse conceptions of the good life.  
Contemporary liberalism - Rawlsian egalitarianism in particular - tries to overcome the issue by separating the notions of Justice and Good. The idea is to sustain that liberalism may be a political and legal frame in which individuals can follow and realize their own particular moral ideas.  
There is a type of implicit consent regarding the pertinence of this option. Yet, we would like to defend that behind the veil of universality and the curtains of universality even the most well intended liberalism as the egalitarian view risks to take the path of a radical position.  
In fact, the critique done by Michael Sandel seems to demonstrate that the Rawlsian enterprise is complicated and destined to moral and logical inconsistencies: it is not possible to propose a qualitative distinction between Justice and Good because it is impossible to split the unity of the mind. We do not treat moral questions in one way and political questions in another way. Even if it reaches for a universal status, it stays a particular vision, marked by a Kantian conception of morality and by a metaphysical idea of the individual interpreted as an autonomous Self.  
On the other side, liberal communitarianism terminates in particular systems that are unable to easily overcome the risk of moral relativism and of arbitrary normative decisions.  
If liberalism wants to accede to a universal status it cannot impose a particular vision of the Good, otherwise it would just be one version among all the possible conceptions coming out of the pluralism of values.  
Moreover, by conveying a particular social ideal liberalism sets a restrain to individual and groups preferring other ideals than the liberal one. Thus, it falls into an internal contradiction as it imposes a paternalistic view as well as a limit when its finalities are to protect freedom from restrain and autonomy from dependence. Consequently, liberalism must respect pluralism to avoid contradiction. Yet, the positive versions of liberalism impose restrain and dependence since they arbitrarily prioritize one moral view over the others. It is in this sense that liberalism can fall into a radical discourse and position consisting in defending and imposing the liberal set of values without giving a proper justification.
We would like to defend that radicalism in liberal positions comes from stepping into Moore’s famous “naturalistic fallacy”.

We sustain that the way out is to produce a negative justification grounded on two basic foundations: a) there is an asymmetry of Good and Evil & b) Liberty is the main instrument to avoid the political summum malum that is absolute and unlimited power.

Authors such as Shklar, Margalit and Hampshire help us yield a negative liberalism capable of saving liberalism from contradiction and radicalism.
Andrade, Julio Anthony
Country: South Africa
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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 11, 11h15-13h00

Short Bio:
Julio Andrade is a PhD candidate in the philosophy department of the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. After more than fifteen years in the hospitality industry, he decided to reinvent himself as an academic. He is an associate of the Ethics Institute (South Africa) and the Secretary-General of BEN (Business Ethics Network)-Africa

Title: The compromise of ethics and politics in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and some implications for business ethics
Keywords: Levinas, ethics, politics, undecidability, business ethics, whistleblowing

Abstract:
In Totality and Infinity Emmanuel Levinas (1969; 43) defines ethics as “the calling into question of my spontaneity” by the alterity of the Other. This alterity, or singularity of the Other cannot be captured in any ontological system of representation; instead Levinas calls the way the Other presents him/herself as singular Other as ‘face’. The epiphany of the face holds my subjectivity hostage and leads to an infinite responsibility for the Other. In practice, such a demanding morality would potentially consume me – Levinas (1998; 104) says that if the Other “were my interlocutor I would have had nothing but obligations!”; but he continues, “I don’t live in a world in which there is but one single ‘first comer’; there is always a third party in the world”. As such “it is important to me to know which of the two takes precedence […] must not human beings, who are incomparable, be compared? Thus justice here, takes precedence over the taking upon oneself of the fate of the other” (ibid). The third therefore, marks the movement from ethics to politics in Levinas’s work.

However, such a politics is fraught with tension because politics requires calculation and comparison – compromise – which is in turn founded on ontological categories, and ontology would, unethically, efface the face of the Other. Jordaan (2009; 97) captures this compromise succinctly: “When faced by the other, I can respond politically, seeing the other as my equal, restricting my responsibility to him […] or I can respond ethically by being concerned and assuming responsibility for him beyond what is required by our political equality and reciprocity. Do I relate to the other ethically or politically? I am constantly faced with this choice” (Emphasis added).

Navigating this dilemma between whether to respond to the Other ethically or politically becomes impossible; or what Jacques Derrida (1992) calls the ‘undecidable’ decision. It is this very undecidability however, that restores autonomy back to the moral agent, giving the agent the real possibility of choice that is not predetermined by calculation or compromise. Justice/politics, instantiated in the presence of the third party who must make the undecidable decision becomes for Levinas the limit of infinite responsibility (1998; 157). However this does not imply “ethics [as]necessarily a restraint on power – i.e. one where politics comes first and then ethics evaluates it later – [rather] politics is the machinery through which the ethical demand can be responded to” (McMurray et al. 2010; 546).
After an exposition and critical examination of Levinas’s move from the ethical to the political I use the insights thus gleaned to address the question posed to business ethicists by Martin Parker (2003; 198) in ‘Ethics, Politics and Organizing’ about “why they don’t call their discipline ‘business politics’?” Adapting and paraphrasing Wolff’s (2011; 21) point I will argue that business ethics necessarily passes into business politics (or in fact, that business ethics has always already passed into business politics). I trace some practical implications of this finding for one particular business ethics theme, viz whistleblowing.
**Arese, Laura**  
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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 6, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**  
Laura Arese is MA in Philosophy and PhD candidate at the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC, Argentina). Since 2014 she is member of the research team "The question of rights in contemporary philosophy", of the Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades (UNC). Since 2016 she is professor of Ethics at the Universidad Provincial de Córdoba (Argentina). Funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), she is currently doing a research fellowship at the Freie Universität Berlin. She published different articles on political theory and philosophy of history.

**Title:** Citizenship and social movements in Argentina’s democratic transition. About an intellectual debate in "Punto de Vista" (1983-1987).  
**Keywords:** citizenship, democratic transition, social movements, Argentina

**Abstract:**  
During the first years of Argentina’s democratic transition, an intense intellectual debate took place in the journal on politics and culture “Punto de Vista”. Important left-wing intellectuals started there a critical revision of projects of revolutionary social transformation that had predominated in the Argentine left-wing thought of the ‘60 and ‘70. On the one hand, they considered it necessary to identify the theoretical aspects of these projects that contributed to the failure of the attempts to bring them into practice. At the same time, they wanted to establish a link between socialism (or whatever would remain of it, after the critical revision) and a category which became central in the new context and has been dismissed until then as an invention of capitalist and bourgeois ideology: democracy. The purpose of the paper is to explore this debate focusing on a concept which expresses theoretical tensions and unresolved questions: the concept of citizen. In contrast to the radicalism of the sixties and seventies, the figure of the committed citizen appeared to the intellectuals of Punto de vista as a promising starting point for the reconceptualization of political agency. First, the paper will explore in which extent the conceptualization of “the figure of the committed citizen” in Punto de vista was indebted to the “paradigm of social movements”. These movements emerged in the 1960s as an auspicious phenomenon of the European and American political scene and gave rise to a new way of conceiving political agency. It will be shown that certain traits of this paradigm were recovered by the intellectuals of Punto de vista for the criticism of several aspects of local Marxist and left-wing peronist theories: avant-gardism or personalism, authoritarianism, a certain conception of violence, “movementism” and a too narrow conception of political subjects. Second, the paper will analyse one important limit of this creative task of conceptual revision and criticism. According to our hypothesis, the new theoretical perspectives of Punto de vista displaced or neglected “the social question” and that had an exclusion effect upon the way in which political actors in Argentina had historically configured their practices and identities. Thus, the revision of local revolutionary traditions was done at a high price: the impossibility of identifying the concrete political actors capable of satisfying the high theoretical expectations deposited in the figure of the citizen. The result was that the figure of the citizen, around which much of the intellectual creativity of this debate was deployed, became a hope and at the same time remained a vacant position.
**Assayag, Laure**

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 9, 09h30-11h00

**Short Bio:**
Laure Assayag is currently a graduate student at EHESS. She obtained a MPhil in Transnational History from ENS-Ulm (Ecole Normale Superieure) and a MPhil in Philosophy from Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne. Former student of King’s College, Cambridge University, and Loyola University, Chicago, she was also a visiting student at Columbia University. She is a recipient of a JSPS-CNRS fellowship and beneficiary of a grant from the Andrew Mellon Foundation. Her research focuses on the ethics of compromise, which she studies both in its normative and historical, transnational aspect. Her latest article “Confidence in Paul Ricoeur’s works” was published in the Ricoeur Studies.

**Title:** Compromise in Paul Ricoeur’s Thought  
**Keywords:** compromise; philosophy; Paul Ricoeur; ethics

**Abstract:**
This article argues that compromise lies at the heart of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical project despite the apparent fragmentation of his work. Indeed, anyone who ventures into the work of Paul Ricoeur is surprised by the abundance of his questions, the volume of his production, the labyrinthine aspect of his thought. Ricœur’s philosophy is distinguished by its absence of a central point, by “the variety of registers, its innumerable interests, the multiplicity of references” (Mongin, 1998: 41). Therefore, any angle of analysis chosen to comment on his work must be fully argued and justified. Then, in what way is the concept of compromise legitimate to approach the work of the philosopher?

The compromise is simultaneously symbolic of Ricœur’s philosophical posture, a sign of a weighting of opposites, and a theme that crosses and structures, between the lines, his whole thought. Let us note, however, that P. Ricoeur never delivers a clear and definitive definition of compromise. Is it due to the fact that his reasoning does not develop by frontal inputs, but by transversal diagonals? Is it because compromise itself is a problematic and unstable concept, difficult to circumscribe?

Far from being systematic, his reflection on compromise palpitates in the course of an argumentation, where the term is constantly put in tension with the conflicting poles of conflict or violence. With Ricœur, compromise is never themed as such, which also explains the absence of critical works on this subject. As a "philosopher of the middle path" (Resweber, 2011), Ricœur proposes a via media that is characterized by a conciliation or an agreement between two or more proposals of a divergent or even contradictory nature, in order to find an alternative to oppositions. One must say that a theoretician of the middle ground is not the enemy of any theory of conflict, or an adversary of extremes, but is instead opposed to determinism or fatalism. For P. Ricoeur, the importance of conflict does not condemn society to violent relationships- a mutual recognition is possible and desirable. The compromise is therefore the consequence of the agonistic character inherent in the social bond, but also the possibility of offering an effective solution to these disputes, as fragile, problematic and temporary as it is.
Our research will be guided by one strong hypothesis: we believe that the originality of Ricœur's approach lies in the presentation of compromise as an intersection of several orders of magnitude.

In the first part, the structure of compromise, conceived as an "intersection setting" of interests will be under scrutiny. We will then study the dialogue established with Laurent Boltanski and Luc Thévenot's book *De la justification*, a source of inspiration for Ricœur's theory of orders of magnitude. As a third move, we will investigate the take-away from Ricœur’s model of compromise.
Baião, António

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 12, 11h15-13h00

Short Bio:
António Baião is a PhD candidate in Philosophy (speciality: Social and Political Philosophy) at the Institute of Arts and Humanities of University of Minho. I've previously done research on the main expressions of modern anarchism in Portugal. I'm currently developing a PhD project on post-structuralist anarchism, where I intend to develop a theoretical and critical analysis of contemporary anarchist thought.

Title: Utopia, anarchism and radicalism
Keywords: Utopia; Anarchism; Radical politics

Abstract:
Thomas More, na Utopia (1516), cria um género novo na busca pela óptima república ou sociedade. O texto apresenta-se não só como um devaneio contra a sociedade inglesa seiscentista, mas também como uma obra de crítica ao caos social. Ao opor-se à visão do fenómeno político como desejo arbitrário dos governantes, inflecte numa direcção alternativa, reforçando a necessidade de estruturar uma sociedade subordinada ao bem-comum. Desta forma, desponta o género utópico na análise política.

A Utopia apresenta dois referenciais absolutamente fundamentais para que possa ser plenamente compreendida. Por um lado, existe uma evidente aproximação à eutopia platónica, ao bom-lugar situado na República. Por outro, a referência cíptica à Constituição de Licurgo e ao ano de 254 a.C., último ano de vigência da carta jurídica espartana e ano de formação da ilha imaginada por More. Mas a Utopia supera estas duas referências, através de uma narrativa que torna possível conhecer o funcionamento da nova cidade e representá-la juridicamente, sensível e conceptualmente, como é demonstrado na Sextilha de Anemólio.

A obra conjuga portanto ficção e teoria política de modo atípico. O propósito deste paper é explorar cinco características determinantes para o pensamento utópico moderno e contemporâneo: (i) desenvolvimento de imaginários, procurando situar a sociedade ideal numa imágica ou espaço ficcional; (ii) permanência eterna no presente, renegando a História e estabelecendo que o futuro é meramente constituído de acasos; (iii) racionalidade das instituições sociais, tornando possível que o próprio funcionamento da cidade contraste com dimensões meramente proféticas e apresente uma finalidade definível; (iv) comunismo como condição de justiça, confirmando a propriedade privada como imoral e reforçando que só a sua abolição permitirá alcançar a sociedade desejável; (v) beatitude ou existência de um bem supremo e fim último da própria utopia.

Na nossa leitura colocaremos a ênfase na ligação entre estas facetas da obra e as (re)leituras contemporâneas da obras, especialmente na tradição anarquista.
**Ballacci, Giuseppe**

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 13, 14h30-16h30

**Short Bio:**

**Title:** Agonism and Deliberation: Reconsidering the Debate through Arendt  
**Keywords:** Deliberation; agonism; Arendt; democracy; best form of life;

**Abstract:**
In the debate between deliberative and agonistic theorists of democracy, Hannah Arendt is usually identified as a member of the latter group. But at the same time, her theory of politics is characterized also by an undeniable deliberative dimension. Accordingly, we can find in the secondary literature on Arendt two quite distinct, if not completely irreconcilable, readings of her theory of politics. In this paper, instead, I am going to present a more reconciliatory interpretation of Arendt’s political theory. My aim however is not so much to demonstrate an overall coherence in her theory, but rather to use the way in which she reconciles agonism and deliberation to reconsider that debate in democratic theory. The peculiarity of Arendt’s agonistic vision of politics is that differently from the vast majority of agonistic theories based on an apology not only of pluralism, but also of politics as the best form of life. The vita activa is for her the best form of life, since it allows at the same time to reveal the unique identity of the agent and to actualize human freedom and care for the world. More than that, according to Arendt, politics existential and public motives coexist to the extent that individual excellence can emerge only collectively: first, because excelling in politics requires, above all, the capacity to judge and persuade; and second, because the attribute of excellence is conferred by an audience of judging spectators, who evaluate those actions politically, as they unfold in the public sphere. In this paper, I will explore Arendt’s quite distinctive combination of deliberative and agonistic themes and show how it can contribute to enrich that debate in democratic theory.
Baptista, António Luís Silva  
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Presentation: 2-Feb, Session 14, 14h30-16h30

Short Bio:  
PHD in Political Theory at University of Lisbon (2013); Post-doc researcher at University of São Paulo (2014-2016); Integrated Researcher at CEPS-UM

Title: The Anti-federalists as “populists” avant-la-lettre? Radicalism and compromise in the early years of the American independence  
Keywords: Populism; Antifederalists

Abstract:  
Populism may be seen as an attempt by non-elites, defined both in terms of their socioeconomic status and their usual political influence, to regain lost power and effect changes in an existing political and economic regime so as to return to what they perceive as being a proper balance between different interests. Very often they will not present a revolutionary discourse, as their goal is thought to be one of rescuing a regime and its original principles from a degenerative process that ensued after its emancipatory or “democratic” origin. I will contend that the anti-federalists – or part of this somewhat vaguely defined group - and ideology may be understood as a proper precursor of later forms of “populism”.

The American Constitution of 1787 is usually seen as a work of compromise between, on the one hand, the Federalists’ political theory that favored the emergence of a large, centralized and expanding commercial republic in which the will of the people would be heavily filtered so as to have irrational passions neutralized, and, on the other hand, some of the main concerns expounded by the Antifederalists regarding the preservation of some degree of democratic control of representatives as well as ensuring essential freedoms against a distant government always on the verge of being fully dominated by elites hostile to the interests of a virtuous common people. Still, this compromise was clearly more congenial to the values expounded in “The Federalist” papers and, as time passed, the antifederalist movement would come to react with the formation of the “republican-democratic party” in which Thomas Jefferson along with James Madison (the former federalist theorists that had grown weary of the mounting power of northern financial and commercial elites) took the lead. This party would come to achieve some victories in the late XVIII and early XIX centuries.

As in some forms of modern populist – or so called - movements, one can find among antifederalists the systematic portrayal of a growing rift between, on the one hand, a large majority of the population, the common people, that is essentially virtuous, hard-working and that is struggling to maintain its economic and political independence and that has been bereft of any real influence on politics by the progressive corruption of the political process, and a shrinking governing elite, usually associated with the banking system and those urban sectors where large concentrated wealth is found. The latter are perceived to have both benefited from as well as promoted inequality-enhancing policies. Also, to counterbalance these tendencies, the anti-federalists stress the need to revitalize the democratic element of representation by making representatives more dependent or fearful of their electors, namely through the stricter control provided by annual elections. I intend to show that by studying antifederalist thought and the political and
socioeconomic context in which they emerged, one can better grasp the nature of recurring “populist” waves today.
Boss, George
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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 2, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio:
George's work focuses on the political philosophy of human needs, value change and modernisation, and Marxism, under the supervision of Professor Terrell Carver and Dr Jonathan Floyd. Currently he is studying the competing conceptions of human needs, and their role in the work of Marx. George's background involves an undergraduate degree from Oxford (PPE) and a Masters degree from Birkbeck, University of London (MRes Politics).

Title: Capabilities, values and human needs
Keywords: Capabilities; human needs; values; justice; development

Abstract:
The capabilities approach has had significant impact as a metric for distributional justice, and in the construction of international measures of development. This paper will explore one particular application of the approach: whether it can give an adequate account of the concept of ‘human needs’. It will be argued that the approach, in distinguishing itself from alternative bases for ethical evaluation, is committed to a tripartite conception of human persons. The artificial separation between these three elements – individual autonomy, values, and functionings (‘beings’ and ‘doings’) – means the approach cannot adequately capture the concept of human needs. Firstly, ‘capability’ is understood as the freedom to choose a particular set of functionings, but the approach is ambiguous, and even contradictory, in what it conceives as the possible constraints on that choice. This problem follows from the separations involved in the approach’s understanding of persons, which make it difficult to construct a sufficiently robust notion of ‘access’ to functionings. Secondly, in an attempt to develop objective accounts of wellbeing the capabilities approach artificially separates our agency from our values and from our experiences of living. This results in a frozen, narrow lists of basic needs that lacks dynamism, sufficient respect for difference, and an appreciation of power. To address these problems, a successful approach to human needs requires a socialised account of agency and values, and a deeper understanding of the dynamic social processes – including the role of power, conflict and struggle – that drive our needs.
Bouvot, Kathrin

Country: Austria
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Affiliation: University of Vienna, Austria
Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 11, 11h15-13h00

Short Bio:
Completed Studies at the University of Vienna:
Studies for Magisterium: Spanish, Philosophy and Psychology. I have completed my studies in January the 16th, 2014 and I have gained the degree of Mag.phil
Bachelor Studies in Philosophy: I have completed my studies in July the 12th, 2010 and I have gained the degree Bachelor of Arts
Bachelor Studies in Spanish Literature: I have completed my studies in July the 5th, 2011 and I have gained the degree Bachelor of Arts
Master Studies in Philosophy: I have completed my studies in June the 27th, 2012 and I have gained the degree Master of Arts for Philosophy
Academic degrees: Mag.phil., MA, BA, BA
Institutional affiliation: PhD student at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vienna
Professional activity:
Since 2012: assistant of the program managment of the community college (Volkshochschule VHS Urania in Vienna) Participation in the following congresses (a selection): 10th Congress of the OEGP, 4-6 June, University of Innsbruck, Being Human- Foundation, Imperative or Platitdue My lecture was on Thursday, 4th June 2015, 10:00-10:30 with the title Über den Sinn einer begrifflichen Differenzierung von „Mensch“ und „Person“ im bioethischen Diskurs am Lebensanfang und am Lebensende 53rd Societas Ethica Annual Conference 2016, Ethics and Law, Bad Boll, Stuttgart, Germany, My lecture was on Friday, 19th August 2016, 15:45-17:15 with the title Böse oder determiniert? Der determinierte Straftäter und die Folgen für die Strafrechtspraxis Symposium, University of Geneva, 15-17 Septembre 2016, La philosophie et son histoire. Un débat actuel. Société Suisse de Philosophie. My lecture was on Friday, 16th Septembre 2016 with the title Über das adäquate Verhältnis zwischen Geschichte und Leben. II Braga Colloquium in the History of Moral and Political Philosophy: „Lying and Hypocrisy in Politics and Morality“, University of Minho, 12-13 January 2017. My lecture was on Friday, 13 January 2017 with the title Lying as a competence?

Title: The "exotic", the "strange" and the "different": an artificial constructed evil - an analysis of reductionisms as an origin of the development of radicalisms
Keywords: the phenomenon of the evil, the origin of the evil, Plato's Republic IX, human soul, the attitude towards the supposed "stranger", to judge the "sranger" as evil, reductionisms, radicalism

Abstract:
There is a nearly multitudinous diversity of possibilities how to define the phenomenon of the evil. In the history of philosophy can be found positions1 that put a question mark over whether it is at all possible to define the evil2 without downplaying the evil acts themselves. According to such positions it must be feared that every attempt to explain or to define could banalize the evil acts. The present contribution does not provide the attempt to define the evil but it avoids it consciously. My research interest is focused on the variety of faces which the evil can have and has. Phenomenologically, the evil can have and has many faces.
But the evil has, so my approach, always one single origin. The root of the evil has to be located in the human being itself. To defend my thesis that the origin of the evil resides in the human being itself, that is to say in its personal disposition, I would like to refer to Plato’s Republic IX, 571c3- d5. In the just mentioned passage Plato claims that the phenomenon of the evil has one accurate root that can be located in the human soul. In other words, according to Plato the origin of the evil cannot be found in another place than in the soul of each and every one of us. To define it more precisely, Plato argues that basically every man has an evil element in his soul that is generally capable of committing every kind of crime. In a nutshell: there are innumerable faces of the evil that find expression in the most diverse evil behaviors. All of them are expressions of the evil but they have one common origin that is the personal disposition of the man to do evil things. In this context, I have to clarify that in my view the precondition of the evil is an active will. I believe that pure events, as for instance, natural catastrophes as earthquakes, without an actor as initiator, cannot be seen as an expression of the evil. The thesis that I am defending in this contribution is that one of the diverse faces of the evil becomes apparent in the attitude how we are treating our counterpart, how we are facing the supposed „stranger“ or rather the putative „other one“, that is to say when a demonization as a menace and a stigmatization as the evil as such of those that are coming from the outside take place. It is one specific face of the evil that comes to expression in an attitude that judges the „stranger“ and everything that is „different“ as evil what interests me in the present study. It is the illustration of the evil as an overcoming imminence through persons that are „different“ , „strange“ or „exotic“ that leads to the phenomenon of reductionisms that are classifying persons through one or two group affiliations. Such an illustration of the evil has the potential to give one certain identity a predominating or rather hegemonic status within a society that has the destructive power to extinguish all other existing identities which, in turn, are the only antidote against the development of a bellicose identity or against radicalisms. In such reductionisms, that I will analyze in more detail later, Amartya Sen sees a great danger. The indoctrination of the idea that the evil, the existential threat lies in the „different“, in the „exotic“, in the „strange“ or to put it otherwise in something that comes from abroad and the conclusion that we have to unify building a kind of united front against it we have had more often in our history. To give one concise example, we have had the incantation of such an idea when the German emperor William II held his speech to the Reichstag on August 4th, 1914: „I know no parties anymore, only Germans!“ The consequences of such ideas should basically be known but nonetheless this horrifying idea to gang up against the „others“ is not disappeared. The aim of my contribution is to analyze the phenomenon of the just mentioned specific face of the evil that shows itself in a prejudiced and xenophobic attitude towards people with another cultural or religious background. The illumination of the artificial construction of „evil stranger“ is in this research issue absolutely necessary. Over and above that I will demonstrate that a possible reason behind a lot of intercultural conflicts and also behind the development of radicalisms is the categorical will to integrate immigrants into the dominating culture of the host state. Such an unidirectional integration leads to the phenomenon that cultural minorities are feeling unaccepted, suppressed, misunderstood and excluded. This sense of being expelled from the majority in turn causes the formation of socially marginalised groups and, as a consequence, the arising of parallel societies that don't communicate with each other and that want to be independent because they want to protect their own identity towards other groups. The multiculturalism that arises of such a multiplicity of multicultural parallel societies is, on closer consideration, in reality, to use the term of Amartya Sen, a „plural monoculturalism“, in which every person is a prisoner of its own identity or group identity because of the rigid ascription of one singular identity.
Brea, Sergio

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 8, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:  
Sergio Brea García, undergraduate degree in Philosophy from the University of Oviedo (2010-2014). Ph. Dr. candidate (2016-present) in the Humanistic Research Program of the University of Oviedo (Thesis title: La (a)tracción del centro. Un estudio comparativo de las síntesis y los discursos socioliberal y falangista en España. Supervisor: Prof. Francisco Javier Gil Martín.)

Title: In medio ist virtus. The political center as a double-sided category  
Keywords: Political spectrum – Center – Synthesis – Compromise - Radicalism

Abstract:  
Talking about compromise in politics means primarily talking about agreement, understanding, or dialogue and negotiation. No political category exemplifies it better than the political center. Both moderate left and right tend towards it, and it’s around this political space where elections are won in modern democracies. However, since the economic crisis in 2008, Western democratic societies have become radicalized on both sides of the political spectrum. In the case of European Union countries, the increase of social inequalities, the popular disaffection and distrust and the citizens’ perception that both national and communitarian authorities remain distant and insensitive, cold and bureaucratic, detached from the real problems of the people, without effective capacity or true interest in solving them. In this context, the political center reemerges as the category to which all those parties that try to move away from extremes appeal. Partisan advocates of “quiet” changes and reforms instead of revolutionary drifts, “sensible” instead of imprudent solutions and “rational” instead of emotional decision-making, revive -explicitly or implicitly- the Aristotelian motto in medio ist virtus.

But what is really the political center? What is its nature? Does it have any kind of ideological “substance”? If yes, what is it? What traits define it and distinguish it from other political positions? If not, does it make sense to talk about the center as a political position? To what extent can there be “center” parties if the center lacks ideology? Which parties consider themselves as “centered”? Could the center, traditionally understood as the intermediate position par excellence, be radicalized? What's more: could the center have an extreme version? Extreme center: Does it exist? If so, what kind of movements would it include?

These issues will be the object of our analysis. After reviewing a sample of influential definitions of political spectrum, especially Norberto Bobbio’s spectrum model, we will focus our attention on the category of political center. We will identify some of its fundamental characteristics and defend that the center lacks ideology, being, essentially, a sort of synthesis in a moderate version of compromise or in an extremist version of radicalism.
Celik, Sinan Kadir

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 10, 09h30-11h00

Short Bio:
Sinan Kadir Çelik was graduated from METU Metallurgy and Materials Engineering in 1998 and then started his master’s program at METU Philosophy Department. In 2002, he completed his Ph.D. Having many national and international publications, Çelik is also producing and directing the documentary series entitled "Scientific and Wisdom Traces in Anatolia". He is still working as a lecturer at Atatürk University, Department of Philosophy, Department of History of Philosophy.

Title: Max Weber and the Era of Politics as a Vocation: A Critical Assessment
Keywords: Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, Common sense view, the relation between Ethics and Politics, Ethics.

Abstract:
In our contemporary world, confronting with variety of ethics becomes an ordinary practice for those who are interested in practical philosophy: ethics of sports, ethics of technology, medical ethics, ethics of international relations, business ethics, sexual ethics, computer ethics, environmental ethics, military ethics, animal ethics and so on. All these emerging disciplines are often gathered under the term of “applied ethics” and within this frame, “ethics of politics” or “political morality” is a branch of “applied ethics,” which deals with the moral problems concerning political activities, political decisions or decision making procedures. The moral norms that ought to be adopted by politicians are also one of the foremost concerns of “ethics of politics” or of “political morality.” Politics in the present intellectual climate often seems to be considered as an activity, a realm or a career having a peculiar kind of morality.

From one perspective, the existence of diverse branches of ethics can be treated as parts of disciplinary specialization in the academy. The acceleration in and the proliferation of the problems with that we have faced, especially in the last century, could culminate in the elaboration of much more specific moral problems. But from another perspective, one seems to have a right to dispute that there is something strange in this scene. For both Plato and Aristotle, for instance, the term “political morality” or “ethics of politics” would have been labeled as category mistakes. Both philosophers could have insisted that there is only one way to be a virtuous person, regardless of whether one prefers to engage in political affairs or not. However, should there be special kinds of moral norms peculiar to different spheres of human activity? For instance, is it plausible to presume that politicians have to comply with a different set of norms of conduct from ordinary people?

Whatever the rejoinder to these questions one could give, for the Zeitgeist of our era, it is obvious that the attribution of assorted sets of moral norms to diverse professions is considerably wide-spread and commonly espoused. Politics is often supposed to be a special occupation associated with its own unquestioned morality. It seems to be a principle derived from the common sense view that being a “moral” or a “good” person and being a “politician” are usually not identical. The majority of people are inclined to think of separate virtues: those of a morally good person and those of a politician. To repeat, whatever the reason behind the majority’s tendency towards perceiving morality and politics as two distinct realms, is it
still ethically admissible to confirm that the existence of this gap, a gap between ethics, and politics, is inevitable?

In the forthcoming paper, Max Weber’s lecture, “Politics as a Vocation” (1919) will be appraised as exemplary of the impact of this trend. Therefore, in Weber’s view, we find the newest shape of the gap between ethics and politics. I will critically consider it as a representative instance of the common sense view under consideration.
Colen, José

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 10, 09h30-11h00

Short Bio:
Jose Colen has an MBA by IESE (Barcelona) and a PhD in Political Science from IEP (Lisbon) and he is Associate Researcher of Minho University and recurrent guest Professor of IEP (Portuguese Catholic University) He was researcher of CESPRA of the École des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales (Paris) and Visiting Scholar at Notre Dame University (2014), University of Vienna (2015) and Navarra (2016). His most recent books include: Voting, governments and markets (2010); Guide to the Introduction of the Philosophy of History (2011); Facts and Values: A conversation (2012), Platão Absconditus (2013), The Early Moderns (2014) and The Companion to Raymond Aron (2015).

Title: Max Webber's Faustian deals
Keywords: Max Weber, compromise, political choice, tragic, consequences

Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the November Revolution of 1918, Weber gave his famous Politik als Beruf lecture before the Münchner Freistudentischer Bund. One could even say that politics surrounded the origins of the lecture itself: Weber initially did not want to give the talk and recommended Friedrich Naumann in his stead. Naumann was ill at the time and it seemed like the opportunity might be passed to Kurt Eisner, whereupon Weber, who cared deeply about the success of the new German democracy, rose to the occasion in order to prevent Eisner from adding any more to the revolutionary fervor of the students.[i] Weber defines politics early on in this lecture as “striving for a share of power or influence over the division of power, be it between states or between groups of people within states.”[ii] It is here that Weber also sets forth the three qualities that are prerequisites to embarking on a political career: passion (Leidenschaft), feeling of responsibility (Verantwortungsgefühl), and sense of proportion (Augenmaß).[iii]

As far as Aron’s engagement with this particular teaching is concerned, he focuses primarily on the dichotomy and implications of Weber’s ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). These two ethics follow on Weber’s discussion of the relation between ethics and politics. That the ethic required for effective statesmanship might be different from the personal ethic necessary to be a good Christian, say, is an idea that goes as far back as Machiavelli. Unlike his Florentine predecessor, the fulcrum of political morality in Weber’s construct is not only about having the fortitude to choose potentially disagreeable means in order to achieve desired ends, but also having the fortitude to take responsibility for the consequences, intended and unintended, of political action.[iv]

This paper will address the problem of the conciliation between Weber inner feeling of the tragic choices involved in political action and the need of compromises within the framework of his "ethics of responsibility."
Davis, Daniel
Country: United Kingdom
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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 9, 09h30-11h00

Short Bio:
I have just completed an MA in Social and Political Theory and am taking a year out to think about PhD projects.

Title: The Cost of Enlightenment: Rationality and Value
Keywords: Enlightenment, Frankfurt School, pluralism, virtue ethics, modernity, historicism, meta ethics

Abstract:
The key question of this study is: what is the effect of Enlightenment rationality on values, and how are we best to respond to this? Three very different, yet related, approaches are explored. First, as a worst-case-scenario, the work of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. For these authors, enlightenment is synonymous with the dawn of a new kind of barbarism in human history. Although there are considerable merits to aspects of their account, it is counselled against as an ultimately sweeping and overly pessimistic view, a pessimism without sufficient warrant, and one without substantive offer of redemption. Significantly, the key paradox they posit for the modern, that of instrumental reason, cannot be sustained in the face of criticism.

Elsewhere, Alasdair MacIntyre offers an insightful and pertinent critique of the modern, but one that ultimately is not taken up here due to insufficient power to commend his solutions, other problems notwithstanding. For MacIntyre, one faces a choice between what he terms loosely the Aristotelean and the Nietzschean, the old and the modern, and it is not at all clear that Aristotle will win out. It remains uncertain that the Aristotelean is more attractive than the Nietzschean, indeed we might plausibly conclude the contrary, and thereby we have insufficient motivation to return to the former.

Berlin, dealing with similar empirical data to MacIntyre, offers alternative explanations and strategies. Berlin’s account is preferred for what might be thought reasons opposite to those why MacIntyre’s is dismissed. Between what could be seen as broadly empirically equivalent accounts of the state of the post-Enlightenment moral condition, the principle here invoked of adjudication is an assumed notion of preconceived value. In other words, if one may choose between these accounts, then one does not, nor should, have to decide the matter in a vacuum. Instead, one must make appeal to a preconceived notion of what is important, however inchoate, and in this point Berlin is assumed the more appealing. Berlin, in pluralism, it is argued, offers a plausible and sophisticated method of accounting for what might be valuable in the post-Enlightenment moral condition, simultaneously providing a method of preservation of much of the condition (thought essentially rotten by others) and a means of answering the issues raised by the previous two positions.

However, Berlin’s account suffers from lack of full development, leaving substantial problems to be addressed. Significantly, one must answer the metaphysical problem (what is the nature of a pluralist metaethic?) and the epistemological question (how do we know what a pluralist metaethic requires/permits?). Robust answers are needed if one is to have a principle by which one may preclude undesirable would-be moral positions. With warranted consternation, it is shown that Berlin’s thoughts...
towards these problems are substantively lacking. Yet one should not be over hasty in dismissing Berlin’s pluralism. Its other virtues leave it worthy of consideration: crucially that it offers an intelligible theoretical underpinning for the post-Enlightenment moral condition and bulwark against the criticism and suspicions encountered in the previous two positions. To this end, suggestions are tentatively made towards conceivable improvement. Previous commenters have suggested taking the Capabilities Approach as a model, and establishing something akin to a list of acceptable positions within the pluralist spectrum. One needs to be careful to tread the line between remaining authentically pluralist and creating a merely inclusive ethics. If some sort of directory of genuine pluralist goods cannot be established, then one must develop a principle, or criteria, to achieve the same goal (i.e. of determining what should and should not be included within the pluralist ethic). If one is optimistic that development can be found in this direction, we need not think the situation so bleak as sometimes imagined: there are serious problems associated with post-Enlightenment moral thinking, but problems that are appropriate to a sensible moral system for the post-Enlightenment age.
Eylon, Yuval

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 4, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:
I am a senior lecturer in Philosophy at the Open university of Israel, where I have worked for the past decade. My main areas of interest include ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of sports.
I received my PhD from the Hebrew University In Jerusalem in 2003. The subject of my dissertation was the Virtuous Person.

Title: The Vice of Compromise
Keywords: compromise, virtue, vice, politics, tactics

Abstract:
Political compromises are assessed one by one. Compromises might be prudent or wise, or opportunistic. This holds of compromises made with other parties, and also holds of what I label "tactical compromises" - cases in which a politician or party adopts a political platform in order to improve electability (e.g., appealing to the "center" by adopting a more popular policy that goes against the principles of the party, to some extent). In line with this, the character trait of compromise seems unquestionably to be a political virtue, and an important one, at least as long as it does not involve a complete loss of integrity.
My aim in this paper is to suggest that this conception of political compromise is overly simplistic, and that consequently compromise can be a political vice, and not a virtue.
Consider a party that makes a tactical compromise. Nevertheless, it fails to win the elections. However, in adopting the compromise it ceded political ground - important principles - to its rivals, and the whole political map has shifted away from its core values. In the next elections this pattern repeats itself - the party moves towards the center, now further from its core values, and still fails to win the elections. However, the center shifts again. And so on. Eventually, our imaginary party will lose touch with its original values, and cede the political map to its rivals. What this means is that a series of rational and justified compromises can lead to a loss of integrity - to giving up core positions and values.
The problem is not confined to tactical compromises. For example, in Adults in the Room Yannis Varoufakis presents his own account of the events leading to the third Greek debt agreement. According to Varoufakis, his strategy in dealing with debtors was based on the idea that a new debt agreement was preferable to withdrawing from the Euro, which in turn was preferable to the old debt agreement. He believed that the only way to reach a new deal was to credibly threaten to withdraw.
At certain key times of its negotiations over the debt agreement, the Greek government made compromises which seemed rational and almost necessary. Arguably, however, the accumulated of these compromises in committing various political actors to the existing framework is what eventually led to preferring the third option over the second.
The problem is a structural one: under what conditions is compromise a political virtue? it seems that under present political conditions in many democracies - the weakening of political parties, the prevalence of short term considerations, etc. - comprise becomes a political vice, rather than a virtue.
**Filipe, Rui**

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Affiliation: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal  
Presentation: 2-Feb, Session 12, 11h15-13h00

**Short Bio:**

Rui Filipe is master of Philosophy by FLUL (Scholl of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon), with a thesis concerning the anarchist thought of Bakunin. He is a member of the Nucleus of Political Studies (NepUL), place where he now centers his investigations on Anarchism and Marxism.

**Title:** The “Right” of the Radical Left – a Bakuninist approach  
**Keywords:** Radicalism; Compromise; Bakunin; Negation; Dialectics

**Abstract:**

When a radical movement, sometimes with violent dynamics, comes forth in a society, a couple of pertinent questions arrive – Why should a specific group in the whole of a community have a special treatment in the heeding of its calls? Given that a society is composed by a large multitude of groups, every one of them with a different interest and view that binds them, should we not listen to all of them instead of giving privilege to a single one? When facing this question, the attitude and actions of that radical movement seem to be disrespectful to all other groups.

After all, this appears as something intuitive in our democratic societies that value pluralism. If our political reality is composed by a large number of different groups, that find their voice in a great number of political parties with a vast array of ideologies, it’s only necessary that we accommodate all of them in a room where they can talk everything out. Being so, compromise appears as the most important word in the political dictionary.

However, against this common view, which is usually accepted but not questioned, we can summon the testimony of Bakunin. In his youth text – The Reaction in Germany [Die Reaktion in Deutschland] – the compromising frame of mind of politics finds itself put into question in its very foundations. By trying, in accordance to a young Hegelian agenda, on the German Annals, to defend the legitimacy of a radical movement, all of these themes come into play.

My intention in this presentation is to follow the arguments developed by Bakunin in this effort. With this purpose, first of all, it will be shown how the negative element plays a major role in Bakunin’s reading of the Hegelian dialectic. Such a view leads to a dialectical process where there is no Hegelian sublation [Aufhebung], but only a victory of the negative. This will be the cornerstone of Bakunin’s reasoning.

By taking this stance, the compromising and the radical perspective won’t have an equal standing. Only the second expresses the negative element that, while seeking to transform existing reality, opens up a new form of freedom. The compromising side, here, will always have a somewhat conservative tendency. By defending compromise, it will try to maintain the very background (social, political and economical), where it occurs, something that a radical movement doesn’t accept. In other words, only the radical tendency can bring forth a really new framework for society. The compromising one, even when defending some changes, will always try to channel the internal movements of society through a somewhat fixed frame of institutions and economical systems.
In the end, this will bring back the first question again. A radical movement might be currently only a specific group against others. However, it finds itself with a course of action that wants to transform the whole of society in a manner where freedom becomes a right for everyone, and not only a privilege of a few.
Garcia, Vivien
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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 12, 11h15-13h00

Short Bio:
Phd in philosophy — Prize-winner Prix de thèse de L’Université Grenoble Alpes, 2016 — Research associate Université de Grenoble

Title: A Politics without Compromise: The Young Hegelians and Politics
Keywords: Young Hegelianism, Hegel, dialectics, mediation, compromise

Abstract:
For a long time, the Young Hegelian movement has been considered as an epiphenomenon in the history of the Hegelian school — and in the history of ideas in general. Fortunately, an increasing number of recent studies have revealed the great interest of the Young Hegelian reflections and demonstrated their relevance in order to understand the political modernity and, consequently, our present political condition. As Jürgen Habermas puts it in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: “Today the situation of consciousness still remains the one brought about by the Young Hegelians. [...] And the triumphant gestures of mutually surpassing one another, in which we gladly overlook the fact that remain contemporaries of the Young Hegelians, have also been in currency since then. Hegel inaugurated the discourse of modernity; the Young Hegelians permanently established it, that is, they freed the idea of a critique nourished on the spirit of modernity from the burden of the Hegelian concept of reason” (Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lecture, trans. Frederick Lawrence, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990, p. 53.). My contribution will question some aspects of their political framework.

One of its core elements is the rejection of all forms of compromise. For the Young Hegelians, that notion is anti-dialectical. It implicates the adoption of a median position which does not correspond with a real mediation. It is rather related to tepidity and mediocrity. It is a way of deflating conflicts and, more precisely, to avoid the oppositions at work in history being unveiled in their purity. In other words, compromise is inconsistent and inconsequential, it is just a manner of preserving the status quo. A compromise is never a picking up, it can not reach any form of universality. From a(n) (Young) Hegelian point of view, the problem with such a gesture is that it presupposes that the opposites are equal in right. It is true that both are unilateral — and that none of them, as such, can claim that it is fully universal — but one of them is preponderant because it can bring to universality: the negative.

In addition to presenting this theoretical perspective, this contribution would aim at exploring the various Young Hegelians understandings of what is to be radical in politics. Their movement was born of a succession of radicalisations, starting from the controversies inside the Hegelian school about the status of religion in Hegel’s philosophy, they defend and refine a criticism of religion that is gradually translated into a political criticism (and in a criticism of politics then). As such, the Young Hegelians try to define forms of radicalism that do not renew a kind of dogmatism nor they are fanatical. But how can they be assured that they do not recreate what they oppose? How can a radical politics not be a politics of hate? And can this kind of politics be relevant for nowadays?
Gavran Miloš, Ana (& Zelič, Nebojša)

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 8, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:
Ana Gavran Miloš received her PhD degree in philosophy in 2010. From 2016 she works as Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka. Her field of interests is ancient philosophy and epistemology, with a special focus on Epicurean epistemology and ancient moral theory.

Title: Civic Friendship as Compromise
Keywords: civic friendship, compromise, well-being, care for others, trust

Abstract:
Our aim in this paper is to explore the relationship between an individual person and political community by focusing on well-being understood as human flourishing. More precisely, the question we are interested in is how to fit the interests of others in the pursuit of one's own good, that is, how to reconcile selfish aspiration for one's own good with the others-concern. By person's own good here we understand also a pursuit of her idea of ideal society. It is inevitable that any kind of social cooperation in plural society will end up in some kind of compromise understood as giving up a part of ideal for the sake of others. The theoretical problem which arises is whether these kinds of compromises can realize certain kind of valuable political relation that is worth pursuing?

We believe that the solution for this problem can be found in Aristotle's notion of political or civic friendship. Aristotelian notion of civic friendship as we understand it is characterized by the following features: basic concern for others (basic volitional attitude that does not depend on any kind of list of admirable qualities or shared beliefs); relational equality (equality of status, absence of hierarchy and marginalization); social trust (generalized trust; based on imperfect information about the behaviour of others where we lack mechanism of assurance); practical doing for others (contributing to well-being of others through various social networks and associations). These characteristics should be realized through common political institutions. A society built upon the notion of civic friendship will provide stability and social cohesion which are the values that go far beyond the value of individual well-being motivated only by instrumental rationality. This explains why concern for others becomes an integrative part of our own well-being.

We want to claim that such a concept of civic friendship is a normative framework which is not some particular political ideal but itself is a compromise understood as giving up on my own interest for the sake of others. Since it refers to a relation among citizens in a plural community it should not be based on any particular identity such as religion or ethnicity, but on the relations among citizens through shared institutions of political community. Civic friends thus differ in their comprehensive doctrines of good and in their visions of ideal society but are motivated with the same goal: to live in a society that provides for each member to achieve life worth of human dignity and as such serves as a precondition to avoid making rotten compromises.
Gilabert, Fernando

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 11, 11h15-13h00

Short Bio:

Title: das-Manocracy  
Keywords: Heidegger-Politic-das Man-democracy

Abstract:
Our idea is to expose the concept of democratic society within the political thinking of Martin Heidegger. For that, the key concept that we will work will be exposed in Sein und Zeit under the name of das Man (the One, the impersonal). This impersonal das Man refers to the state in which Dasein is fallen into daily life because, as Heidegger points out, that fallen world in the quotidian belongs to the impropriety of Das ein. Faced with this impropriety, the analytics that develops Heidegger in Sein und Zeit has a mission to take back the own character, authentic, of Dasein. Heidegger’s method of resurrecting the Dasein property is through the understanding of the factual life, especially on the basis of temporality, which is what conditions the affections of factual Dasein.

Our world is the world of democracy, we live in a society that is politically governed by the system I call late-parliamentarism. This system late-parliamentary breaks with the etimological conception of democracy since it's not forged in the people, in folk, in δεμος, but in society, in which dominate non-political elements such as economics or morality, so that democratic sovereignty is in question. Society is the one that governs the modern state, which is transformed in the present time into a bureaucratic machinery that legislates the late-parliamentarism by dint of law, having no place for a real sovereignty of the people. This state-machine is the world of das Man.

Human coexistence is regulated in this das Man. Faced with the pretensions of Modernity, there is not a pure subject, but it takes the form of plurality. But in doing so, it takes the form of impersonality, because it’s the others who determine us with their actions, and those actions the coexistence is determined. That is why this indeterminate das Man is the one who determines and governs us, that is, there is no self-governance of oneself, but in political coexistence we are always somehow dominated by others but in political coexistence we are always somehow dominated by others. This self is scattered in the das Man and must find. The impropriety of daily life is what defines the primary character of existence, but it involves a cover-up of the world which lead to a escape from himself. In late-parliamentarism, this escape is what determines life in the public sphere. This results in failure of democracy the failure of democracy because to the factor of inauthenticity that pervades the lives of citizens. A true and authentic democracy would then have to pass through the filter of an authentic citizenship.
Groot, Eveline

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Affiliation: PhD Candidate Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands
Presentation: 2-Feb, Session 14, 14h30-16h30

Short Bio:
As a PhD Candidate at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Eveline Groot works on the philosophical implications of the work of Mme de Staël. She is also coordinator of the annual Month of Philosophy in the Netherlands.

Title: De Staël – Uniting Heart and Reason
Keywords: Public opinion, Moderate Liberalism, French Revolution, Sentiments

Abstract:
If there is one woman who lived through radical political times and tried to find compromises, it was Mme de Staël (1766 – 1817). De Staël lived through multiple political transitions – from the Ancien Régime to the French Revolution, the period of Terror, the Dictoire, the reign of Napoleon and the restoration of the Bourbon-monarchy – and suffered many personal losses. As the daughter of Jacques Necker, the Director-General of Finance under King Louis XVI of France, she belonged to the French elite and was a friend of Constitutionalists.

Without taking part in the democratic faction of the revolutionary days, and remaining loyal to the aristocracy, De Staël was nevertheless drawn towards liberal and cosmopolitan ideas. Together with Benjamin Constant, she is responsible for the development of French moderate liberalism. During her lifetime, De Staël worked on different aspects of her moderate liberalist theory, inspired by a plethora of sources: from enlightened thinkers as Rousseau to the middle European ideas of the Early Germany Romanticists. Rousseau has been seen as one of the thinkers who inspired the Terror movement, yet he is also regarded as a thinker who brought sense to the idea of political rights, stirred the people’s hearts and promoted independent spirits. De Staël emphasises the importance of ‘Rousseau the sentimentalist’. However, this does not entail that ‘Rousseau the rationalist’ is secluded. De Staël relates the sentiments to the rational faculties. In her De l’influence des passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations, she tries to develop a new way of thinking about immersive disruptive historical events like the French Revolution. She claims that it is not sufficient to understand the horrors rationally, the sentiments need to be addressed as well.

De Staël was convinced that a synthesis between the French and German tradition, uniting sense and reason, would not only suit her theories on freedom of thought, politics and religion, and literary engagement, but might also be applied to political reality itself: the esprit public. This point of view makes De Staël the first thinker to analyse the position of the passions in the development of the public opinion. Politics is not a purely rational matter, existing of only a set of rules and ideas. The stirring of the emotions, the existence of different expectations, as well as resentment and frustrations are equally important.

Being a woman of aristocracy, a woman of the world, and a woman as such, De Staël is a woman of compromises in many ways. Both her philosophical and political views can be regarded as an attempt to unite different traditions in order to develop a new theory. By assigning power to a representative government of the elite, that would be based on political rights, popular sovereignty, and private property,
as worked out in Des circonstances actuelles, her political theory was based on moderation. By working towards a naturalistic scientific model of politics, her model would also allow political passions to be taken into account. The question is whether her compromising method of moderation did not have radical implications in the end.
Huang, Chia-Hung
Country: Taiwan
Email: ch13852@bristol.ac.uk
Affiliation: Political Philosophy, esp. on secession, United Kingdom
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 4, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:
Studying PhD at university of Bristol, with Christopher Bertram. I have broad interests in moral and political philosophical issues although I wrote my MA dissertation on civil disobedience and I am now doing the research on a philosophical account of secession.

Title: A meaningful-wise account of political freedom and its implication for politics
Keywords: political freedom, meaningfulness, natural and social being, legitimation of state violence, disobedience

Abstract:
A Meaning-Wise Account of Political Freedom and Its Implication for Politics
1. It is an account of political freedom centring around why political freedom is meaningful for human beings and in what sense we need it. I start with a biological account of freedom based upon what sort of species we are and then subsequently contemplate what moral implication this non-moral account would imply.
2. Yet it doesn’t say this account is absolute or prior to other plausible accounts of political freedom.
3. I shall argue that without this account our understanding of political freedom is neither comprehensive nor convincing if we expect an action-guiding theory from political philosophy.
4. The framework of the account:
   • The freedom is political because it is a sort of freedom necessary for fixing political disruption and justifying the legitimation of state violence. This kind of freedom contains meaningfulness as it represents the necessary condition of bargaining power for groups and individuals in political realm. Mankind needs such a freedom for pursuing a meaningful life.
   • Human species comprises two beings, i.e. natural and social being, because we are a species between solitary and eusocial, both of which have no political freedom, or don’t desire the freedom as a meaningful pursuit.
   • Human as natural being means an individual by nature pursues the fulfilment of basic needs, personal preferences, and cherished values. Human as social being refers to the entity by which an individual is developed into certain social positions, and its behaviour is motivated by strengthening those social positions. Moreover, a given social position is attached to its relevant group(s), and the consolidation of a social position relies on the prosperity of relevant groups, namely the fulfilment of such group interests.
   • Political freedom is meaningless for an individual if its interests as natural being correspond to the interests as social being. There’s no gap between the two entities.
   • Political freedom is meaningful if the gap emerges as the conflict between the two beings. Under this situation, the freedom is called for the holding of or increase in bargaining power. In other words, for the two beings’ interests overlap, one necessarily demands a meaningful-wise account of political freedom.
   • The gap between entities occasionally appears and yet can never be nullified.
Someone feels free (in the negative sense) iff it doesn’t need political freedom, i.e. political freedom is meaningless to it. By contrast, someone doesn’t feel free iff it demands the political freedom for setting it free to grasp the political bargain.

5. The Implication

• The account needs any moral value reconciling the perpetual conflict by the gap. Yet this value is determined contextually or even arbitrarily.
• If the modern state is an impartial arbiter, it has the duty, in terms of policy-making, to prioritise the people having the greatest gap. Its violence is legitimate and just in such prioritisation.
• It is social being bearing ideologies and group interests by which the natural being would be suppressed. To liberalise such suppression, disobedience is justified.
**Huk, Marta Z.**

Country: Poland  
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Affiliation: Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland  
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 7, 17h00-18h30

**Short Bio:**  
Marta Z. Huk is a Ph.D. candidate in the Chair of Public Philosophy and Philosophy of Law in Institute of Philosophy at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland). She graduated cum laude in philosophy (2014). Currently, her main research area remains deliberative political philosophy and philosophy of law.

**Title:** How to compromise adversary and unitary institutions?  
**Keywords:** adversary democracy, unitary democracy, Jane Mansbridge, democratic legitimacy

**Abstract:**  
This paper aims to demonstrate, according to Jane Mansbridge`s concept contained in `Beyond Adversary Democracy`, that in order to gain and maintain its legitimacy, a democratic system ought to compromise and use both adversary and unitary institutions. Every time, when society becomes uncertain about the legitimacy of specific democratic institutions, occurs the discussion concerning the possibility of reorganizing those institutions in such way, so their new shape could fully reflect beliefs of the widest part of society. In practice, this process of democratizing public life should begin with realization that, beyond particular and often conflicting, there is a common interest of citizens. Understood as Hegelian thesis and antithesis, both sides of participatory democracy can be shaped into separated, yet not contradictory models. On the national level, democratic system should be adversary with the elements of reflexive unitary justification, however smaller parts of social reality must be primarily unitary. In other words, legitimized democratic procedures ought to adopt those solutions, which are essential for adversary model of conflicting interests, as well as unitary model of common interest. In my presentation, I will focus on showing how particular categories, such as equality, decision-making processes and type of social involvement need to be interpreted so they could fit Mansbridge`s distinction and create a specific compromise on the grounds of participatory democracy.
Kumankov, Arseniy

Country: Russia
Email: akumankov@hse.ru
Affiliation: National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 6, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio:
I work on moral and political philosophy as well as the history of philosophy, specializing on different aspects of just war theory and critique of violence. I lecture at National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow Russia) and The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, where I have courses on philosophy of war, social philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy of violence. Besides, I am an academic supervisor of the master programme “Philosophy and History of Religion” and co-director of Philosophy of War Research Group.

Title: Notions of Compromise and Alliance in the Political Rhetoric of Modern Russia
Keywords: compromise, alliance, terrorism, Russia, political realism

Abstract:
The ethical framework of the Russian politics in the beginning of 21st century is shaped by the political realism. Realpolitik approach is clearly visible if we analyze the language adopted by the key figures of the Russian government: they usually use rhetoric of national sovereignty, traditional values, national interest as well as special path of Russia. They are widely used as a tool for constructing national identity and Russia’s own ideology. The one who uses these words in his or her political speech usually intends to ground independence and self-sufficiency of Russia. It could be concluded that the general line of the Russian policy tends to autonomy. And that is generally true, a high degree of autonomy in political decision making is perceived to be one of the most valuable qualities from the Kremlin’s point of view.

However, autonomy does not imply isolationism or exit from the political dialogue and deafness to the alternative arguments of other political actors. In my speech I would like to demonstrate that despite the stepping stone of the official language in Russia is political realism the idea of compromise remains significant for the Russian politics. This becomes particularly noticeable in discussion on global terrorism that threats Russia in the same degree as the western countries. Moral criticism of terrorism by the Russian politicians is usually stresses that terrorism is the most dangerous threat to the whole world and to humankind itself. And since this threat is common for the whole western world Russia could pose itself as member of desired counterterrorism coalition. Russia self-identifies as one of the first country that met modern terrorism, suffered from it and started fighting it. This identification of Russia as a long-standing participant of war on terror is not simply a historical consideration. This is a political argument — Russia has a moral right to fight terror, consequently, the world powers should pay attention to the position of Russia and point of view of its rulers. This is a very important aspect of international affairs for the key Russian politics (president, patriarch, chief of security service) who constantly repeat that only counterterrorist alliance could help in struggling terrorism and Russia must play a leading role in such an alliance.

Claiming that terrorism is wrong and dangerous because it threatens security of a state, undermines its stability, political sovereignty and authority Russian officials designate a field for possible cooperation with the west. But in the same time they share a very specific notion of compromise.
The official authorities of Russia would like to make an alliance or partnership with the west, but one that does not imply the need to discuss with the allies internal affairs and the principles of their conduct. The compromise is perceived as an important element of economic interaction or an instrument of world politics aimed at solving common problems facing the Western world. But it does not presuppose the need to change Russia's own political system, assuming the political values of Western partners.
Langella, Simona

Country: Italy
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Affiliation: Università di Genova, Italy
Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 10, 09h30-11h00

Short Bio:
Simona Langella: se ha licenciado en 1992 en Filosofía en la Università degli Studi di Genova, obtuvo en 1994 la Licenciatura en la Universidad de Salamanca y el PhD en Filosofía en 2001 en el Ateneo genovés. Titular de investigación y dos veces becaria Marie Curie, actualmente es profesora titular de Historia de la Filosofía Moderna, Introducción a la Historia de la Filosofía, Filosofías de el Renacimiento.

Title: El ius gentium: instrumento de paz y solucionador de conflictos en los escolásticos españoles del siglo XVI
Keywords: ius gentium, ius belli, pax

Abstract:
El ius gentium: instrumento de paz y solucionador de conflictos en los escolásticos españoles del siglo XVI
Se analizará, en los principales autores de la escolástica española del siglo XVI, cómo el ius gentium, a partir del descubrimiento de América, llega a ser especialmente un instrumento para resolver posibles conflictos y para establecer y reforzar la paz entre las naciones. En particular, se examinará su papel en el pensamiento de Francisco de Vitoria y cómo, precisamente en relación con la defensa de los indios, él no lo pondrá–a partir de 1539– ya bajo el derecho positivo, sino directamente bajo el natural. Anteriormente, en su comentario a la Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 57, a. 3, del año 1535, Vitoria incluía el ius gentium en el ámbito del derecho positivo. En ese lugar, en efecto, después de haber anticipado que «quia omne aliud ius a iure naturali, est positivum. Dicitur enim positivum quia est ex aliquo beneplacito» , afirmaba que el «ius gentium potius debet reponi sub iure positivo quam sub iure naturali» . Su inclinación, como comentador de santo Tomás, hacia una concepción del ius gentium como derecho positivo se explica más como una reacción a la definición propuesta por los juristas, que como una firme posición teórica que, por el contrario, llevará a cumplimiento solo con la relectio De indis , poniendo el ius gentium bajo el ius naturale. Efectivamente, con una visión del derecho de gentes meramente positiva la relectio de 1539 habría perdido su carácter de denuncia en relación con las injusticias que se estaban perpetrando en las tierras de Ultramar y los indios habrían quedado igualmente abandonados a la avidez y a merced de los conquistadores españoles.
Se pasará, después, a examinar cuál fue la postura de Francisco Suárez en este aspecto, para determinar cómo su pensamiento es más incisivo, por lo que respecta a presentar un perfil de un nuevo derecho internacional, aunque su postura, remontándose a la fundación del ius gentium en los usos y costumbres de los pueblos y, por eso, en última instancia, al derecho positivo, presenta una dificultad en relación con la justificación del carácter de universalidad por el mismo atribuido al derecho de gentes . Además, se mostrará también la continuidad entres estos dos pensadores respecto a las fuentes teológicas, filosóficas y jurídicas citadas, aunque su uso en algunos casos los llevará a soluciones diferentes.
Madigan, Patrick
Country: United States
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Affiliation: Heythrop College, Kensington Sq, London W8 5HQ, UK, United Kingdom
Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 13, 14h30-16h30

Short Bio:
I received my Ph. D. in Philosophy from Tulane University in New Orleans, USA, in 1972. I have taught at institutions around the world and published five books. My particular interest is intellectual history, or the history of ideas. I am currently the editor of The Heythrop Journal

Title: Expressive Individualism, the Cult of the Artist as ‘Genius’, and Milton’s Lucifer
Keywords: Expressive Individualism, Genius, Romanticism, Milton

Abstract:
I propose an ‘intellectual genealogy’ of the widespread contemporary lifestyle called ‘expressive individualism’, tracing it back first to the cult of the artist as genius, which flourished during the 19th century, but which has been democritized and universalized in our day. I then trace it back one step further, somewhat surprisingly, to the altered depiction of Lucifer John Milton gives in his poem Paradise Lost. Milton’s Lucifer rejects not only Jesus as the highest creature, he rejects the Father as father; he announces ‘I know none before me; I am self-begot.’ To the extent that we embrace the ethic of ‘expressive individualism’, we are implicitly committed to Milton’s Lucifer as an archetype for human fulfillment, which I suggest, however, is a toxic model.
Magni, Beatrice

Country: Italy  
Email: beatrice.magni@unimi.it  
Affiliation: University of Milan, Italy  
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 3, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:  
Born in 1970, she holds a BA degree in Political Sciences from the University of Milan, an MPhil in Political Philosophy from the EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) of Paris, and a PhD in Political Studies from the University of Paris VII. She is Assistant Professor since 2009 at the University of Milan, where she teaches Political Philosophy, Bioethics, Theories of Equality.  
Her research interests are in political theory, theories of justice, political realism.

Title: Compromise and/or Integrity?  
Keywords: Compromise, Disagreement, Integrity, Pragmatism, Reconciliation, Hypocrisy

Abstract:  
In classic compromise, parties make a strategic calculation that a sacrifice of some their commitments is the best tactic to advance their other values and interests over their current positions.  
But if we try to figure a compromise as a way to get to agreements that – firstly – can minimize harm and promote mutual respect between individuals, and secondly could increase the level of cooperation between them, we can consider a compromise shaped in that way as an agreement that can translate at its best some of the individual’s deliberative ideals, as fairness, mutual respect, and equality of opportunity, in order to influence the outcomes of the agreement. This kind of compromise will be different from simple negotiation, and more demanding to each one of the parties. It will require first and foremost a reciprocal recognition of moral fairness.  
But when and how real people locked in conflict are at times willing to revise and relinquish some their desires—be they material interests and/or matters of principled concern—for reasons of mutual respect, community, and other kinds of higher-order moral, political, and procedural ends? Can we ever compromise on matters of ethical principle without compromising our integrity? And can men and women who value their integrity commit themselves to the vocation of politics if, as a matter of course, it requires compromise on ethical issues? The paper aims to propose an answer to those questions, firstly considering the normative evolution of the idea of integrity, and, secondly, investigating – in a very brief analysis - what public role integrity and hypocrisy can and should precisely play in politics, and how individuals can preserve the former and to incorporate the latter in the constitution of a public framework. An overall conclusion is that – once integrity and hypocrisy are redefined as consistent concepts in politics – compromise is positively related to the reliability of an individual and the accountability of an institution. Consequently, compromise and integrity can not only stand side by side, but also they can and should work together to face the challenges of our societies.
Marras, Martina

Country: Italy
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Affiliation: University of Cagliari, Italy
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 3, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:
I'm a PhD student in Philosophy, Epistemology, and History of Culture at the University of Cagliari. My field of study is political philosophy, in particular contract theory, theories of justice and feminism. At the moment, my research focuses on Jean Hampton and her feminism contractarianism.

Title: Pluralism and conflict. What does the idea of overlapping consensus teach us?
Keywords: pluralism, consensus, contract, negotiation, Rawls

Abstract:
Inspired by Rousseau’s idea that we must consider “men as they are and the laws as they may be”, John Rawls, who may be perhaps the greatest contemporary political philosopher, sets out his theory as a realistic utopia. If we consider politics as the art of the possible, we must seek a reasonable and extended agreement. Surely the agreement should be the result of compromises and negotiations. However how is it possible that such different “and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” (J. Rawls, Political Liberalism) can find a mediation? Rawls’ well known answer is that the basis of that agreement cannot have a moral nature, but it has to result by a political process.

In a time of crisis, I believe the notion of overlapping consensus has a lot to teach us. No normative theory can provide a concrete solution to our most pressing problems, but it can, at any rate, show the way towards which we should turn our gaze. The aim of my statement is that a careful reflection on a political instrument, such as the Rawlsian overlapping consensus, can meet this demand at least in some part. Societies must reflect on the need to define their own foundation unambiguously, which must be largely shared. Clearly one must admit that a certain degree of morality cannot ultimately be excluded from any political conception, but the effort must be in establishing a minimum of principles that would enable plural identities and different conceptions of the good to live together, under equal conditions for everyone.

The separation between morality and politics becomes even more necessary if we consider the theme of pluralism to be significant. How could it be possible to find a compromise solution while dealing with radicalism and taking seriously the variability of conceptions of good? The overlapping consensus does not want to be solely a modus vivendi, but a real political instrument which, leveraging the notion of reasonability, applies the principles of justice at political level, upon which there is at least the wider imaginable consensus. The political challenge of our century should be to identify a common ground in which there is a true and utterly broad agreement, independent from our divergences, but through which all our differences are legitimate to exist within the limits of respect and reasonableness. Looking back on the traces of John Rawls, I would like to outline the importance of the concept of reasonable overlapping consensus in mediation between “radicalism” and “compromise”.
Medina, José Luis Ventura

Country: Venezuela
Email: josventu@ucm.es
Affiliation: Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 4, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:
Former Professor of Philosophy at the Central University of Venezuela.
Bachelor in Philosophy, Magister in logic and philosophy of science, and PhD in Management. Currently doing PhD in Philosophy at the Complutense University of Madrid.

Title: Group polarization’s biases in populist politics.
Keywords: Populism, biases, group polarization, deliberation, rumors.

Abstract:
In our reading of populism from the perspective of cognitive biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), we agree with different theoretical proposals (Canovan 1981), (Di Tella 2010), (Laclau 2007), which assume that one of its characteristic elements is the polarization of groups. In this paper we look at the nature of group polarization, the underlying cognitive biases (Sunstein, 2011) and how they are used in populist politics.

We first look at the sources of information that feed group polarization, that is, deliberation and rumors. We examine the nature of both sources of information and how citizens process, both the lack of information, and the excess of it. This is crucial in political terms because democracy implies the tolerance of different opinions and ideas, the question is how we discriminate the different information we receive through different means, especially when there are no elements to contrast if the information is valid or not. We devote special attention to information that promotes emotions such as fear and hope, and how they help to polarization.

Second, we examine the biases that underlie the way we process information and enable our tendency to radicalize. In this sense we examine the biased assimilation, which makes it possible to interpret the information in a way that confirms our own beliefs and interest and the Attitude polarization, which leads us to radicalize and combat contrary ideas.

Finally, we show how these biases have been used to feed populist politics. To examine some examples of these mechanisms in the Venezuelan policy of socialism of the 21st century (Brading 2012).
Molnar, Attila Karoly

Country: Hungary
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Affiliation: Eötvös University / Thomas Molnar Institute for Advanced Studies, Hungary
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 1, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio:
Attila K. Molnar (1961) a historian of ideas, Assistant Professor of the Eötvös University (Budapest) and the director of the Thomas Molnar Institute for Advanced Studies (Budapest). His main interest is the history of social and political thought with special reference to religion, he has published nine books and edited many others.

Title: The philosopher and the politician: dealing with the potentials of justice
Keywords: Plato, Morus, political epistemology, humility, heroism

Abstract:
Although one may read in Plato’s Alcibiades I. that just things are expedient and ignorance is a cause of evils, his cave metaphor and the scandal caused by the returning philosopher problematized the relationship of justice and the existing political order. The returning (transgressing) philosopher talking about justice may demolish order and peace, stirring irrational emotions.
So, speaking about justice and acting in the name of justice, although it usually aims peace and harmony, violent actions in the original sense of the world [violare] and usually causes more violence.
So, the dilemma is very political, this-worldly dangers may come from both the loss of transcendental measures of humans and human relations, and also from the penetration of transcendental claims into this-worldly affairs. Without transcendental measures – like the idea of justice, liberty, etc. -, how would people be able to realize whether their order is good, just and free or not? While transcendental claims mean obvious danger for existing immanent order, it may sink into tyranny without these measures. The mentioned transcendental ideas and the mess generated usually by them seem to be the very core of the European tradition and the one potential explanation of its dynamic.
Ambiguity of crossing the boundaries is a characteristic dilemma of our tradition, and there no certain measure or method can be seen to solve this ambiguity, to separate pure chaos from perfect order and eternal peace. The yearning for a world beyond politics – containing conflicts, decision and enforcement – is self-destructive.
Political Modernism hoped and aimed to form social relations. Politically Modern means the hope that people is able to take into their hands their own life, they will be our own masters, human condition can be completely understood and controlled. Consequently, anything resists human understanding and control – because it is opaque and unintelligible – is arbitrary and oppressive. Moderns are rationalist because they are not able to accept piety: the sense that humans must trust something what is out of their control.
The acceptance of this human condition requires humility, a basic attitude of religion. And tranquility is fleeting at best, human beings are not rocks. Conflict and instability are perennial possibilities.
Because of the unforeseen and often unpleasant consequences, understanding the human condition contains a piety toward the human world: an acceptance of its fuzziness and that our knowledge of human world is rather limited.
Pointing to the imperfect nature of political epistemology involves the tragic view of political action and the morally absurd nature of human condition. The non-rational and non-knowable nature of human world involves the necessary imperfection of politics. The famous dialogue – between the Platonist philosopher and More, the politician – in the first book of Morus’ Utopia ended by More statement on his heroic interpretation of responsible and wise politician who tries to do his best on the stormy sea.
Overeem, Patrick
Country: Netherlands
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Affiliation: assistant professor in political theory, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 1, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio:
Dr. P. (Patrick) Overeem is a tenured assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the Vrije Universiteit (VU) in Amsterdam. He specializes in normative political theory, in particular the ethics of political practice. Patrick has won an Early Career Fellowship of the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF) for his research project "Compromise with Character: An Integrated Framework to Assess the Moral Quality of Political Compromises". He has recently published on statesmanship, value pluralism, Aristotle's concept of the 'politikos', and political compromises.

Title: Aristotle and Good Compromise-Making
Keywords: (Political) compromise, Aristotle, virtues, golden mean, moral corruption

Abstract:
Compromises are part and parcel of life, particularly public life. In recent years, moral and political philosophers have paid increasing attention to the ethics of compromise-making. Their discussions, however, mostly concern the question whether particular compromises are justifiable or not, rather than the question how one can make compromises well. But if compromises must be made in (public) life, as (I assume) they occasionally must, it is an important question how one can 'give in with integrity', that is to say, virtuously. So far, virtue-ethical theorizing about compromises is scarce; most work on compromises is deontological or consequentialist. Yet, since virtue ethics is arguably more situation-sensitive than the other two, it is potentially more helpful to assess the often complex casuistry of compromises. In order to contribute to this alternative approach towards compromise, this paper goes back to Aristotle’s moral and political thought as the fons et origo of most contemporary virtue ethics. In the paper, I will first of all inquire why the notion of ‘compromise’ as such seems to be lacking, or perhaps implicit, in Aristotle’s thought: what is it, actually, that makes ‘compromise’ an apparently modern rather than a premodern notion? Next, I examine (more positively) to what extent Aristotle’s moral and political thought can nevertheless be seen as providing a theory of compromise and how he clearly wrestles with what we regard as problems of compromise. Concrete examples from the Politics (e.g., those concerning class relations and distributive justice) will be discussed to illustrate this. Thirdly, and more specifically, I will concentrate on two clusters of concepts from the Nicomachean Ethics in particular, namely those concerning ‘the golden mean’ (the metron) and those concerning ‘virtue’ (arête), in particular the virtues of moderation (sophrosyne) and prudence (phronesis). Although in a sense Aristotle’s thinking about these concepts centers around problems of compromise, it will turn out that none of them has a simple and straightforward relationship with compromise: both the golden mean and the virtues are too morally outstanding (too ‘uncompromising’ in a way) to be equated with sheer compromise and compromise-readiness, respectively. Hence, their more complex relationship with compromise will be investigated. Fourthly and lastly, I discuss one further complication which is often overlooked in present-day thinking about compromises but which is very important for any virtue-ethical approach, namely the point that not only certain virtues may be required to strike good compromises, but also that, reversely, compromise-making can have an impact on those same virtues. Whoever engages in
compromise-making, inevitably shapes and possibly corrupts his/her moral character. I will investigate how this problem emerges in Aristotle’s ethical thought as well and how he thinks the ‘politikos’ (and the polis as a whole) can deal with it. Through these four steps, and drawing on Aristotle’s own writings as well as on recent secondary work, the paper ultimately aims to assess to what extent Aristotle’s moral and political thought can contribute to a better understanding of good compromise-making.
Title: Socrates’ Confronting with Callicles In the Gorgias : Not For a Fight but for a Compromise
Keywords: Plato's Gorgias, Socrates, Callicles, Compromise, True Art of Politics

Abstract:
Socrates’ confrontation with Callicles in the Gorgias is often understood an outright rejection of rhetoric for the sake of Socratic philosophy. Socrates' presence at Callicles’s is also understood as to show the primacy of Socrates' philosophical life over Callicles's political life. However, the deeper meaning of the confrontation remains unknown, since Socrates’ intention to visit Callicles’s was not fully uncovered. In particular, Socrates shows no sign of compromise in the conversation with Callicles. While Callicles ridicules a potential philosopher for the helplessness in defending himself from the threat of those with political power, Socrates still declares that he is the singular practitioner of true art of politics. Socrates’ encounter with Callicles seems to have no effect on Callicles’s way of life. Should Callicles had been such a stubborn villain, why would Socrates care to visit Callicles’s house and converse with him? Would it have not been better for Socrates to converse with other corrigible citizens in the marketplace and the street?

Through a close examination of the conversation between Socrates and Callicles, this paper reinterprets the meaning of the confrontation and suggests that Plato does not intend a fight against politics but a compromise with it. First, the paper examines the dramatic setting of Callicles’s house where different groups gathered with varying motivations based on their attitudes toward life and the world. The first group are those seeking the manipulative rhetoric with an expectation of taking power in the future. The second group are those wanting to use rhetoric as a neutral tool to practice politics for the sake of advancing the common good. The third is Socrates’ group. In fact, Socrates takes advantage of Callicles’s challenge as a chance to address his message to different groups.

On the surface, Socrates seems uncompromising as he rejects any rhetoric and presents a rigorous standard for true art of politics. Yet, by no means would naïve Socrates have known that a true politician is helpless before the political persecution. Nevertheless, he rejects even the beneficent politicians like Pericles. While this makes Socrates look more uncompromising, it is notable that Socrates’ censure of Pericles is not based on Pericles’s contribution to the common good but on the excessive praise of him. Here Socrates makes a compromise. Socrates admits that the production of the common good is an indispensable political end. Yet, he warns that the excessive praising of it, as if it were the highest end of politics, would result in political corruption. The praising of material goods, even if for the common good, could unwittingly
slide into the pursuit of private interests. Socrates posits that the true art of politics is to make people better regarding the soul-care and, whether practical or not, should remain the highest goal of politics. This paper argues that Socrates' compromise is not to merely secure the common good but to set the highest goal of politics in a safer political environment. From this perspective, the paper concludes that Socrates’ compromise prevents political corruption and inspires those in the existing political dynamics to take up the true art of politics.
Pavlic, Goran
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Affiliation: University of Zagreb, Croatia
Presentation: 2-Feb, Session 13, 14h30-16h30

Short Bio:
Postdoctoral researcher at the Academy of Dramatic Art, University of Zagreb. Main fields of interest:

Title: On Political Intransigence: From Aeschylus to Sophocles
Keywords: intransigence, irrationality, Aeschylus, Sophocles, drama

Abstract:
In his famous study The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966 [1945]) Popper stresses a significant distinction between historicism and social engineering. While the latter, in both its forms – utopian and piecemeal – relies to some degree on “the application of the critical and rational methods of science to the problems of the open society”, historicism conceives of politics as a sort of evolutionary unfolding where everything is always already predetermined, and individual human agency is significantly hindered or annulled. Popper decries such a perspective due to its rigid fatalistic approach, and its inability to distinguish scientific prediction from historical prophecy, as distinctive tools of political deliberation. Thus, historicism (later to be elaborated in Poverty of Historicism) stands for “science” of immutable historical tendencies, where prophecy serves as a basic “method” of political epistemology. In such a perspective, historicism principally departs from rational deliberation on the meaning and aims of political action.

In his analysis of Plato’s position, Popper acknowledges both tendencies present in different parts of Plato’s oeuvre, and goes on to illuminate the controversies of such a position within Greek culture, and its consequences for European history.

Looking back into Ancient Greece, more precisely Athens, 6th and 5th century BCE, along philosophical treatises on this issue we may find two ostensibly opposite stances, expressed in two masterpieces of Western drama. Aeschylus’ trilogy Oresteia deals scrupulously with gradual political transformation, whereby reason and meticulous deliberation serve as the most appropriate tools for attaining highest political Good. On the other hand, Sophocles shows, most notably in his Oedipus the King and Antigone, where does the intransigent rationalization of political mores lead a community.

Drawing on insights from Plato’s Ion, Toscano’s (2017) analysis of fanaticism, and Menke’s (2011, 2008) evaluation of political intransigence in dramatic narratives, I’ll try to demonstrate in what ways, if at all, a political irrationality can be de-pathologized. Or, to be more precise, is it possible to speak of political irrationality beyond the personal folly and madness, and make it accountable within parameters of rational discussion? And what would be the role of drama in such an endeavor?

To paraphrase a problem in Else’s (1965) fashion: if tragedy does not have any relation to Dionysus – (among others) the god of ritual madness and ecstasy – is the dramatic discourse the privileged realm of rationality, and as such the constitutive place of Western political culture?
Petrilli, Raffaella
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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 5, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio:

Title: The language of radicalism
Keywords: political language, argumentation, post-truth language, pragmatics

Abstract:
Recently, the political discourse of leaders adopts new forms to express radicalism, forms as virality and fake news. Such devices characterize the so called “post-truth language”. The question is how to consider such a radical language: as a strategy of political debate, or conversely as the sign of a general decrease in availability to rational argumentation (negotiation and agreement)? The analysis of the language used by some italian political movements offers the opportunity to answer the question. The report will show that there are two types of radicalism: the radicalism that use the language of “polemical cooperation”; and the radicalism that use the language of “non-recognition of the other”. The former is a dialogical language; the latter is a monologic language. In western democracies, the monologic language characterizes the new tendencies of political radicalism. However, it has historical roots, when Plato introduced the notion of the logos as a tool of public debate (see Politeia). Thanks to the logos –rational, cooperative, based on the criteria of truth (aletheia) and of common good (agathon) –, the political conflict moved from the physical to the symbolic level. But Plato was well aware that logos is both very difficult to practice without careful training (paideia) and can never replace the ordinary level of language, which express cultural-tribal identity, emotional and “patemic” meanings.
Today, Platonic awareness seems to be lost, and the current policy seems to be incapable of understanding and managing the political (populism) as well linguistic phenomena of post-truth age.
Quintino, Karim

Country: Portugal
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Affiliation: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Portugal
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 6, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio:
Born in Lisbon on August 20, 1990. Holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Westminster, an MSc in Political Theory from the LSE, and is a PhD student in Political Science and International Relations at the Institute of Political Studies of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
He was a teaching assistant and researcher at the University of Westminster, and is currently a teacher and pedagogical coordinator in several Portuguese educational institutions, a researcher at the CIEP - Research Center of the Institute of Political Studies of the Catholic University, translator, and Visiting Student at the University of Oxford.

Title: The Kingdom of Bhutan – a democracy by compromise
Keywords: Bhutan, Compromise, Consolidation, Democracy, Transition

Abstract:
Some democratic transitions have demonstrated how it is possible to move from a radical starting point towards an ongoing state of compromise. The Kingdom of Bhutan, a small state bordering India and China and located deep within the Himalayan Mountains, stands as an illustrative case of that paradigm. Not only has that country recently welcomed extensive democratic practices after a century of monarchical rule, but more interestingly, it did so by royal decree. This rather unusual top-down transition saw the ruling monarch effectively “enforcing” democracy onto the people rather than the opposite, which defied the customary paradigm of democratisation, where absolute monarchs normally oppose change, and are overthrown and displaced as a result. Such transformation was possible thanks to Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth Dragon King of Bhutan who ruled from 1972 until 2006, and who pushed for strong political and legal reform in that country, including decentralising and devolving administrative powers to the people and writing up a draft Constitution in consultation with the Bhutanese people. That document would later serve as a basis for the first Constitution of Bhutan, ratified and enacted in 2008 by his son Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the fifth and current Dragon King of Bhutan, who also led the country in its transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Nonetheless, Bhutan’s process of democratisation was hampered at an initial stage because most Bhutanese citizens remained satisfied with the monarchical regime in place, and therefore were not keen on democracy. Such early antagonism might have been based upon cultural precepts: as in most Asian societies, there is a widespread feeling of strong reverence and appreciation to leaders in Bhutan – in fact, the figure of the Dragon King is (still) revered with utmost admiration – and hierarchy is perceived as inherent to the natural order of society. Democracy, on the other hand, gives a voice to every individual and encourages one to express his or her views – something that had been alien to Bhutanese citizens, at least until the process of democratisation took place. In due course, the people interpreted the paternalist inception of democracy as a “gift” from a concerned father to his children; and refusing a gift from the Dragon King would be completely unacceptable – hence the compromise. As such, the purpose of this paper is to enlighten the reader with the features of Bhutanese democracy and its preceding process of democratisation, while intertwining the features of radicalism and compromise that were (and still are) part
of the transition process in Bhutan. In order to do so, the paper firstly looks at Bhutan’s modern political history; secondly, it analyses the idiosyncrasies of Bhutanese democracy, and at how it has evolved and adapted over time; and thirdly, it shows how the historical, religious and social background of Bhutan should lead to a peculiar process of democratic consolidation.
Ramos, Iago

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Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 14, 14h30-16h30

Short Bio:
I'm a lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Salamanca. My main research interests are Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Social Enlightenment and the public mind. My more relevant works are two forthcoming papers in the *Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques Rousseau* and the *Adam Smith Review*.

Title: Private property as a persuasive element
Keywords: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, social contract, private property, commitment

Abstract:
In *The Social contract* Rousseau claims that the commitment to the civil society implies an exchange: “Ce que l'homme perd par le contrat social, c'est la liberté naturelle et un droit illimité à tout ce qui le tente et qu'il peut atteindre ; ce qu'il gagne, c'est la liberté civile et la propriété de tout ce qu'il possède”(*OC Pléiade T3*, p. 364). A bargain that might seem like a bad business when we recall the often quoted starting sentences of the second part of the *Discourse on Inequality*, where Rousseau describes private property as the greatest Evil: “Le premier qui ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire, *ceci est à moi*, et trouva des gens assez simples por le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile. Que de crimes, de guerres, de meurtres, que de misères et d'horreurs, n'eut point épargnés au Gendre-humain celui qui arrachant les pieux ou comblant le fossé eût crié à ses semblables. Gardez-vous d'écouter cet imposteur; Vous êtes perdus, si vous oubliez que les fruits sont à tous et que la Terre n'est à personne”(*OC Pléiade T3*). But, as Rousseau continues until the end of the paragraph, the problem with the private property is that people accept it without understanding its real meaning, thus the social contract becomes the social scam.

In my paper I want to analyze the meaning of private property in Rousseau's system and discuss why it is not a devilish element of the civil society but a reason for the individuals to agree with the social contract. Even more, private property might be the main reason to sacrifice natural freedom to get a moral existence within the limits of the civil freedom.

To do so, I will review the arguments in the second part of the *Discourse on Inequality* and some relevant fragments about the subject, like Rousseau's views in the *Constitutional Project for Corsica* on the citizenship as a personal gain, not an heritage; or the lesson that the gardener teaches to Emile about what we own.

PS – I read the CFP this morning and I haven't had time to translate quotes or correctly check expression. I'm really sorry. The paper I propose is part of a research work in progress.
Rosas, João Cardoso
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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 2, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio:
João Cardoso Rosas is associate professor of Philosophy and dean of the School of Arts and Humanities at the University of Minho.

Title: Models of Consensus and Compromise on Human Rights
Keywords: Human rights; Universal Declaration; doctrinal pluralism; consensus; compromise.

Abstract:
Since the Universal Declaration of 1948 the law and the language of human rights have become increasingly relevant in the international arena. Nevertheless, over these almost seventy years, the challenge of doctrinal pluralism to a common understanding of basic human rights has always been present. The question regarding the conditions of possibility of a world consensus or compromise on human rights amidst a plurality of different or even incompatible religious and philosophical doctrines, which was raised and addressed by the UN Human Rights Commission and the UNESCO “Philosophers’ Committee”, is still looming. In a way, the challenge has been revived by the new realities of globalization and the debates on Asian Values, or on Islamic Values, and their supposed doctrinal incompatibility with human rights.

In this paper, I revisit the main lines of doctrinal disagreement in the UN drafting body and in the UNESCO committee and I examine five theoretical models to make sense of these disagreements that are both interpretative and normative. The idea is to understand the different ways how the actors involved in the genesis of international human rights faced themselves the problem of doctrinal disagreement, but also to assess the normative force of these different ways of facing the problem and to draw lessons for the present. The five models analysed are the following: strict consensus; overlapping consensus (Rawls; Taylor); incompletely theorised agreements (Sunstein); strategic compromise; and moral compromise.

“Strict consensus”, on both rights content and underlying doctrine, was clearly in the mind of some participants in the drafting process of the Universal Declaration, but it is a weak model in view of “the fact” (Rawls) of doctrinal pluralism. As an alternative, the UNESCO Committee already proposed something like the Rawlsian idea of an “overlapping consensus” (avant-la-lettre), which was later developed by Charles Taylor in the context of the post-Asian/Islamic Values debates. However, I will point out the weaknesses of this model regarding the question of interpreting the meaning of the rights written into the Universal Declaration. The alternative idea of “incompletely theorised agreements” was actually suggested by Sunstein as a model of consensus on constitutional principles and human rights, but I will suggest that it can hardly account for an agreement on international human rights at the global level. Finally, the idea of a “strategic compromise” is not a moral idea. Although it may have explanatory power, it was not in the minds of the drafters of the Universal Declaration and it has no normative force. Instead, I propose the idea of a “moral compromise” (i.e., a compromise that is not just self-interested – and certainly not “rotten” (Margalit) - but also morally driven and occurs even in the absence of a settled agreement on the meaning of rights) as the best way to account for what happened in the UN and the UNESCO between 1947 and 1948, and also as the strongest model for a defence of human rights in view of deep doctrinal disagreement.
Santoro, Daniele

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 3, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio:
Daniele Santoro is FCT Researcher at the Center for Ethics, Politics, and Society of University of Minho, Portugal. He works primarily on the role of dissent, secrecy, and rights in constitutional democracy.

Title: Dissent and the Forgotten Legacy of European Dissidence
Keywords: Dissent, Dissidence, conscious conviction, publicity, silent majority

Abstract:
Practices of dissent figure in important moments of Western political history, especially in the form of civil disobedience, whose limits and justification occupies most of the contemporary debate in political theory. Such attention led to neglecting ‘dissidence,’ a cognate and yet distinct form of political resistance epitomized by Eastern European history of the late 20th century. In this paper I will draw attention to the distinction between these two forms of dissent, and focus on the lost concept of dissidence.

Although the terms tend to be confused, dissidence and dissent are far from being semantically equivalent: dissent is a species of political agency that often marks political opposition in democratic regimes, while the term dissidence has a specific connotation referring to a form of political agency conducted in presence of an authoritarian regime. The semantic distinction highlights important features of these forms of political agency and of their institutional circumstances of engagement.

Different forms of dissent exhibit different features: some acts of dissent are collective actions, others are essentially individual; some forms of dissent may justify the use of violence, others the opposite; some forms of dissent can be anonymous, others requires showing one’s face and making one’s identity available to law enforcement agencies. Yet, all these forms share two constitutive features: they presuppose a conscious conviction in the righteousness of their actions, and the public nature of their communicative action. The nature of dissidence is different with regard to these two features, in some interesting ways.

First, although dissidence has in common with dissent the appeal to the conscious conviction of the agent, the nature of the conviction appears to be quite distinct from the consciousness we refer to in cases of democratic dissent, such as civil disobedience or conscientious objection. In these later cases, consciousness figures as a standard of private morality in judging the legitimacy of a particular law. The characteristic of dissident consciousness is instead more essentially political, that is it is directed against the legitimacy of the political regime as such, not to the legitimacy of a law or political command within a generally acceptable democratic regime. Historically, such consciousness has appealed to the fundamental human and political rights de facto or de jure denied in realist socialist regimes.
The second of feature dissidence is that it does not need, and often cannot be a manifest act, although it is arguably an act of resistance that would become public in due course. To appreciate the difference, I will compare dissidence to civil disobedience. The defining feature of civil disobedience is to address both the public and the law enforcement in performing the act of violating the law. It’s an overt act of testimony against the injustice of the law. On the contrary, dissidents often exercise the virtue of dissimulation and clandestinity under regimes of strict police surveillance. They cannot address a public according to the model of civil disobedience on pain of sabotaging their own dissent. It’s a clandestine act of testimony against the injustice of a regime.

The political nature of dissidence makes of dissidents a voice for a silent majority in a way that is not true of other forms of dissent. We may say: dissidents speak their truth in the name of a silent majority, while civil disobedients often speak out their truth against a silent majority. Dissidence in the Eastern European political history was not necessarily public, as long as public is understood along the lines of civil disobedience. However, this form of dissidence was public in a different sense: its aim was to establish a contact with the Western public opinion, and being a witness of the condition of political repression of those regimes.
Santos, David G.
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Affiliation: University of Beira Interior, Portugal
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 5, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio:
Full-time Assistant Professor at the University of Beira Interior. PhD in Philosophy since 2013 from the University of Lisbon; has taught since 2009 in the courses of Political Science and International Relations, Philosophy, and Communication Sciences. Interested in Philosophy of Biology, Ethics and Politics.

Title: Radicalism and Political Compromise: An Evolutionary Perspective of Politics
Keywords: Politics, Evolution, Morality, Evolution, Biology

Abstract:
Along the fundamental axis of the problem of radicalism and the question of political compromise, lies the reality of political Power, Authority, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and, therefore, also of Legality. As part of the latest studies in Political Science, we have been witnessing the systematic emergence of works that tend to depart from a naturalistic point of view, well grounded in ethological data on, not only human, but also non-human animal moral intuition. In this paper, I intend to show how it is possible to redirect, not only the problem of the origin of the State, but also, fundamentally, of radicalism and political commitment, to the three sources that biologically underpin these phenomena: Cooperation, Competition and, finally, Recognition. I will argue how this triptych tends to be more effective when it comes to reflecting upon the human and non-human animal political phenomenon, demonstrating that its most radical natural roots lie in the most central condition of possibility of a co petition that is always underpinned by the play of radical intersubjectivity via Recognition. From an evolutionary perspective of politics, I will try to show and explain the main mechanisms of human and non-human political development. In the second part of my presentation, I will seek to demonstrate the philosophical consequences of this radical naturalization of human morality, as well as its repercussions on Political Science, thinking about the problem of a natural history of Justice in a radicular way. In the third part of my presentation, I will seek to reflect upon the present and the future of the phenomenon of radicalism and political compromise, attempting to envisage, based on the sources of the political phenomenon, the vertex of Freedom and the way it interacts with our liberal democratic intuitions of Security and Control. In the last part of my paper, I will seek to show how this naturalistic perspective - as well as the self-awareness that its vision adds as innovations to the political phenomenon - can be one of the cornerstones of a more positive progress for our global political reality.
Segalerba, Gianluigi

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 8, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:

Date and place of birth: 24. June 1967, Genoa, Italy.

Title: Is multiculturalism bad for women? Radicalism and compromise on multiculturalism, group-rights, forms of liberalism and compatibilities between cultures
Keywords: multiculturalism, individual rights, group rights, Moller Okin, Kymlicka, Barry, Kukathas, Dworkin, Taylor, Coleman

Abstract:
In my contribution, whose title refer to the article of Susan Moller Okin „Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?“, I would like to deal with different position on multiculturalism expressing opinions in favour or against the compatibility of multiculturalism with individual rights and, likewise, expressing opinions whether rights must be conceded only to individuals or whether groups too should be received particular rights. Radical position for or against multiculturalism and its implications are accompanied by more moderate positions.


The analysis von Moller Okin will explain which problems are represented by the integration, into a liberal society, of illiberal cultures for the rights of women: the study will offer us a first instrument in order to understand which problems every theory of integration will have to solve, if a correct integration between different groups in the same society is to be reached. The analysis of Coleman will introduce us in the interesting problem of the cultural defences and of the problems that the strategy of the cultural defences poses for the American and not only the American tribunals: Is a pluralistic interpretation of the law in a right state to be accepted, as those who sustain cultural defences want to, or is a pluralistic interpretation of the law to be refused? The analysis of Coleman gives us highly valuable elements in order to understand the problems posed by some interpretation of multiculturalism for the equal protection clause.

The comparison between different form of interpretations of liberalism in Dworkin, Taylor, Kukathas and Barry will give us the possibility of discussing form of radicalism in the interpretation of liberalism: for instance, Barry’s radical interpretation of liberalism as a theory defending the autonomy of the person
strongly opposes Kukathas likewise radical interpretation of liberalism as meaning tolerance: Barry excludes every form of diminution of individual liberty and of diminution of protection of the individual liberty in his interpretation of liberalism and in the connected duty assigned to the state as to the protection of the fundamental rights of the individuals, whereas Kukathas considers the state as only being an aggregation between groups without having, therefore, any authority of coercion in relation to the groups: since liberalism is tolerance, the rules holding in the different groups ought in the opinion of Kukathas to be tolerated, even if these rule are oppressive, intolerant and illiberal for the members of the group itself. The opposition between Dworkin and Taylor will introduce us into the opposition between a procedural and a substantive interpretation of liberalism. Finally, Kymlicka’s rather moderate liberal theory of group rights, on the basis of which the acknowledgment of rights to groups and, therefore, not only reserved to individuals is to be interpreted as an extension and natural development of the liberal tradition, will be compared with the strong and radical criticism expressed by Barry in relation to every form of group rights.

My opinion will be that liberalism has to be interpreted as a theory of autonomy and of defence of the autonomy of the individuals. The primacy ought to be done to individual and to the defence of the individuals against groups. Notwithstanding, I believe that group rights are indispensable in a geopolitical dimension in order to protect minority groups from abuse perpetrated by majority groups.
Sivarajah, Mark

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 7, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:
I am doctoral candidate at The University of Bristol (SPAIS) Political Theory. My research centres around the ethics of migration and citizenship, with a particular focus on the rights of non-resident citizens. I also have an interest in methodological issues in normative political theory, multiculturalism and the politics of identity.

Title: Migration Facts, Political Principles and the Constraints of Justice
Keywords: migration, facts, first-order principles, second-order principles, justice, social science

Abstract:
Political philosophers have been spilling a lot of ink discussing migration. In devising principles of immigration justice, three separate but interrelated questions have typically been addressed. Firstly, whether a political community has the right to unilaterally control its borders. Secondly, what criteria can be used in assessing this process. For instance, who to admit and under what criteria. Lastly whether to include non-citizen residents who are already present within a territory into a political community. What is less represented in the literature is how theorists set about addressing these questions.

This paper asks whether the facts of migration generate changes in practical requirements or action-guiding principles. For instance, does the fact that states are increasingly composed of non-citizen residents generate changes in principles regarding whether they can and should have the right to exclude potential migrants? How does this affect considerations of inclusion into a political community? In sum, does this place constraints on developing principles of justice in immigration? Engaging in a wider methodological debate within political philosophy, this paper questions whether political principles should be grounded in facts or need operate independently as fact-independent foundational principles.

The initial section surveys the methodological literature and relates this back to normative discussions of migration. Section two distinguishes between first and second order political principles and stipulates the necessity to further distinguish between different types or constellations of facts. It is argued that only certain facts or social practices can and do shape the formulation of first order principles. Additionally, the more forceful claim is made that it is unavoidable that secondary action-guiding political principles are not altered by facts. The resultant claim is that one of the main objectives for normative theorists of migration is to remain cognisant of a changing empirical landscape. The final section highlights how this may be done and the need for political philosophy to both engage more with social science, whilst also retaining an awareness of certain limitations social science poses.
Sławiński, Maciej

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Affiliation: University of Warsaw, Poland
Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 2, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio:
Maciej Sławinski is currently preparing a PhD on Martha C. Nussbaum political philosophy. He graduated Warsaw University and Warsaw Music Academy. For five years he worked as a tutor and a philosophy teacher in a secondary school in Warsaw.

Title: How Should We Value External Goods? On Martha C. Nussbaum’s Theory of Compassion
Keywords: Compassion, Emotional Cognitivism, External Goods, Virtue, Capabilities Approach

Abstract:
Perhaps everyone of us has experienced an emotional impulse to share food or shelter with a person in need. We normally do not ask for reasons for such an attitude, we simply adopt it. It might even be said that to demand reasons for compassion is a morally questionable position. Nevertheless, Martha C. Nussbaum, in her theory of compassion provides us with such reasons. Her detailed examination of this emotion enables better understanding of its cognitive content and its connection to the history of western thought. One of the guidelines of her critical assessment of western thought in relation to compassion is a problem of valuing external goods.

In my paper I first review briefly Nussbaum’s cognitive approach to human emotions and how it applies to compassion. Then I present her historical account of the anti-compassion tradition and its problems with valuing external goods. I conclude with a brief account of Nussbaum’s capability approach as an endeavour to reconcile material needs and human moral dignity.

The principal thesis of Nussbaum’s theory of emotions is that they are evaluative judgements which have developmental histories going back to infancy. In virtue of these histories, they have a narrative structure. They are conceived of as interested or eudaimonistic. They are conditioned on the interest one invests in the things and people which favourably or adversely affect one’s well-being. The history of one’s investments in such things and people defines the narrative structure of one’s emotions.

Nussbaum describes compassion as pain caused by the perception of some misfortune that a person has suffered undeservedly and that one is liable to suffer oneself. Her definition consists of three judgements. First, something seriously bad happened to someone. Second, the person suffers undeservedly. Third, one must regard oneself as similarly vulnerable. Nussbaum calls these three qualifications the cognitive requirements of size, nondesert, and similar possibilities.

Nussbaum traces the roots of the anti-compassion tradition back to the ancient thought. She engages in a criticism of Socrates, the stoics, Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche. She points out its difficulties: the claims to rationality that lead to indifference and the ideal of perfection that leads emotional relationships to decline. She exhibits a radical opposition between virtue and external goods and a tension between emotion based moral knowledge and the rational moral guidance this tradition provides us with.

It is by the reference to her capabilities approach that Nussbaum reconciles the demands of human dignity and human material needs. Her position, informed by the aristotelian idea of human flourishing, is of such an account of human development which includes material well-being, social relationships and moral maturity.
On this ground she elaborates the guidance towards appropriate value judgements concerning external goods. She is also able to give reasons for compassion which urges us to meet the material needs of others and, therefore, to conceive compassion as a reasonable emotion.
Vanini, Paolo  
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Affiliation: University of Trento, Italy  
Presentation: 2-Fev, Session 9, 09h30-11h00

Short Bio:  
Postdoc at the University of Trento, with a project on the Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran and his criticism of Utopian thought. In the same University, I organized the International Conference “Cioran and the West: Utopia, exile, fall” (April 2015). I have been also a Research assistant in Philosophy of Renaissance for three years (2014-2016).

Title: A Reactionary Fascination: Emil Cioran and Joseph de Maistre  
Keywords: Cioran, Maistre, revolution, reaction, engagement

Abstract:  
In 1957 Emil Cioran wrote an essay dedicated to Joseph de Maistre and the reactionary thought. Maistre was the most radical critic of the Enlightenment, and the most paradoxical advocate of the political absolutism. For this reason, he is usually defined as an anti-modern dogmatic thinker: a thinker which denies the rational compromise of philosophical discussion. Cioran refuses this definition and claims that Maistre’s criticism of modernity is fundamental to understand the contradictions of our political age. In Cioran’s view, Maistre allows us: 1) to deconstruct the dichotomy between “revolution” and “reaction”; 2) to realize how a revolutionary ideal can be overturned into a dogmatic justification of political intolerance.  
Cioran’s interpretation of Maistre is the premise of his confutation of Sartre’s existentialism. According to Sartre, philosophers have to be engaged in the defense of the ideal of freedom, since all humans are forced to be free. Cioran denies this postulate and shows that it is easier to do something bad if we do it in the name of freedom. This is particularly true when we talk about contemporary revolutions and their political effects. Cioran’s criticism of Sartre’s engagement is brilliantly portrayed in a famous passage of his Essay on reactionary thought, where he writes: “Every anarchist conceals, in the depth of his rebellions, a reactionary who is awaiting his hour, the hour of taking power, when the metamorphosis of chaos into... authority raises problems no utopia dares solve or even contemplate without falling into lyricism or absurdity”.  
This article aims to examine the meaning of this quotation and to investigate the contradictions of “the metamorphosis of chaos... into authority”.

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Zelič, Nebojša (& Gavran Miloš, Ana)

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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 8, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:
Nebojša Zelič received his PhD in Philosophy at University of Rijeka. He works as Assistant Professor at Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka where he teaches Political philosophy and Ethics. He published on various topics – political liberalism, liberal theory of justice, freedom of speech, genetic enhancement and justice, civic friendship. Currently he is working on the relation of community and individual well-being.

Title: Civic Friendship as Compromise
Keywords: civic friendship, compromise, well-being, care for others, trust

Abstract:
Our aim in this paper is to explore the relationship between an individual person and political community by focusing on well-being understood as human flourishing. More precisely, the question we are interested in is how to fit the interests of others in the pursuit of one's own good, that is, how to reconcile selfish aspiration for one's own good with the others-concern. By person's own good here we understand also a pursuit of her idea of ideal society. It is inevitable that any kind of social cooperation in plural society will end up in some kind of compromise understood as giving up a part of ideal for the sake of others. The theoretical problem which arises is whether these kinds of compromises can realize certain kind of valuable political relation that is worth pursuing?

We believe that the solution for this problem can be found in Aristotle's notion of political or civic friendship. Aristotelian notion of civic friendship as we understand it is characterized by the following features: basic concern for others (basic volitional attitude that does not depend on any kind of list of admirable qualities or shared beliefs); relational equality (equality of status, absence of hierarchy and marginalization); social trust (generalized trust; based on imperfect information about the behaviour of others where we lack mechanism of assurance); practical doing for others (contributing to well-being of others through various social networks and associations). These characteristics should be realized through common political institutions. A society built upon the notion of civic friendship will provide stability and social cohesion which are the values that go far beyond the value of individual well-being motivated only by instrumental rationality. This explains why concern for others becomes an integrative part of our own well-being.

We want to claim that such a concept of civic friendship is a normative framework which is not some particular political ideal but itself is a compromise understood as giving up on my own interest for the sake of others. Since it refers to a relation among citizens in a plural community it should not be based on any particular identity such as religion or ethnicity, but on the relations among citizens through shared institutions of political community. Civic friends thus differ in their comprehensive doctrines of good and in their visions of ideal society but are motivated with the same goal: to live in a society that provides for each member to achieve life worth of human dignity and as such serves as a precondition to avoid making rotten compromises.
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Presentation: 1-Feb, Session 7, 17h00-18h30

Short Bio:  
After receiving my PhD from the University of Pavia (Italy), I held post-doc positions at the universities of Pavia and Trento. Then, I obtained an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship and I spent a couple of years in Hamburg and Berlin. Since May 2017 I am Assistant Professor at the University of Genova (Italy). I have published papers in such journals as History of Political Thought; Journal of Applied Philosophy; European Journal of Political Theory; Philosophical Papers; International Journal of Philosophical Studies; Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger; The Journal of Value Inquiry; The Journal of Social Philosophy; Utilitas. My research interests are animal ethics from a political perspective and public reason. I also published some papers and books on some authors in the history of philosophy (Plato, Spinoza, Machiavelli, Kant).

Title: Integrity that changes the world. Radicalism in animal rights movements  
Keywords: Activism, Animal rights, Animal rights radicalism, Effectiveness, Integrity

Abstract:  
Radicalism is usually taken to be committed to the realization of an ideal impossible to achieve in practice, whereas compromise is standardly understood as the necessary price to pay to the realization of the ideal. This commonsensical motto has some exceptions. In particular, in the field of animal rights compromise is usually criticized for being too condescending to the status quo. In this paper, I analyse the main forms of and grounds for radicalism in animal rights movements. The idea is to show how animal righters live the opposition between compromise and radicalism in a peculiar way, and radicalism has more practical chances of being effective than it might seem.

First, I outline the main types of actions that animal righters as individuals or groups put in place in order to achieve and live according to their values. These strategies include forms of rational and emotional communication, animal rescue, civil disobedience, and forms of psychological pressure. But in this list we should also include the fact that successful lives of animal rights activists can convey the vegan ideal through their being living examples of the practical possibility of animal rights.

Then, I characterize radicalism as an idea that can be understood in two different and possibly diverging senses. Radicalism can be the attempt to achieve the maximally desirable state of affairs whatever it takes; or it can mean the commitment to the value of integrity. If in nearly all domains radicalism is usually taken to be ineffective, in the domain of animal rights pursuing the value of integrity might be more effective than the practice of compromising. Living examples of integrity, indeed, show to the uncertain supporters or to those who fear overdemandingness the possibility of another type of life.

After discussing the relation between radicalism and integrity, I will analyze the overall conception of effectiveness that radical animal rights activists put in place. In particular I will focus on the idea that animal rights activism is mostly played at the societal level. Indeed, animal rights activists seek to advance values that can mostly be achieved in one’s personal and private life without the aid of institutions. This is somewhat the strength and the weakness of animal rights radicalism. It is a strength because people
committed to these values can put in practice them in their lives without further waiting to convince other people or changing the world. It is its weakness because some parts of the whole ideal do need some political enforcement.

I will conclude my paper by showing the limits of these strategies. Despite the capacity to involve an increasing number of people, animal rights theories and movements are still wanting at the institutional level. Except some theorists (Donaldson-Kymlicka) animal rights theorists have failed to show what institutional changes are necessary to put in practice the animal rights ideal, and how political activism can go beyond the societal activism.