

4th Braga Colloquium in the History of Moral and Political Philosophy

The Politics of Emotions Historical Insights and Contemporary Challenges

January 29-30, 2019
University of Minho, Braga

Book of Abstracts



INDEX OF PANELS

PLENARY LECTURES	6
Duncan Kelly (University of Cambridge)	6
Richard Bellamy (European University Institute, Florence)	6
1.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1/3)	7
David Jiménez Castaño (University of Salamanca)	7
Luca Tenneriello (Sapienza University of Rome)	8
Aaron Zubia (Columbia University, New York)	8
1.B COGNITIVE AND DELIBERATIVE DIMENSIONS	9
Lauren Nuckols (Central Washington University)	9
Bruno Daniel de Brito Serra (UBI LabCom.IFP)/CEPS)	10
Job Vossen (University of Antwerp)	11
2.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (2/3)	12
Aylon Cohen (University of Chicago)	12
Lorenzo del Savio (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich)	13
Nora Timmermans (University of Leuven)	13
2.B THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONS	14
Virgil Brower (Charles University, Prague)	14
Francisco David Corrales Cerdón (University of Girona)	15
Krupa Patel (Harvard University)	16
3.A THE LEGACY OF THE CLASSICS	17
Gianluigi Segalerba (Arbeitskreis Kulturanalyse Universität, Vienna)	17
Hélder Telo (University of Coimbra)	18
Emo Trimçev (University of Greifswald)	18
Ronald Weed (University of New Brunswick)	19
3.B COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS AND MOBILIZATION	19
Thomás Zicman de Barros (Science Po Paris)	19
Abel Franco (California State University)	20
Andrea Nicolini (University of Verona)	21
Léna Silberzahn (Science Po, Paris)	22
4.A 20th CENTURY CONTINENTAL THEORY	22
Kathrin Bouvot (University of Vienna)	22
José Colen (CEPS, University of Minho) / António Baião (CEPS, University of Minho)	23
Héla Hecker (Carl von Ossietzky University, Oldenburg)	24
Nythamar de Oliveira (Pontifical Catholic University at Porto Alegre)	25
4.B USE AND ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN	26
Charlie Kurth (Western Michigan University)	26
Ditte Marie Munch-Juriscic (University of Roskilde)	27
Maria del Pilar Sánchez Barajas (Universidad Autónoma de México - Universidade de Lisboa)	27

Ruth Rebecca Tietjen (University of Vienna)	28
5.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (3/3)	29
Alexandra Abranches (CEPS, University of Minho)	29
Alexandra Oprea (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) / Wenqing Zhao (Whitman College)	30
Marie Wuth (University of Aberdeen)	31
5.B FEMINIST APPROACHES TO POLITICAL EMOTIONS	32
Virginia Fusco (University Carlos III, Madrid)	32
Alicia García Álvarez (University of Oviedo)	32
Laura Luz Silva (University College London)	33
6.A RHETORIC AND POLITICAL EMOTIONS	34
Giovanni Damele (University Nova, Lisbon)	34
Rob Goodman (McGill University) / Samuel Bagg (McGill University)	35
Benedetta Romano (Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich)	36
Mauro Serra (University of Salerno)	36
6.B EMOTIONS: LANGUAGE, MEDIA, AND STYLES OF GOVERNMENT	37
Maurício Amaro (Porto University)	37
Alba Baro Vaquero (Autonoma University of Madrid)	38
Elena Falletti (Università Carlo Cattaneo-LIUC, Italy)	39
Pedro Góis Moreira (Catholic University, Lisbon) / José Colen (CEPS, University of Minho)	40

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

Abranches, Alexandra	29
Amaro, Maurício	37
Bagg, Samuel	35
Baião, António	23
Baro Vaquero, Alba	38
Bellamy, Richard	6
Bouvot, Kathrin	22
Brower, Virgil	14
Cohen, Aylon	12
Colen, José	23, 40
Corrales Cordón, Francisco David	15
Damele, Giovanni	34
De Brito Serra, Bruno Daniel	10
De Oliveira, Nythamar	25
Del Savio, Lorenzo	13
Falletti, Elena	39
Franco, Abel	20
Fusco, Virginia	32
García Álvarez, Alicia	32
Góis Moreira, Pedro	40
Goodman, Rob	35
Hecker, Héla	24
Jiménez Castaño, David	7
Kelly, Duncan	6
Kurth, Charlie	26
Luz Silva, Laura	33
Munch-Juriscic, Ditte Marie	27
Nicolini, Andrea	21
Nuckols, Lauren	9
Oprea, Alexandra	30
Patel, Krupa	17

Romano, Benedetta	36
Sánchez Barajas, Maria del Pilar	27
Segalerba, Gianluigi	17
Serra, Mauro	37
Silberzahn, Léna	22
Telo, Hélder	18
Tenneriello, Luca	8
Tietjen, Ruth Rebecca	28
Timmermans, Nora	13
Trimçev, Emo	18
Vossen, Job	11
Weed, Ronald	19
Wuth, Marie	31
Zhao, Wenqing	30
Zicman de Barros, Thomás	19
Zubia, Aaron	8

PLENARY LECTURES

Tuesday, 29, 17:15 - 18:45
Auditorium ILCH

Duncan Kelly (University of Cambridge)
“Max Weber’s Political Thought and the First World War”

Email: djk36@cam.ac.uk

Abstract:

Max Weber is a central figure for modern political thought and intellectual history, widely known for the range, depth and polemical texture of his scholarship, and the pointed, national-liberal imperialism of his politics. To what extent, though, did the First World War make any difference to Weber’s political thought, whether through his scholarship, his political journalism, or his activism? How did he engage with the challenges of war, revolution, and peace, at the level of political thought and intellectual history, and to what extent did his well-known concerns about the tension between passion and the ‘pitiless sobriety of judgment’ remain central to his thinking?

Bio: Duncan Kelly (PhD, Sheffield) is Reader in Political Thought at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. He has worked extensively on different topics in intellectual history and political theory, with an explicit interest in understanding how ideas from the past can shed light on contemporary politics. Currently his research focuses on the intellectual history of the First World War, the nature of political judgment, the challenge of the Anthropocene, and histories of the history of political thought since 1848. Among his many publications are: *The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann* (Oxford University Press for The British Academy, 2003), *Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought* (ed.) (Oxford University Press for The British Academy, 2009), and *The Propriety of Liberty: Persons, Passions and Judgement in Modern Political Thought* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

Wednesday, 30, 17:15 - 18:45
Auditorium ILCH

Richard Bellamy (European University Institute, Florence)
Does Democracy Induce or Reduce Lying?

Email: Richard.Bellamy@EUI.eu

Abstract: Although lies are often seen as inimical to a well-functioning democracy, there is also a long tradition of political thought - from Plato to Arendt - that has regarded Truth as alien to politics - not least because the political is seen as a realm of passion rather than reason. This talk begins with democratic objections to lying, before asking whether democracy itself might rest on a lie and even encouraging lying. I suggest that the circumstances of democratic politics make what Arendt calls ‘rational’ truth inaccessible, but that democratic reasoning nonetheless calls for, and can to some degree encourage, reasonable truthfulness. The current challenge for democracies lies in whether they offer sufficient incentives for citizens and politicians to be moved towards truthfulness if not truth, or whether a crisis of democracy is shifting the incentive structure towards post truth bullshit.

Bio: Richard Bellamy (PhD, Cambridge) is Director of the Max Weber Programme at the European University Institute in Florence, and Professor of Political Science at the University College, London (UCL). He is

one of the leading political theorists of his generation. He works on wide set of themes, including the history of European social and political theory (with particular emphasis on Italian political thought), and contemporary legal, social, and political philosophy. He is well known for his works in normative theory on republicanism, citizenship, democracy, and constitutionalism. He is author of 8 books to date, and edited or co-edited more than 25 books and special issues, including scholarly editions of works by Beccaria, Gramsci, and Bobbio. His latest book, *A Republican Europe of States. Cosmopolitanism, Intergovernmentalism and Democracy in the EU* for Cambridge University Press, is forthcoming in 2019.

1.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1/3)

Tuesday, 29, 9:45 – 11:15
Room: Auditorium ILCH

David Jiménez Castaño (University of Salamanca)
“Passions and politics in Thomas Hobbes”

Email: djimenez@usal.es

Abstract: Thomas Hobbes’s theory of passions is basic to understand his political philosophy and, mostly, his social contract theory. This is what I want to show with this communication. Hobbes explains passions using a materialistic, mechanical and anatomic model. As he says, the movement received by the sense organs arrives, through nerves, to the brain and causes ideas. This same movement continues to the heart and can cause two kinds of movement: or it helps the circulation of blood and causes pleasure, or it complicates it and cause pain. From pleasure and pain arises others simple passions as desire, aversion, love and hate. The combination of a simple passion with a thought causes what Hobbes calls composed passions: hope, fear, curiosity, glory, vainglory, envy, etc. Most of those passions are very problematic. On one hand, the scarcity of the state of nature force its inhabitant to fight for what they need to survive, but not everybody could satisfy their desires; on the other, some composed passions are “relational” and need to be judged by a third person, but their judgments not always match with ours and that causes troubles in the state of nature. From this point of view, passions are one of the main motives of the so called war of all against all. But while some passions as vanity envy, ambition, etc. create conflicts between men, other passions as fear, hope benevolence, etc. force them to search peace by all means. Here appears the cooperation between passions and reason: passions give reason the aim and reason calculates the best way to reach it. In this sense, we can say that, as Hume will say lately, reason is the slave of passions. Finally, reason will give us some precepts –what Hobbes calls laws of reason– to join the other inhabitants of the state of nature and create the civil society and the State. But in this new stage, passions are still problematic because seditious men can use speech to cause indignation in the people against their sovereign, lead them to a civil war and put them back to the dangerous state of nature. The best way to prevent it is by giving the people some kind of political education: a person who knows what must and mustn’t be done in politics is a person who cannot be deceived by a rebel.

Keywords: Thomas Hobbes, Social contract theory, theory of passions, History of Early Modern Philosophy

Bio: I teach History of Early Modern Philosophy in the Degree on Philosophy of the University of Salamanca. My PhD work was about the importance of language to understand Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy. I have published some works about Hobbes’ theory of passions because I was involved in a research project about the importance of emotions in the Early Modern Philosophy. I have also published some papers about other political philosophers of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries as Machiavelli, Domingo de Soto, Francisco Garau and Rousseau.

Luca Tenneriello (Sapienza University of Rome)
“Making social consensus by emotions: Insights in the light of Thomas Hobbes’s thought”

Email: luca.tenneriello@uniroma1.it

Abstract: Due to his particular historical and social context, Thomas Hobbes might be arguably regarded as one of the most prominent voice in discussion about the political role of human emotions (‘passions’ in Hobbes’s lexicon) in modern philosophy. Indeed, Hobbes is profoundly aware of the value of treating emotions in public policy. According to him, emotions are essential both for resisting and for obeying the law. Developing a fascinating account of individual conscience as an ‘inner court’ of judgment, full of cognitive, moral and religious implications, he provides, on one hand, an accurate explanation of how human emotions work disruptively in public sphere, as irrational sides of human nature excitable by particular forms of persuasion. On the other hand, he smartly points out how emotions could be successfully used for preserving stability and cohesion within the Commonwealth. Starting from the twofold effect that political use of emotions could have, according to Hobbes, emotions constitute a peculiar motivating force to act in public scenario. In particular, since emotions could suggest one citizen to obey or to resist the law, in the name of personal beliefs held in conscience, the mere existence of political authority by covenant, i.e. the mere existence of a reason-grounded instrument of public control, is not enough to ensure a peaceful social order. In other terms, the political authority must take into consideration citizens’ emotions to make social cohesion (and social consensus) stronger and stronger. A perfect example of that is the account of ‘civil religion’ argued by Hobbes in order to combine political obedience with an ‘emotional consensus’ of most of the people, who need symbols, worships and myths as necessary psychological motives to obey. Such an evaluation of the public value of emotions has been often associated to totalitarian systems; by contrast, we use to think our advanced democracies as established on purely rational elements, scarcely focused on emotional sides of humans. Martha Nussbaum has recently argued that public emotions can play a worthwhile political role even in our societies; they deeply shape our lives as citizens and strongly influence the stability of the country. Elaborating the notion of ‘civil religion’, she argues that a “decent” society must use resources of human psychology (and not only rational elements) for the sake of moral and political progress of the country, educating to civic cohesion e limiting the conflict-leading sides of our nature. Although a number of obvious differences, it seems to me that this account could be profitably compared with Hobbes’s one, which remains, anyway, a peculiar way to understand how the concept of political emotions has been conceived at the beginning of modern philosophy. Such an account could constitute a fertile field of studies even now.

Keywords: Hobbes, Passions, Conscience, Social Consensus, Civil Religion

Bio: I am currently a PhD Student working on conscience and religion in Hobbes, in the light of current issues of conscience spreading in our time. My research interests are focused on history of moral philosophy, ethics and applied ethics.

Aaron Zubia (Columbia University, New York)
“Hobbes and Mandeville on the Liberal Government of the Passions”

Email: aaz2115@columbia.edu

Abstract: In this essay, which is a work in the history of ideas, I argue that two proto-liberals, Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville helped shape the liberal approach to the passions by making the Epicurean idiom a central element of their political theorizing. These two thinkers rejected the Christian and classical republican idioms, according to which spiritual and moral improvement are primary concerns, and used an Epicurean philosophical anthropology as well as an Epicurean narrative of progress to develop a new politi-

cal science the goal of which is the management of the passions. It is this same Epicurean idiom that, according to Istvan Hont (2015), informed the liberal theories of Hume and Smith. Though, in reviews of Hont's work, the idea of an Epicurean revival has been questioned (e.g. Bourke, *Political Theory*, 2018 [3]), I argue that the Epicurean idiom is both discernible and essential to the development of a liberal political science built on the idea that passions can be redirected for public advantage. At the heart of Epicurean political analysis is a conjectural history of progress, which traces the advancement of pleasure-seeking human beings from barbarism to civilization by means of social and political conventions. The key to civilizing human beings, from this perspective, lies not in countering the passions, but controlling them, so that desires might be peacefully satiated. The respective theories of Hobbes and Mandeville present not vague ideas, but specific formulae for how to manage the passions in order to promote peace and prosperity. Whereas, for Hobbes, the government ought to direct people away from concern for heavenly felicity toward concern for earthly felicity, for Mandeville, the government ought to channel desire, so that it is directed toward wealth accumulation, and regulate love and esteem, so that it is directed toward commercial friendship. In each case, an active government is required to act upon an expert knowledge of the passions and develop self-perpetuating institutions capable of curbing destructive passions without requiring their rehabilitation. Indeed, liberal political theory is an elaboration on this premise that a political society can thrive by diverting people from spiritual and moral concerns and focusing their attention on the mutual melioration of their earthly condition.

Keywords: Liberalism, Epicureanism, Hobbes, Mandeville, Commerce

Bio: Aaron Alexander Zubia is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Theory at Columbia University. His research interests include the Scottish Enlightenment, the American founding, political liberalism, and the interaction between politics and religion. His dissertation, *The Making of Liberal Mythology*, is an exercise in the history of ideas detailing David Hume's appropriation of modern Epicureanism.

1.B COGNITIVE AND DELIBERATIVE DIMENSIONS

Tuesday, 29, 9:45 – 11:15
Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Lauren Nuckols (Central Washington University)
“The politics of ambivalence”

Email: lauren.Nuckols@cwu.edu

Abstract: In *Psychoanalysis, Literature and War*, psychoanalytic theorist Hannah Segal argues that human beings have a long-standing tendency to idealize specific persons, groups, and political leaders, while simultaneously demonizing and dehumanizing others. This occurs by a process of psychological “splitting” that constructs a world of villains and heroes, dividing our world into those who are, evil, criminal, malicious, or immoral, on the one hand; and those who are good, noble, virtuous, or upright, on the other. The emotions accompanying this polarized worldview are, respectively, hatred, aggression, and disgust, and love, respect, hope, and attachment. In Segal's account, this binary worldview reflects a failure of ambivalence. In this paper, I will focus on Segal's account of achieved ambivalence as it might inform contemporary social, political, and humanitarian crises. Segal distinguishes two forms of ambivalence: 1) primary ambivalence, or “the fact of ambivalence” (159), that is, the fact that persons may at times act in ways that are harmful; at other times, benevolently, and 2) achieved ambivalence, “the achievement of knowing one's ambivalence” (159). Achieved ambivalence in its fullest sense means “recognition of reality, which is both gratifying and frustrating” (159). In the state of achieved ambivalence, we become capable of recognizing, navigating, and unifying complex sets of instincts and emotions. In this paper, I will draw on Segal to illustrate the ways in which failed ambivalence underlies our increasingly divided, polarized political life in the 21st century. As Segal writes, warfare, aggression, violence, authoritarianism, Nazism, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the contemporary War

on Terror are all examples of the psychological “splitting” characteristic of the collective flight from ambivalence. Current political leaders such as Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro further reflect and reinforce failed ambivalence. In Segal’s words, “Groups under the sway of psychotic mechanisms tend to select or to tolerate leaders who represent their pathology. But not only do those groups choose unbalanced leaders; they also affect them” (163.) Because leaders embody, feed, and are fed by, collective psychopathologies, they express and perpetuate toxic patterns, including the pattern of splitting. In this paper, I will draw on Segal’s theory of failed ambivalence to examine a) the increasingly divided political landscape of our contemporary world, and the extreme, destructive emotions underlying such divisions; and b) the widespread acceptance of megalomaniacal political leaders who reinforce and perpetuate psychologically “split” worldviews. I will then question to what extent a sense of ambivalence is an appropriate or productive way of approaching inhumane, racist, genocidal, and ecocidal practices, and leaders. Where moral atrocities occur, to what extent is ambivalence justified? Are there circumstances that demand that we depart from the reasoned, moderate emotions characteristic of ambivalence? Here, I suggest that although ambivalence is generally a healthy and productive emotional state, there are some moral atrocities so condemnable that they cannot, and should not, be regarded with an ambivalent eye.

Keywords: Ambivalence, Ethics, Ideals, Emotions, Evil

Bio: Lauren Nuckols is currently a Lecturer in Philosophy at Central Washington University, United States. She earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Pennsylvania State University in 2017, and a B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Hartford in 2006. Her main philosophical interests are Environmental Philosophy, Ethics, and American Pragmatism. Consistent with her research interests, she has taught courses in Ethics, Environmental Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Ethics of Media and Journalism, Ethical Leadership, Philosophy of Love and Sexuality, Philosophy of Law, and Critical Thinking.

Bruno Daniel de Brito Serra (UBI LabCom.IFP)/CEPS)

“The blind leading the blind: Illuminating the role of emotion in political deliberation and decision-making”

Email: bd Serra@gmail.com

Abstract: Contemporary western politics have long been dominated by a widespread form of political rationalism that all but imposes a reductionist notion of rationality on our understanding of political behaviour. The fact that it artificially excises emotions from mental and social phenomena inherently connected to the political sphere makes such reductionism, I would argue, at once philosophically illegitimate and politically dangerous. And since the roots of this malaise of contemporary political thought can be traced back to a very specific conception in philosophy of the mind, any serious consideration of the specifically political problem at stake must begin by presenting a different conception of how the relation between human reason and emotion can be understood in a much more holistic and genuine manner. With that intent in mind, and in order to later successfully redirect the discussion towards its political dimension, we must first establish a concept of “emotion” which is not inherently incompatible with the demands of democratic political life, but that may actually prove to be political in itself. Thus, an examination of the nature of emotions as universal phenomena of human life should provide a valuable stepping stone towards understanding the particular relationship between emotions and politics – and lay down the foundations upon which we may ground a coherent conception of a political existence that necessarily involves emotions. Current accounts of emotion and its relation to reason, usually polarized into cognitivist or non-cognitivist, rationalist or anti-rationalist, are largely unable to provide an accurate picture of a problem whose complexity invalidates such polarization. I will hence reject both cognitivist and non-cognitivist approaches on the grounds of their excessive narrowness, and propose to find a more comprehensive alternative. To accomplish this, some key aspects must be explored: firstly, the connection between emotion and cognition, and the possibility to contradict the common-sense view on emotions as unruly passions that, by definition, are passively experienced by the subject – thus diminishing accountability; secondly, the role played by emotions on deliberation and general decision-making – which, unless the role in question is a disruptive one, still strikes most as a bizarre notion; thirdly,

the relation between emotion and action, focusing on the phenomena of motivation and weakness of will (akrasia). By the end of the present paper I thus expect to have established that emotions not only inevitably play a crucial (and not necessarily disruptive) role in mechanisms of general decision-making, motivation, and action, but also why it is necessary that they do so.

Keywords: Emotions, Rationalism, Political Deliberation, Decision-making, Akrasia.

Bio: Bruno Daniel de Brito Serra holds a PhD in Philosophy from Durham University (UK), and is currently a post-doctoral researcher at LabCom.IFP and CEPS. His research interests include the relationship between rationality and emotion in politics, the work of Carl Schmitt, decision-making, and the use of propaganda in democratic states.

Job Vossen (University of Antwerp)
“Positive and Negative Emotions. A linguistic-historical perspective”

Email: job.vossen@uantwerpen.be

Abstract: Plato (e.g., Timaeus & Phaedrus) already noted the motivational potential of emotions in relation to politics and observed that the Greek word for emotion, as does our Latin derivative, comes from ‘moving’. Emotion moves, or motivates people, in varying ways; fear may for example paralyze or direct a person to fight or flee. This paper theorizes how positive and negative emotions can give rise to different morals and types of solidarity and provides novel empirical examples. Simply stated, the political question “what do we want?” is inspired by positive emotions, such as awe, pride and joy that underlie private notions of a good society. On the other hand, the question “what don’t we want?” is inspired by negative emotions such as disgust, fear and contempt that underlie perceptions of evil. Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morality) shows how opposing moralities can emerge from the two types of questioning. Where the first causes individuals or groups to unite like birds of prey, for the same treat, the second causes them to unite in reaction to a perceived collective threat, like lambs. While common treats and threats are both conducive to solidarity and morals, the latter is reactive rather than spontaneous. The paper provides examples from my own research showing how Flanders’ Green and Nationalist party mirror each other regarding the type of morality that is being communicated or performed on twitter, where the first mainly exploits the spontaneous morality of treats and the latter a reactive morality of threats. Subsequently I highlight an interesting parallel in the history of philosophy, to explain the where the classical political problem “what do we want?” was largely abandoned for the question “what don’t we want?” with a prime focus on the legitimacy of political power and democracy (through social contract). Most famously this was done by Hobbes, who – after having witnessed value pluralism in action first-hand during civil war – argued humans are by nature hostile to each other and only bind together in order to overcome fear. Populist nationalists likewise utilize fear and focus on the legitimacy of sovereignty and of ‘the people’. They thrive in times of perceived moral and economic crisis by giving voice to negative emotions and providing a negative solidarity. Indeed, as Sophocles and other tragedians illustrate, scapegoating rituals often provide a (last) resort to remedy a continuing plague and social disorder by reactively uniting against a scapegoat. The paper concludes with some suggestions for future research. One avenue that especially merits attention is the increasing use of reactive morality in opposition to populist nationalism.

Keywords: Political Emotions, Morality, Solidarity, Populism, Nationalism

Bio: Job Vossen is a doctoral student of political science at Antwerp University with background in psychology and philosophy from Tilburg University. His PhD research looks at the way identity and solidarity are framed and imbued with morality by instrumentalizing gender, culture and sexuality.

2.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (2/3)

Tuesday, 29, 11:30 – 13:00

Room: Auditorium ILCH

Aylon Cohen (University of Chicago)

“Feeling Fraternal: Equality, Touch, and The Politics of Men's Bodies”

Email: ayloncohen@uchicago.edu

Abstract: The long 18th century forms a pivot point in the history of the body politic in the West. 1688 in England, 1776 in the United States, and 1789 in France mark the high points of the shift from the sovereignty of the king to the people. The age of monarchs gave way to republican states, as elected legislatures became representatives of the people. Since the publication of Carole Pateman's *Sexual Contract* (1978), feminist political theory has illustrated the centrality of gender to these 18th century revolutions. Rejecting the political figure of the Patriarch-King who demands obedience from his subject-children, republicans advocated for brotherhood as a new model of political equality. While scholars have explored the role of fraternity as a political discourse of gendered equality, little attention has been paid to the injunctions of fraternal love for the constitution of the new body politic. Using this feminist scholarship as a point of departure, this paper explores how the bodily gestures of brotherly love between men in fraternal organizations aimed to materially constitute the political ideal of equality. Focusing on Freemasonry as the definitive fraternal organization of the 18th century, I argue that masonic initiation rituals and practices of membership illustrate the importance of brotherly touch for cultivating political bonds of equality between loving brothers. This paper aims to analyze fraternal feeling in the dual senses of the word. On the one hand, 'feeling' can describe an emotional state or reaction. In this sense, Freemasons advocated for a republican vision of citizenship where men were bound together not by coercion but by voluntary feelings of brotherly love. On the other hand, feeling can describe a bodily or physical sensation. In this sense, Freemasonry elaborated complex initiation rituals, handshakes, and embraces where brothers touched, that is felt, one another's bodies. This paper argues that a proper understanding of the politics of fraternal feeling must take account of these dual meanings of feeling. To do so, the paper highlights the political significance of the sensing body by situating these fraternal organizations within the emerging 18th century paradigm of sensibility. Rejecting Cartesian mind-body dualisms, new scientific and literary trends viewed the body's materiality as both a medium of and means for cultivating moral and political conduct. Contextualized within the phenomenon of sensibility, then, the paper outlines the politics of fraternal feeling in both its tactile-material sense of touch and emotive sense of love. By re-reading the political transformations of sovereignty through an emphasis on sentimental fraternity, the paper not only highlights the politics of brotherly love for new conceptions of citizenship in the 18th century, but also argues for the political significance of the material and fleshly body for analyzing fraternal love. In so doing, the paper de-emphasizes the role of discourse for the study of emotions, shifting focus to the sensing body and its gestures in order to better understand the material politics of feelings in democracy.

Keywords: Fraternity, Love, Body, Touch, Republicanism

Bio: Aylon Cohen is a PhD candidate at the Department on Political Science at the University of Chicago. His work is situated at the intersection of political, feminist, and queer theory, and explores the questions of the male body, touch, and feeling in the political constitution of state sovereignty during the 18th century. His writing has been featured in both English and German collections, such as *Subjectivation in Political Theory and Contemporary Practices* (Palgrave, 2016) and *Tiere - Texte - Transformationen: Kritische Perspektiven der Human-Animal Studies* (Transcript, 2015).

Lorenzo del Savio (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich)
“McCormick on Machiavelli’s two humors and contemporary populism”

Email: lorenzo.delsavio@lmu.de

Abstract: John McCormick has recently re-discovered the Machiavellian arguments in favour of a “ferocious populism” that checks the power of political and economic elites. Such Machiavellian democratic arguments are based upon a frankly naturalistic rendition of the “humors” of two kinds of citizens: the “many” who do not want to be dominated, and the “few” whose appetites for domination are unrestrained. Such class-conscious analysis of political emotions is a relatively unexplored avenue to address two key contemporary challenges of democratic politics: both the destructive effects of populist politics and the overwhelming political power of economic elites. In this article I would like to reconstruct and extend the naturalistic and class-conscious approach of McCormick’s Machiavelli. I will do so by updating their analysis with contemporary scientific sources and by discussing political-institutional consequences. I firstly argue that there is anthropological and psychological evidence that supports the Machiavellian claim that the fundamental political passions of the elites and all the others may be strikingly different. On the one hand, fear and annoyance of domination are robust psychological features that have been historically and indeed evolutionistically consequential, and violently so. On the other, the power of economic elites make them psychologically unsuitable to pursue the common good, both motivationally and cognitively. These facts suggest that institutional design should generally strive to channel the controdominatory passions of the many — which would otherwise be destructive — and exploit these passions to constrain the power of the elites. Depending on the circumstances, this may require a restriction of the aristocratic, representative component of democracies, and its supplementation with populist procedures such as lotteries and plebiscites, as argued by McCormick. I contribute with new arguments to the effect that, extra-institutionally, a partisan, agonistic, fiercely contestatory public sphere should also be cultivated on the same grounds. Both kinds of measures may be necessary to contain both disruptive populist backlashes and the rapacity of the elites.

Keywords: Political Humors, Populism, Machiavelli, Domination, Elites.

Bio: Lorenzo Del Savio is a Postdoc researcher at the Münchner Kompetenzzentrum Ethik (LMU). His research interests lie at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of the life sciences.

Nora Timmermans (University of Leuven)
“The public sphere, sentimentalism and natural republicanism in the French Revolution”

Email: nora.timmermans@kuleuven.be

Abstract: Starting from the Habermasian account of the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere, I argue in this paper that the new, modern form of subjectivity that is presupposed within this account, not only led to the formation of the public sphere, but also had significant effects in the public sphere. If Habermas’ account is accurate or at least plausible, it is any case incomplete. Contemporary research in the history of emotions has shown that the awakening of the modern subject also inspired an important change in the understanding and the experience of emotions, which was of fundamental importance in the public debate. The late 1780’s and early 1790’s were characterized by a very intense and also very particular historical experience, known as “sensibilité”, “sensitivity” or “sentimentalism” and that can be described as “the cultural expectation of the performance of a natural sincerity through emotional excess” (David Denby, 1994). Compared to the Old Regime, the age of sensibility meant a radical increase and intensification of the use and expression of emotions, in the private, but also - and more importantly for my argument - in the emergent public debate. On the basis of this research, I contend that reason and emotion both need to be taken into account when assessing the advent of modern politics of which the public sphere is deemed to be an integral element. Although intellectual historians have recently been applying this more encompassing theoretical perspective to

the French revolutionary political debates, no-one has yet examined its effects on the ideological positions of the French revolutionaries. Strikingly, as I will explore in the second part of this paper, it did influence their positions with regard to public opinion and freedom of the press – both deemed crucial prerequisites for a well-functioning public sphere. Drawing on the work of Dan Edelstein, who has identified sentimentalism as one of the catalysts that enabled a particular form of ‘natural republicanism’, I will show that natural republicanism entailed a very restrictive view on the significance of public opinion and freedom of the press. These philosophical premises can explain the control of the press and the political censorship during the Terror in terms that are more fundamental than mere political strategy and opportunism.

Keywords: public sphere; history of emotions; sentimentalism; republicanism; freedom of the press

Bio: I am a PhD student in political philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy in Leuven, Belgium. In my PhD research, I examine the relation between the social and the political in 19th and 20th century French liberalism. I am funded by an individual scholarship of the Research Foundation Flanders.

2.B THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONS

Tuesday, 29, 11:30 – 13:00

Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Virgil Brower (Charles University, Prague)

“Shame, disgust & physiology of race & identity politics: Emotional transformations of the public sphere in Nussbaum & Agamben”

Email: virgil@u.northwestern.edu

Abstract: Further developing her earlier studies on shame, Martha Nussbaum suggests, in “Political Emotions”, that disgust becomes a political problem as personal feelings are projected outward onto identified minority groups. “Projective disgust is disgust for a group of other humans who are segmented from the dominant group and classified as lower because of being (allegedly) more animal...They are associated with sexual fluids, excrement, and decay.” Adorno makes note of a similar dynamic at play in fascism and Sartre suggests its role in anti-Semitism. As repugnant feelings form into “exclusionary disgust,” it becomes, for Nussbaum, a “threat posed to morality” that “jeopardizes national projects...for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet.” The politics of emotional projection arguably can be traced back to the cultural instauration of the modern concept of ‘race’ (and eugenics), e.g., as found in Arthur de Gobineau’s “The Inequality of the Human Races.” One of Gobineau’s primal physiological presumptions is that there is an undeniable “part of mankind, is in its own nature stricken with paralysis, which makes it forever unable to take even the first step towards civilization, since it cannot overcome the natural repugnance, felt by men and animals alike, to a crossing of blood.” Nussbaum calls into question Gobineau’s anthropomorphic zoology and reductive animality. She believes instead that, “problems of discrimination and group subordination require us to think about the role played in human development by disgust and shame at the human body itself, a problem that no other species seems to have.” This relation between shame, disgust, and animality in Nussbaum is discernible, as well, in Giorgio Agamben, for whom shame “is grounded in our being’s incapacity to move away and break from itself” that “originates in our own intimacy; it is what is most intimate in us (for example, our own physiological life.)” This intimate experience of physiological life corresponds with disgust as “an obscure awareness that in [humanity] something lives so akin to the animal that it might be recognized.” Agamben translates this into optical terms. “The phenomenon of *aidos*...unites respectively active vision and passive vision, the man who sees and is seen, the seen world and the seeing world.” He concludes “whoever experiences shame is overcome by his own being subject to vision...” Nussbaum resists this temptation to conceive disgust as optics. It must instead be ad-

dressed to gustation. Nussbaum's interest in the gustatory aspects of the Bengali Bauls is precisely their endeavor to overcome such disgust. They cultivate love and an attachment to humanity by "their well-known initiation ritual, in which new members [are] required to taste all the fluids of the body—thus, apparently, overcoming disgust with one's own bodily nature." As such, they compromise the shameful disgust Agamben believes most intimate in physiological life. For Nussbaum, the Bauls begin surpassing their private disgusts, which, in turn, has beneficial effects on their political lives.

Keywords: Political Exclusion, Emotional Projection, Disgust, Race, Animality

Bio: Virgil W. Brower began teaching ethics at the Chicago Police Academy, while Full-Time Lecturer of Philosophy at Chicago State University, where he co-administrated the Honors College and taught logic and ethics for over a decade. He holds two PhDs and is Research Fellow in Philosophy, Theology & Media Theory at Charles University in Prague.

Francisco David Corrales Cordón (University of Girona)
"Assessing Nussbaum's arguments on fear as a political emotion"

Email: david.corrales@udg.edu / fdcorrales@gmail.com

Abstract: Our paper aims to assess Nussbaum's arguments about fear as a narrowing emotion in her "Political Emotions". It will be claimed that notwithstanding the wide range and richness of the sources used to argue her position, there is no in-depth analysis of its problematic aspects. This results in a rather limited and weak argumentation of significant issues, and especially of the core point of the book: the prioritization of love and other broadening emotions for a well ordered political community. At this respect, we will focus on some aspects of the evolutionary biology she uses to give support to her position. The development of the paper will be divided into two parts as follows: 1) Nussbaum's characterization of fear as a narrowing emotion. Although she does not exclude the possibility of a broadened kind of fear based on views of good and evil, fear is labeled as a primitive emotion with an inherent tendency to resist good developments (p. 321). This inherent tendency seems to be identified with "mechanisms that are rooted in genuine evolutionary usefulness" (ibidem). This same characteristic explains the exploitable nature of fear by "rhetoric and politics (p. 322), and makes of it an enemy of compassion and, in general, of broadening emotions. 2) Using Nussbaum's sources on the subject of empathy and the evolutionary basis of morality, we will argue that those "mechanisms" of evolutionary usefulness may also be considered principles of a broadening social tendency. Evidences (see for instance De Waal's "The Age of Empathy" [La Edad de la Empatía, Barcelona: Booklet, pp. 36-40]) show that fear causes animals to move close to the others individuals of the same species. This may be identified as a broadening dynamic irrespective of the cognitive value of that response, and even if it is rooted in evolutionary usefulness: as a matter of fact there is an effective collaboration resulting in survival. Moreover, De Waal also argues that fear is in the origin of our social life (ibidem). 3) By the same token, we will argue that even if fear does not necessarily entail empathy, it appears that as a primitive or primary emotional response it is necessarily implied in the origins of empathetic reactions of different animal species: an imaginative displacement occurs when two individuals perceive reciprocally the fear of the other, and this may lead to a mutual approach and the establishment of social bonds, as appears to be suggested, for instance, in Montesquieu's "De l'Ésprit de Lois" (I, II); on the other hand, we will argue that a broadening emotion as compassion can hardly be understood without fear: we experience compassion because we believe that somebody has been undeservedly harmed, and this undeserved harm is an object of fear for the individual. We will conclude that although political emotions matters for justice, Nussbaum's attempts to prioritize particular emotions as love or compassion over fear lack a solid justification.

Keywords: Nussbaum, Fear, Narrowing/Broadening Emotions,

Bio: Francisco David Corrales Cordón is Adjunct Professor at the University of Girona. His area of specialization is Ancient Philosophy and Rhetoric and his area of competence includes Moral and Political Philosophy and Aesthetics.

Krupa Patel (Harvard University)

“Excusable Envy: A Neglected Worry for the Stability of Rawls’s Society of Peoples”

Email: krupapatel@g.harvard.edu

Abstract: Envy has long been regarded as a vice in philosophy, associated with hatred of mankind (Kant) and demonized as a bad passion that admits of no mean (Aristotle). This is unsurprising, given its connotations of ingratitude and threat to politically pertinent values such as cooperation. But John Rawls is a notable exception in the literature, making space in *A Theory of Justice* for a discussion of excusable envy, or envy that it would be unreasonable to ask one to overcome in the face of circumstances where one’s lesser position is so great as to cause a loss of self-esteem. Rawls recognized that, if aroused to a socially dangerous degree, this kind of envy could undermine the arrangements of the just basic structure by hurting social cooperation and encouraging mutually disadvantageous action. However, he neglected to discuss this worry in his later work on international relations, *Law of Peoples*. In this, I believe Rawls erred.

In this paper, I argue that one reason excusable envy presents a worry for Rawls’s *Law of Peoples* is because it threatens to destabilize the Society of Peoples. First, I briefly discuss Rawls’s treatment of envy in the context of the well-ordered society, explaining his notion of excusable envy. Next, I provide reasons to believe that the conditions Rawls argues would evoke hostile outbreaks of envy in the well-ordered society may also arise in the Society of Peoples. I also note how several of the features of the well-ordered society that Rawls indicates would mitigate this envy or prevent it from arising are not present in the Society of Peoples, raising the question of how, if at all, this envy would be managed by the basic structure of the latter. Notably, the Society of Peoples, unlike the well-ordered society, has no international difference principle, no factors constraining the growth of international inequalities, and no clear constructive alternatives to hostile outbreaks of envy. Finally, in the third section, I explore one way in which the stability of the Society of Peoples may be undermined by sufficient degrees of this envy, reflecting on a phenomenon salient in our current political moment: the power of envy, evoked by stark international inequalities under particular conditions, to motivate migration to societies with greater economic prospects and opportunities.

Keywords: international inequalities, envy, stability, migration, Rawls

Bio: I am a second-year JD/PhD student at Harvard University and am primarily interested in issues in moral and political philosophy. I am currently investigating the tension between human rights and state sovereignty, state duties to the global poor, the ground and scope of duties of beneficence, and the socially destabilizing effects of stark inequalities. I am interested in these questions both as topics of research and as issues in urgent need of policy solutions informed by moral considerations.

3.A THE LEGACY OF THE CLASSICS

Tuesday, 29, 15:00 – 17:00

Room: Auditorium ILCH

Gianluigi Segalerba (Arbeitskreis Kulturanalyse Universität, Vienna)
“Reason and antireason in Plato”

Email: gianluigi.segalerba@univie.ac.at

Abstract: In my contribution, I analyze some aspects of Plato’s conception of the parallelism between soul and society. A particular attention will be dedicated to the destructive force of at least some emotions and passions both for the individual and for the community of individuals: the structure of the soul, the reciprocal influences of the conditions of the soul on the society and of the society on the soul, the processes of moral degeneration of the constitutions and of the individual souls will be, therefore, the main themes of my exposition. I shall base my contribution on the Republic (in particular, on passages taken from books IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Republic); references to other works of Plato will also be present in my analysis. I shall develop themes such as the contrast between the rational part and the appetitive part of the soul together with the contrast between desires of the rational part and desires of the appetitive part; the development of evil emotions and their influences both on the destruction of the balance of the individual soul and on the degeneration of the constitutions; the process of degeneration of the state and of the different form of constitutions and the causes of the death of a state in relation to the prevalence in a society and in the individual of some evil components; the processes of individuals’ internalization of the bad conditions of a society and of individuals’ externalization of the bad conditions of the souls into a society. Furthermore, Plato’s remarks on the presence of an evil factor in everyone will be dealt with in the exposition. The presence of an evil factor in men’s soul is attested, for instance, in Republic IX, 571b3-572b9, and in Republic 588b1-589b7. Plato asserts, among other things, that a component of our soul, at least while sleeping, does not omit any act of folly or shamelessness: human beings are capable of every crime. This predisposition is not accidental: on the contrary, it belongs to the very nature of men, since a terrible, savage, and lawless form of desires is present in every person, even in the seemingly most measured persons. This soul component appears to be a kind of “antireason”. Thus, men have in themselves emotions being able to destroy everybody and everything. I shall describe how, in Plato, the structure of the individual soul has immediate effects and immediate impacts for every state and every society, as we can see through the description of the degeneration and the decadence of the constitutions in the books VIII and IX of the Republic. An analysis of the individual soul immediately represents, for Plato, an analysis of the dangers for the stability of the individual and of the community: only through this analysis can strategies be found that are able to guarantee the stability of every state. Mechanisms of balance between the parts of the soul are to be found and to be developed through a correct education of the individuals: The reasoning part of (at least some) individuals ought to be improved. The right moral conditions of the soul will not arise by themselves; they will arise only as a result of a long apprenticeship. Without cultivation of the rational part of the soul, the individual will be at least at risk of moral degeneration; the mechanism of control of the other components of the soul needs the rational part; my analysis will, therefore, deal with the risks of degeneration of the individuals and of the constitutions and with the remedies against the moral degeneration. A comparison between Thrasymachus, Glaukon and Adeimantos in the books I and II of the Republic with some passages of Thucydides will furthermore belong to my exposition. The analysis of some similarities between Plato’s tripartition of the soul and Freud’s analysis of the structure of the soul with particular attention for Freud’s *Todestrieb* in the Es will then end my presentation.

Keywords: Plato, Republic, Constitutions, Soul, Degeneration

Bio: Gianluigi Segalerba graduated in Philosophy in 1991 and obtained his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Pisa in 1998. He was visiting scholar at the Universities of Tübingen, of Berne, of Vienna. His research interests include ontology, ancient philosophy, economic ethics, human rights, cosmopolitanism, theories of emotions, feminism, multiculturalism, environmental philosophy, philosophy for children, and animal ethics. His first book was “Note su Ousia” (Pisa 2001). He was co-editor of the volume “Substantia – Sic et Non” (Frankfurt on the Main 2008), and he is the author of the book “Semantik und Ontologie: Drei Studien zu Aristoteles” (Berne 2013). He has published academic articles in reviews from Austria, Brazil, Germany, Greece, Romania, and Switzerland. He currently lives and works in Vienna.

Hélder Telo (University of Coimbra)
“Political care and political emotions in Plato and Aristotle”

Email: heldertelo@hotmail.com

Abstract: Both Plato and Aristotle consider that political communities are, for the most part, very imperfect and need to be cared for. This political care implies deeply changing these communities and their citizens by improving their way of seeing things, their way of acting and also their way of feeling. This latter aspect is perhaps less obvious in the texts, but it nevertheless plays a central role in some of these authors’ political discussions. In “Republic” V, Plato proposes the abolition of personal property and the community of spouses and children as a way of bringing about the highest form of political unity and civic friendship. This would then translate into a community of pleasures and pains, according to which each citizen (or at least each guardian) would, as far as possible, experience the pleasures and the pains of all others. Aristotle, in turn, strongly criticizes this conception in book II of “Politics”. Among other things, he argues that such a unity is impracticable and aiming at it would only cause people to care less for each other and for the community. Hence, according to Aristotle, private family and property should not be abolished. Instead, political care should promote moral virtues such as generosity, because these virtues are directed at others and can therefore bring a certain unity to the polis. This does not mean that emotions should no longer play any role in political life. In fact, according to Aristotle, the exercise of these virtues affords us great pleasure, which constitutes a different kind of political emotion. Thus, Plato’s and Aristotle’s political ideals, as well as their conceptions of political care, seem to aim at two very different kinds of political emotions: namely, shared emotions (or emotional identification) and the emotions that characterize a virtuous way of relating to others. However, I will argue that these two ideals and these two kinds of political emotions can be combined and that by doing so we can develop a concept of political care that is better equipped to face the challenges of political life.

Keywords: Care, Unity, Virtue, Pleasure, Pain

Bio: Hélder Telo was recently awarded his PhD at the New University of Lisbon after writing a thesis on Plato’s notion of unexamined life. He is currently doing research on the care of others in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.

Emo Trimčev (University of Greifswald)
“On the agonistic political psychology of the symposium in Plato’s Laws”

Email: eno.trimcev@uni-greifswald.de

Abstract: This article connects the classical political psychology of the symposium in Plato’s Laws with the contemporary argument of agonistic theories on the constitutive role of contestation and emotions for politics. Reading the text on drinking wine with friends in the context of the myth of the divine puppets, it argues that Plato’s Athenian Stranger unfolds a political psychology which distinguishes politics from rule in order to

show how politics sublates rule. The symposium stands as an example for politics by intensifying and hence training the emotions of fear and shame involved in political activity. By showing how the political virtues are achieved by stimulating their obverse, the Stranger can contribute to shifting contemporary agonist theory towards a concern with the ends of politics.

Keywords: Plato, Politics, Symposium, Friendship, Agonism

Bio: I am a wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter (Research Fellow) at the University of Greifswald, Chair of Political Theory and the History of Ideas. I have published a book on Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin on the question of political foundings and articles on Arendt, Oakeshott, and theory. I hold a DPhil from the University of Oxford.

Ronald Weed (University of New Brunswick)
“Aristotle on populist emotions and political conflict”

Email: rweed@unb.ca

Abstract: In an age of populism and demagoguery we are reminded of ancient reflections on the destabilizing implications of this problem. Aristotle highlights this problem in his **Politics** where he notes that both declining oligarchies and democracies attract populist impulses that enable aspiring power players to emerge through strategic conflict against unpopular representations of privilege and power. These are factionalizing moments where emerging demagogues or other opportunist agents may tap into at least a few core political emotions, such as fear, indignation and envy. On Aristotle’s account, these emotions have features that can lend themselves to exploitation in the public square, such as 1) triggering circumstances with a more immediate purview, 2) impulsive effects that short circuit deliberation and 3) a connective power that can mobilize factional sections in pathological ways. This paper draws from key threads of Aristotle’s **Politics**, **Nicomachean Ethics** and **Rhetoric** to discuss how these three emotions function in conflict scenarios indigent to declining democracies and oligarchies.

Keywords: Political Emotions, Aristotle, Political Conflict

Bio: Ronald Weed is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Brunswick. He works in ancient Greek philosophy, political philosophy and ethics. He has published work on Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, and contemporary philosophy.

3.B COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS AND MOBILIZATION

Tuesday, 29, 15:00 – 17:00
Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Thomás Zicman de Barros (Science Po Paris)
“Anger (colère) and outrage (indignation): two affects in contemporary French demonstrations”

Email: thomas.zicmandebarros@sciencespo.fr

Abstract: In 2016 and 2018, France has seen two political emotions at the heart of what could be called “pre-populist” mobilizations. With the “Nuit Debout” movement, in the beginning of 2016, the main affect invoked by demonstrators was outrage (“indignation”) – to a certain extent, due to Stéphane Hessel’s book,

“Time to Outrage” (Indignez-vous!, 2010). Currently, in the end of 2018, the yellow jackets (“gilets jaunes”) movement claim to express the French anger (“colère”) against political establishment. It’s clear that both appeals to emotions in political speeches lack a deep formalization. Possibly, “indignation” and “colère” are just synonyms used in different contexts to express the same feelings. However, one cannot deny the different approaches and political projects presented by these two movement. The outrage movement seems to be structured around what Sigmund Freud called “helplessness” (Hilflosigkeit), putting into question the pillars of our social practices, questioning our political identities and opening the way to contingency. The anger movements, in the opposite direction, seem to reject the political class in order to reaffirm traditional values and an individualist and consumerist logic, putting forward a closed identity. If the first movement claimed for a leftwing overcoming of capitalist society, the second one wanted to preserve ordinary citizens’ purchasing power, frequently flirting with resentful anti-immigration scapegoating. Hence, building on the works of Ernesto Laclau (On Populist Reason, 2005) and Vladimir Safatle (O Circuito dos Afetos, 2016) and analyzing political manifestos from these mobilizations, the aim of this communication is to advance a clear conceptualization of the two kinds of political affects that circulate in these two movements, indicating their differences as well as their points of convergence. Our partial conclusion is that a movement structured around outrage can easily be converted into a mobilization based on anger and resentment.

Keywords: Outrage; Anger; Nuit Debout; Gilets Jaunes; Affects

Bio: Thomás Zicman de Barro is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris - Sciences Po Paris, associated with the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF). He has a bachelor degree in Economics from the University of São Paulo (2008-2012) and a Master of Philosophy degree in Political Theory from the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris - Sciences Po Paris (2014-2016). He develops his research activity on the interdisciplinary articulation between Political Theory and Psychoanalysis, studying movements that criticize mechanisms of political representation and reflecting about the role of political leadership in the determination of collective identities.

Abel Franco (California State University)

“Genuinely collective emotions?: Their reality and their political use”

Email: abel.franco@yahoo.com

Abstract: Some philosophers have agreed that we should take seriously the commonsense perception that there are collective emotions. And we might be tempted to think that, if such emotions exist, these are the ones that may play a more significant role in politics—from determining who might win an election to alerting presidential candidates about how to generate or guide them in their favor. What characterizes these emotions and whether we can really call them collective are, however, still debated issues. I will try to add some ideas to three aspects of the debate: (1) the subject of these emotions; (2) their intentionality; and (3) their phenomenology. I will try, in particular, to present an alternative to Margaret Gilbert (2002)’s view that these emotions require a “joint commitment to feel as a body.” (1) We usually call them collective emotions because they are held by collectivities, not because they are about collectivities. Emotions behind statements such as “we Ukrainians are afraid of Russia,” or “I, as a Spaniard, feel guilty about what Spain did in America after 1492” are paradigmatic cases. But emotions, properly speaking, are at the end held only by individuals. Thus, if we want to distinguish collective from individual (personal) emotions, we should recognize as genuine subjects of the former individuals insofar as they belong to a collectivity. Loving collectively, unlike loving individually (personally), is loving with others. This explains the sadness of the expatriate that watches alone—and without any awareness about whether anybody else is watching—how a tennis player of her own country loses the final of a major tournament. Her sadness can be said to be collective insofar as a collectivity (nation) might explain it. That collectivity is the reason why the loss is relevant for her. (2) Regarding their intentionality, these emotions do not seem, at first sight, to be different from non-collective emotions. Anything could be a proper object of collective emotions. They can be collectivities themselves (e.g. a foreign government that has banned one of our nation’s products) but also individuals (e.g. our collective emotional reactions to what

we usually call public figures). The difference seems to be rather in how we relate to the object. Both the fear of seeing a national tennis player loose and the fear about the safety of your own child seem to depend on the previous formation of an emotional unity, a unity formed with a collectivity in one case and with an individual in the other. (3) This suggests that the difference collective/individual emotions might be a question of degrees, not of types. If our collective emotions are just emotions that depend on different emotional unions, the different types of unions we become part of and our different involvement in them can account for those degrees. This means that, as all politicians know, war against an enemy nation must appeal to a greater and stronger emotional union. This also explains why different collective emotions might be experienced differently by the same individual and why sometimes our collective emotions might be indistinguishable, phenomenologically, from personal emotions.

Keywords: collective emotions, group emotions, intentionality

Bio: Abel B. Franco holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Salamanca, Spain, and a Ph.D. in History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Pittsburgh, USA. He is currently a full professor at California State University, Northridge (USA).

Andrea Nicolini (University of Verona)

“Radical emotions: Some moral considerations about jouissance and effervescence”

Email: andrea.nicolini.uni@gmail.com

Abstract: "Community" comes from the Latin word *communitas*, which is composed of *cum*, meaning "with," and *munus* a word that has three meanings: "duty," "debit," and "gift." As Marcel Mauss argued in his *Essay sur le don*, a gift is never free, but instead imposes a servitude that can be avoided only by reciprocating the gift. *Communitas* therefore – although with different nuances – means to be tied to something to which we are obliged, something that demands a credit from us. Every form of community requires people to give up some of their time, their energy, and their freedom in order to join the group. Why do people choose to submit to this payment? Why do they renounce their sovereignty in order to be part of a community? Durkheim explains this need with the term "effervescence" and describes it as an overwhelming emotion that cannot be resisted and that is able to bind people together in a common feeling of belonging. Comparing the notion of effervescence with that of *jouissance*, I want to argue that inside human beings coexists two different emotional forces, both overwhelming, that drive in opposite directions: effervescence connects people with feelings of togetherness; *jouissance* creates monads, separate and distinct, monads that cannot communicate anymore, monads that no longer need to interact with each other. Through analyzing Pasolini's *Teorema*, the intention of my paper is to suggest that besides a sublimated effervescence that, according to Durkheim, blends people together, there is also another force that does not let itself be sublimated and for this reason checkmates the Symbolic order of society. This force is the death drive, namely the drive that, according to Freud, is beyond the pleasure principle and works against the flourishing of the individual inside society. The final goal of my paper is to suggest that political philosophy can elaborate a radical theory of emotions only if it seriously takes into account these antithetical emotional forces.

Keywords: *Jouissance*, effervescence, Pasolini, society, emotions

Bio: Andrea Nicolini teaches Moral Philosophy at the University of Verona where he is also a member of *Tiresia* (Research Center in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis). After having studied at the University of Milan and at the Sorbonne University of Paris, he obtained a Masters in Civic Education (in collaboration with Princeton University) and a PhD between Italy and the United States where he was invited many times as a visiting scholar. He attended numerous international conferences at prestigious universities in Italy and abroad (Harvard University, Tufts University, NTU, *Academia Belgica*, *La Sapienza*). Among the articles and books that he has published, the latest are *Self-Recognition and the Genesis of Consciousness* (2018) and

Lascia ch'io pianga (2017). His main interests concern the relation between ethics and emotions that he investigates through an interdisciplinary approach that moves from philosophy to psychoanalysis and cinema.

Léna Silberzahn (Science Po, Paris)
“Affect and agency in environmental movements”

Email: lena.silberzahn@sciencespo.fr

Abstract: In this contribution, I offer a philosophical inquiry into how the perspective of ecological collapse and the negative emotions it sparks impact political agency. While there is a growing consensus about the necessity of triggering positive emotions to mobilize citizens for political action against climate change, the impact of ‘negative’ emotions, such as fear, anger, and sadness remains highly controversial and understudied. Despite facing difficult emotional states with consequences on their daily work, most scientists, politicians and activists avoid displaying them and even talking about them. To what extent do the refusal to trigger - and the inability to cope with- negative emotions regarding climate change impede our political agency? My analysis is developed in three major sections. The first section briefly assesses the limits to the current approaches to political climate mobilization, either based on an information deficit model or the desire to stay “positive”, and links it to the modern western culture of rationalism and compulsory optimism. Part two describes the insights of German philosopher of technique Günther Anders and Norwegian deep ecologist and philosopher Arne Naess regarding the status of the emotions as vehicles of knowledge and symptoms of our relatedness with the world. Their philosophies help us to understand how negative emotions such as fear can play a role as ethical compass (affect heuristic) and become resources for political action. The third and last section is based on fieldwork I did within multiple environmental groups and examines what tools and practices activists have been implementing to cope with the negative emotions induced by their daily work related with ecological collapse. In conclusion, I argue that the elaboration of reflexive social settings where emotions are collectively dealt with and acted upon is essential to the building of ecologically resilient societies.

Keywords: climate change; micro-politics; emotion work; agency; social movements

Bio: Léna Silberzahn is a PhD candidate in political theory at Sciences Po Paris. She’s interested in the depoliticization of ecological and economical conflicts by rhetorics of individual responsibility. For her PhD, she studies the role of negative emotions in environmental mobilisations.

4.A 20th CENTURY CONTINENTAL THEORY

Wednesday, 30, 9:30 – 11:30
Room: Auditorium ILCH

Kathrin Bouvot (University of Vienna)
“The role of the emotions in politics”

Email: k.bouvot@gmail.com

Abstract: The Role of the Emotions in Politics

Max Weber claims admittedly in "Politics as a Vocation" that politics is made of reason but at the same time he notices that politics contains a certain kind of emotion, namely a diabolic force: "Also the early Christians knew full well the world is governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power

and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.” In a further passage of ‘Politics as a Vocation’ Max Weber argues that the embarking on “diabolic forces” belongs to the nature of politics: “Whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He must know that he is responsible for what may become of himself under the impact of these paradoxes. I repeat, he lets himself in for the diabolic forces lurking in all violence.” Dolf Sternberger concedes in his work *Drei Wurzeln der Politik* the aforementioned “diabolic forces” a systematic, indeed enigmatic status in his political terminology. The diabolic forces are part of the sphere of the emotions, namely for good and for bad purposes. The concept “emotions”, however, was and is used in the political sciences in an extraordinary differing way. In a brief survey through the history of political ideas and through the history of philosophy, I want to illuminate the role of the emotions, in particular of the significance of the anger, in politics. Is it possible to be a successful politician without having emotions for the political activities and goals and towards the political opponents?

Keywords: Emotions, Max Weber, Reason, Diabolic Force, Anger

Bio: Mag. Kathrin Bouvot, MA, BA, BA. Born in Vienna. Studied philosophy, psychology and Spanish literature at the University of Vienna. Special research interest: Political and Social Philosophy, Ethics, the works of Friedrich Nietzsche.

José Colen (CEPS, University of Minho) / António Baião (CEPS, University of Minho)
“Rationality, tyranny and ‘Hubris’: Foucault's reading of Sophocles' Oedipus”

Email: jacolen64@gmail.com / antoniosaraivabaiao@gmail.com

Abstract: Recent attention to the role of the appeal to emotions should not obscure the fact that in today's democracies the personality of the elect plays as important a role as their rhetoric skills, or their political program, both in what concerns the persuasion of the crowds and in the conduct of policies. The current populist leaders are characterized by a form of "arrogance" which the classical Greeks called "hubris," a peculiar mix of ambition and arrogance. The typical figure of the tragic hero, whose decisions dictate the fate of the whole city, is the "tyrant" Oedipus as presented in the Theban cycle of Sophocles' plays. Sophocles treats as few others have the relation between the tragic destiny of the hero and the revelation of the truth, and it is, therefore, only natural that his texts have been the subject of very different interpretations. Oedipus is the name of both a universal psychological "complex" (Freud), the moment of "self-consciousness" in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, the designation of the prediction's "effect" on social behavior change (Karl Popper), just to name a few. As if Oedipus misfortune was not in itself troubling enough, Michel Foucault, in his first course at the Collège de France (1970-1971) develops yet another re-reading of the tragedies around the tyrant. But while, according to Freud, "Oedipus was speaking to him about the universal forms of desire," in fact, in low voice, "the Oedipus fable was recounting to him the historical constraint weighing in our system of truth, on which system Freud himself belonged" (Will to Know, 196-7). Michel Foucault takes up the topic of Oedipal knowledge several times again in conferences and texts, delivered on several occasions (delivered with the title "Le savoir d'OEdipe" at the State University of New York at Buffalo, Cornell University in 1972, at Rio de Janeiro in 1973. There are seven versions of the text in the Foucault archives. Moreover, later on, in the course titled *Le gouvernement des Vivants*, during almost three lectures, it is Foucault himself that, in a low voice, tells his audience a secret and explain how the tragedies of Sophocles relate to the nucleus of his apparently scattered historical investigations. In this paper, we will contextualize what we may describe in the Foucault's language "the constitutive elements of the transformation of the juridical-religious truth-test in archaic Greece into the political-juridical truth-report of classical Greece" thus reconstructing one of the most important processes in the history of the "production of truth". But our main goal is to point how this reading of history relates to the "negative" political agenda of the French philosopher's investigations.

Keywords: Sophocles, Michel Foucault, Oedipus, Rule of Law, Hubris, Desire

Bio: José Colen is recurrent Guest Professor of the Institute for Political Studies at Portuguese Catholic University and of the CESPRA of the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Paris). He was Visiting Scholar at Notre Dame University (Indiana) in 2014 and for 2 years conducted studies at the Special Collections of the University of Chicago. He was also Visiting Scholar and Guest Researcher at the University of Vienna (Fall 2105), and at Universidad de Navarra (Winter - Spring 2016). In 2016-17 he was James Madison Fellow at Princeton University. At EHESS received the support of Pierre Manent, then working about Montaigne and co-organized with him a Journée d'études on the early moderns; and also of Dominique Schnapper, the main figure of the republican thought in France. In Indiana his studies on Plato benefited immensely with Catherine Zuckert regular meetings and insights. Received national (Aster 2014, 2012) and international (Aron 2010) prizes for these studies and was entrusted significant projects of edition, commentary or translation of some of their work. His most recent books include *Voting, Governments and Markets* (2010); *Guide to the Introduction of the Philosophy of History* (2011); *Facts and Values: A Conversation* (2012), *Platão Absconditus* (2013), *The Early Moderns* (2014), and *The Companion to Raymond Aron* (2015), *Toward Natural Right and History* (2017-2018).

António Baião is a PhD candidate in Social and Political Philosophy at the Institute of Arts and Humanities of University of Minho and he is currently a visiting scholar at Instituto Cultura y Sociedad in the University of Navarra. In his PhD project, he intend to develop a theoretical and critical analysis of contemporary anarchist thought.

Héla Hecker (Carl von Ossietzky University, Oldenburg)
“The relevance of emotions to politics: Re-reading Hannah Arendt”

Email: hela.hecker@uni-oldenburg.de

Abstract: During the second half of the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt’s writings have fundamentally shaped critical approaches to political theory. Widely recognized as a thinker of a rational political order, the place of emotions and affects in Arendt’s work is mostly ignored in the reception and interpretation of her theory. Analyses of Arendt’s thought often misleadingly and simplistically argue that she classifies the emotional as a threat to the political. I offer a different reading of the Arendtian theory, focusing on the role of human affectability in her work. My core argument suggests that Arendt’s work does not exclude emotions from the political sphere; rather, it requires their transformation into political principles, integrating them into a pluralistic space in which they become relevant. Arendt is not interested in defining a scheme that could generate positive and effective political feelings. She identifies humans as naturally affectable beings. As such, they are driven by passions and emotions that touch the very core of their private space. It is precisely this special kind of privacy (similar in structure but not in function to the oikos) that stands at the heart of Arendt’s approach to emotions. She is interested in the transformation from that which transpires privately into a publicly audible event; in the conditions that turn individual sensation into concrete and relevant action aimed to secure freedom and plurality in society. I also want to introduce my reading of Arendt’s work as an expression and as a result of an affectable and affected political thinking. Her key concepts and the development of her theoretical thought are ignited, I argue, by passion and emotion. For example, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt states that one must anticipate the fear of the concentration camp prisoner in order to understand the nature of the totalitarian regime. Only by embodying that anxiety is theoretical insight made possible. In context of the conference I want to focus on the question how political emotions have been conceived in the work of a particular political thinker, namely Hannah Arendt, and also argue that Arendt’s political theory should be conceived as an expression of political emotions, more precisely: As their transformation into a publicly relevant and audible announcement.

Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Political Theory, Emotions, Affects, Transformation

Bio: Héla Hecker is a doctoral candidate and research assistant at the Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg (Germany). She received her BA from the Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest and her MA from the Humboldt University in Berlin. She was a visiting scholar at the New School for Social Research (Fall 2017) and a fellow at the Institute for Critical Social Inquiry (Summer 2018). Her dissertation project focuses on the relevance of affects to politics in Hannah Arendt's work.

**Nythamar de Oliveira (Pontifical Catholic University at Porto Alegre)
"Recasting political emotions: Critical theory, neuroscience, and social life-forms"**

Email: nythamar@yahoo.com

Abstract: In order to account for the normative significance of emotions, feelings, passions and affects in politics nowadays, I will argue for the primacy of the social (das Soziale) over the political (das Politische), in the light of evolutionary, neurobiological findings relating basic emotions to social, moral sentiments and social evolution. On this view, social normativity is shown to be co-constitutive of moral agency, as suggested by Rahel Jaeggi's conception of social life-forms (Lebensformen) as lifeworldly intertwined features of pre-theoretical practices and relations that are prior to institutional and systemic arrangements such as the State, governmental, juridical, and political structures. Because authors like Sara Ahmed and Martha Nussbaum fail to account for such a distinction, their respective conceptions of political emotions end up favoring a Schmittian-like misreading of both Hobbesian and Spinozan accounts of the so-called state of nature and their respective criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism, so that passions and affects seem to be disconnected from rational choice and decision-making processes. Critical theory's normative reconstruction of sociality, I will argue, must be thus complemented with correlated accounts of social emotions, such as the ones offered by neuroscience and cognitive science. By resorting to António Damásio's contention that "emotion, feeling and biological regulation all play a role in human reason" and to Jesse Prinz's reformulation of social cognition in embodied, embedded, extended, enactive and affective terms, I will recast a view of political emotions that critically avoids both normativism and reductionist versions of naturalism. By revisiting cognitivist and functionalist views of empathy, compassion, and social emotions, I will propose to rethink them as highly flexible, context-dependent responses to different environments, through networks of varieties of basic homeostasis (nonconsciously guided) and sociocultural homeostasis (created and guided by reflective conscious minds), ultimately leading to cooperation and the evolution of social norms, especially norms of fairness. Accordingly, a homeostatic understanding of the development of moral rules, laws, and justice systems can be regarded as a promising response to the detection of imbalances caused by social behaviors that endanger individuals and the group. The cultural devices created in response to the imbalance aim to restore the desirable equilibrium between individuals and political institutions. Hence, humans are capable of social cooperation and empathy, but they alone cannot account for the normative thrust of moral agency. In this paper, I will argue that both Damásio and Prinz succeed in showing that social homeostasis rather than individual voluntarism and the social brain rather than the solipsist mind are what must ultimately account for a scientifically informed theory of normativity, as mitigated versions of naturalism meet halfway with mitigated conceptions of normativity in weak social constructivism, insofar as social evolutionary processes are guided by normative claims, in both reflexive and social terms, with a view to realizing universalizable, valid claims that are justified from the normative standpoint precisely because they are fit for the survival and preservation of the species.

Keywords: Critical Theory, Emotions, Neuroscience, Normativity, Sociality

Bio: Full Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University at Porto Alegre, Brazil (PUCRS), National Research Council (CNPq) Fellow, coordinator of Research Group in Neurophilosophy at the Brain Institute (InsCer), editor-in-chief of philosophy journal Veritas and member of the Clinical Bioethics Committee at S. Lucas Hospital, PUCRS.

4.B USE AND ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Wednesday, 30, 9:30 – 11:30

Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Charlie Kurth (Western Michigan University)
“Should politicians be anxious?”

Email: charles.kurth@wmich.edu

Abstract: Do we want our politicians to be anxious? The answer may seem obvious: No. After all, not only does anxiety signal weakness in a leader, but it also tends to spawn vicious cycles of worry, withdrawal, and motivated reasoning that undermine one’s decision making. Anxiety, in short, is a political liability, not an asset. But this condemnation is too quick. Recent research examining anxiety’s role in promoting both voter engagement (MacKuen et al. 2010, Brader 2006) and virtuous action (Kurth 2018, 2015) suggests that we want our politicians to be appropriately anxious. This talk uses historical case studies and research in the social and cognitive sciences to explain what this appropriate anxiety involves and why it is valuable. In short, anxiety is valuable for politicians both because it sensitizes them to uncertainty and because it prompts the caution and information gathering that helps them work through the challenges they face. But this is not the whole story, for political anxiety comes in different forms. First, there’s a practical form of anxiety: the unease experienced in the face of uncertainty about what to do. Second, there’s a more defensive, outcome-focused version—unease about what will happen give that one has chosen a particular course of action. Drawing on examples of politicians wrestling with the abolition of slavery, I argue that anxiety in its practical form is what we want to see in politicians. While the defensive orientation of outcome-focused anxiety prompts motivated reasoning and political entrenchment, practical anxiety brings a concern for accuracy that prompts open-minded inquiry and engagement—a conclusion that gains further support from research in psychology (Abramowitz 2008, Endler & Kocovski 2001). But recognizing the different forms that anxiety can take raises questions about what a politician can do to cultivate practical anxiety. Enter the second case study: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s anxiety about protesting the Vietnam War. Looking at King’s descriptions of his anxiety suggests that two capacities are crucial if one is to promote practical anxiety and discourage more problematic alternatives: the ability to understand what emotion one is feeling and an appreciation for how particular emotions shape thought and action. I then draw on empirical work to show that these capacities are ones that we can cultivate (Jamieson et al. 2010, Teper et al. 2013). Moreover, understanding both the different forms that anxiety can take and what can be done to cultivate appropriately anxious leaders provides resources for responding to recent concerns about the place of anxiety in politics more generally (Albertson & Gadarian 2015, Edelman 1985). Central to these worries is the assumption that voters are too unaware of their feelings and so too easily pushed around by their anxieties. But these concerns are overblown. Not only can we develop our ability to recognize what emotions we’re feeling, but with that knowledge, we are better positioned to shape their effects on our decision making. In fact, the King example sheds light on the types of social/political structures that could help citizens develop these skills.

Keywords: Anxiety, Political Decision Making, Emotion Cultivation

Bio: My research focuses on issues at the intersection of the philosophy of emotion, ethics, and moral psychology. I have published a range of articles on these issues in places like *Philosophy of Science*, *Mind & Language*, and *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*. My book—*The Anxious Mind* (MIT Press, 2018)—investigates the cognitive science of anxiety and its implications for questions about value, agency, and virtue.

Ditte Marie Munch-Juriscic (University of Roskilde)
“Against comfort: Political and social implications of evading discomfort”

Email: ditemmj@ruc.dk

Abstract: Political emotions are typically identified as emotions and feelings that are displayed in public, political life. Recent work has, for example, sought to understand how emotions like shame, disgust and contempt have shaped the politics of nations and their political leaders (Nussbaum, Bell). In this paper, I focus on the more covert forms of feelings and affects, the so-called gut feelings, and the way they shape and influence political life. More specifically, I focus on feelings of comfort and discomfort to consider how trust of such gut feelings can be an obstacle for social and political progress. We typically think of feelings of discomfort and comfort as highly individual and personal and absent of political content. But if a person with an immigrant background feels nervous and uncomfortable at a job interview, we have only given half of the story, if we say that his nervousness is due to his individual psychology. It is well-established that it is simply easier to interact with people who resemble us (in terms of, for example, ethnicity, gender, social and economic class). They increase our visceral well-being and make us more comfortable. Emotional synchronizing and empathizing become easier when we share the same experiences or cultural background (Barrett, Bloom). The consequence—that most of us evade discomfort and favor the comfortable, often in unconscious and implicit ways—is a problem not only for the individual, but also for the possibilities of social and political change in a given society. Research, for example, has established how in-group favoritism and helping behavior in the US contribute to subtle forms of discrimination (Banaji and Greenwald). Visceral gut-feelings are not merely a product of one’s own individual psyche but co-constituted by the social and political context (Sullivan). Moreover, and importantly, the possibilities for political and social change are dependent on the way an individual interprets and manages his affective states. If we want a more equal and unbiased society, we need to be willing to expose ourselves to more discomfort both by choosing to do things (and to be in environments) that we find uncomfortable.

Keywords: Discomfort, Aversive Emotions, Implicit Bias, Indirect Discrimination

Bio: Ditte Marie Munch-Juriscic is a postdoctoral researcher at the philosophy department at Roskilde University. Funded by a Carlsberg Foundation grant, her current research focuses on aversive emotions and implicit bias. Her PhD dissertation on perpetrator disgust, awarded by the University of Copenhagen (2016), explored the connection between aversive physical reactions, emotions and morality. Publications on the subject appears in *Metaphilosophy* and Cambridge University Press (2018).

Maria del Pilar Sánchez Barajas (Universidad Autónoma de México - Universidade de Lisboa)
“After fair forgiveness”

Email: mapilarsb07@gmail.com

Abstract: Is it possible to talk about a kind of forgiveness which is not cruel and not violent with the self? With this question I address the Nietzschean critical approach of the matter, supported by many philosophers nowadays, and specifically by Martha Nussbaum in *Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice*. I place stress on two main ideas of that critical approach. First, that forgiveness, as much as other (Christian) values like love and compassion, establishes power relations among the parties (in a Foucaultian way); second, that forgiveness is due to cover up, and endure, the resentment of the weak. I sustain that is possible to go after a kind of forgiveness, not cruel and not violent with the self, this is, a fair or gentle forgiveness. But how is it possible? The first step towards this is facing reality: it is true, as Nietzsche says, that

many times, in a personal level and also a socio-political one, the act of forgive establishes roles that undermine the accused identity while empowers the "victim". But this is not a constitutive element of forgiveness. To forgive is not a Christian invention. Cultures around the world and history have their own rituals that assist parties in dispute to come to a solution and to reconcile them. I maintain that reconciliation, then, is the constitutive element of forgiveness. And its reasonableness, rituals and narratives are manifold. We cant pursue one rule for all cases, nor just one authority appropriate for it. The first part of this work is supported on the analysis of two cases of public forgiveness and "redemption". Those are: Ireland's Magdalene Laundries, studied closely by Linda Radzik in *Making Amends. Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics*, and the actual case of "Los perdonados", in Michoacán, a Mexican community. The second part focuses the relation among three concept: authority, identity and narrative. For now it is said that any identity, not of the accused, nor of the authority, can be properly determined by any act of forgiveness without violate moral integrity and equality. Thus, forgiveness follows a reconciliation narrative. In such a way, forgiveness is inserted as a central value of restorative justice, together with other values like: dialogue, respect, prevention, rehabilitation, and, of course, restoration. All of them are situated and developed in some particular community, with its own legislation and culture. Therefore, I emphasize along the text that forgiveness' rationality is manifold.

Keywords: Forgiveness, Authority, Identity, Rituals, Narratives

Bio: PhD Student at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, invited Researcher at Universidade de Lisboa. Coordination of Researching Program "Redefinir la razón práctica: contribuciones y límites de la neurobiologización de la moral" (Redefining practical reasoning: contributions and limits of neurobiological ethics). Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México/ Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos de Investigación e Innovación Tecnológica.

Ruth Rebecca Tietjen (University of Vienna)
"Religious zeal as a theologico-political affect"

Email: ruth.rebecca.tietjen@univie.ac.at

Abstract: My talk discusses an exemplary political affect: the affect of zeal. It focuses on the case of religious zeal as a theologico-political affect. Besides patriotic zeal, this is the most prominent form of political zeal in today's world, at least if we follow public opinion. It is commonly associated with religiously motivated and/or justified violence, i.e. violence perceived as fulfillment of a religious duty and/or committed to achieve a religious objective (Murphy 2011). As such, religious zeal is supposed to motivate, be partly constitutive of, and/or synonymous with religious fanaticism. Since religious fanaticism constitutes a pressing problem in today's world, understanding the nature of religious zeal is not only of theoretical, but also of practical value. Yet, despite its alleged significance and topicality, there is an astonishing lack of general philosophical theories of (religious) zeal. Particularly, though zeal commonly is characterized as "passionate commitment" (Toscano 20017) or "ardent devotion" (Olson 2007), and associated with emotions like love, hatred, anger, and compassion, the exact nature of zeal as an affective phenomenon remains unclear. In providing an analysis of the phenomenon of religious zeal, my paper aims at contributing to filling this gap. My analysis focuses on two questions: What kind of affective phenomenon is religious zeal, and how does it relate to politics? I argue that religious zeal is a passionate, wholehearted and unconditional commitment to a religious object or idea to which we attribute ultimate significance or absolute value. As such, it can take both the form of an emotion and of a passion. Emotional zeal characteristically is directed at specific objects in the world and consists of an affective evaluation that sanctions the violation of a religious law. As such, it belongs to the anger family of emotions (Kauppinen 2018). Passionate zeal is directed at religious objects or ideas themselves, such as the idea of God (Sloterdijk 2009; Assmann 2016). As a passion, it is an affective attachment to the religious object or idea in question that is characteristic of the person and bestows her life with continuity, coherence, and/or meaning (Roberts 2007). It becomes political, if it claims to be valid not only for a certain domain of life, but rather for life as such, and not only for an individual person, but rather for a group of people. It can but need not be violent. But religious zeal cannot only take the form of an emotion or a passion, it also can

be presented and interpreted as such. Though the ascription of religious zeal paradigmatically serves a discrediting function, the concept is also used as a positive self-description (Edwards 2009; Hengel 1989; Olson 2007). Moreover, zealotry is used as a political strategy to mobilize friends, and to force moderates to take sides in a dichotomical struggle (Olson 2007, 2011; Wright-Neville and Smith 2009). It may but need not be undemocratical. As I argue, all in all, religious zeal is a much more ambiguous phenomenon than the pejorative and disambiguating use of the term in public discourse suggests.

Keywords: Zeal, Fanaticism, The Return of Religion, Religious Violence, Passions

Bio: Ruth Rebecca Tietjen is postdoc at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Vienna, working in a project on “Secularism and its Discontents: Toward a Phenomenology of Religious Violence”. Her research focuses on questions in the intersection of philosophy of emotions, philosophy of religion, anthropology, ethics and political philosophy. Moreover, she is interested in metaphilosophical questions, searching for new forms of doing and presenting philosophy in a manner that makes an existential and/or political difference. She finished her PhD in 2018 with her doctoral thesis “At the Abyss. Philosophical Theory of Fear and Anxiety and Exercise in Philosophical Freedom” (forthcoming, 2019).

5.A EMOTIONS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (3/3)

Wednesday, 30, 11:45 – 13:15

Room: Auditorium ILCH

Alexandra Abranches (CEPS, University of Minho)

“From passion to sentiment: Hume’s natural science of the mind and the formation of public opinion”

Email: alexandra@ilch.uminho.pt

Abstract: Naturalistic-minded philosophers tend to look for basic principles to explain not only material phenomena but also the life of the mind as it plays out both in individuals and in groups. In the case of David Hume, those basic principles are investigated using as a model Newton’s science of physics, which had had tremendous success in explaining the movement of bodies, both on earth and in the skies, through the principle of gravitational attraction. The mental, or as Hume calls it, moral phenomena are explained by the principles of association (in the case of inner individual psychic life) and the principle of sympathy (in the case of outward institutional social and political life), equivalent to gravitational power in the case of the movement of bodies. A consequence of this approach is not only a more descriptive than normative moral and political theory, but also a demotion of reason as the central faculty humans can resort to in order to lead happy and peaceful lives. This demotion is a well known aspect of Hume’s theory of motivation, which famously declares reason to be the slave of the passions, giving passion or emotion both a central explanatory role and the status of key to the ordering of the human world. In the private sphere, we confuse reason for calm sentiment and equate being rational with being virtuous; likewise, in the public sphere we confuse impartiality with rationality. What I would like to examine in this paper is the way Hume’s theory of the passions solves or denounces a problem with modern contractualism which is especially clear in Rousseau’s work: how to make selfish individuals choose a social ordering according to some notion of the common good; Hume’s criticism of contractualism and his theory of allegiance show how the conditions for citizenship are acquired through time and only in a social context, through an education of the passions which turns them into virtues.

Keywords: passions, calm sentiments, self-interest, benevolence, Impartial Spectator

Bio: I have taught Ethics, Political Philosophy, History of Political and Social Ideas, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Aesthetics and Metaphysics at the University of Minho. My research interests include the history of Ethics, in particular the naturalist and rationalist traditions stemming from Hobbes and the naturalist and sentimentalist traditions culminating in Hume; issues in contemporary meta-ethics; the metaphysics of free will; and classical pragmatism, and I'm expanding my research and teaching interests to include the thought of modern women philosophers and feminist philosophy.

Alexandra Oprea (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) / Wenqing Zhao (Whitman College)
“Bridging the ideal and non-ideal: Compassion in the writings of Mencius and Rousseau”

Email: alexandraprea@gmail.com / zhaow2@whitman.edu

Abstract: In a world characterized by enduring injustice, high and persistent socioeconomic inequality, and imperfect political institutions, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to compassion as a sentiment motivating the pursuit of justice (Nussbaum 1996; 2001; 2013; 2014; Whitebrook 2002; 2014; Porter 2006) and to care as a guiding ethical framework (Tronto 2013; Noddings 2013; Held 2006; Kittay 1998). Despite the promising vision offered in the literature, advocates of compassion have offered relatively few solutions to the challenges of developing compassion under non-ideal political circumstances. In fact, those who consider the challenges have generally been critical of compassion as weak (Orwin 1997), self-indulgent (Boyd 2004), indiscriminate (Bloom 2016), and unnecessary (Prinz 2011). We contend that the contemporary debates could be productively supplemented by an engagement with two historical figures who addressed the challenge of cultivating compassion in troubled times: Mencius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Informed by the two historical thinkers, we describe a process-oriented account of cultivating compassion that focuses on the interaction of individual, situational, and environmental factors within non-ideal political contexts. The two historic thinkers both conceive of compassion as embedded in a “moral ecology” in which the role of specific moral sentiments and how they function in the overall picture are heavily contextualized and negotiated with other components of the system. The contemporary discussions, on the other hand, often approach the moral sentiments, compassion in particular, in isolation. One obvious drawback of the contemporary approach, which we can learn from the two historical thinkers, is the neglect of the niche construction of moral ecology: the political environment both constrains the moral cultivation strategies available and becomes itself subject to change through acts of subversive educational practice. In this regard, the two thinkers offer valuable insights into how political emotions should be studied by bridging ideal and nonideal theories. The comparative nature of this project also aims at expanding the scope of the affective turn in political thought. Content wise, Mencius and Rousseau offer important and complementary lessons in compassion cultivation. Moreover, we argue that the effort of bridging the ideal and nonideal requires us to think globally and cross-culturally. By bringing Mencius into conversation with Rousseau, this project enriches the contemporary discussion on emotion through seeking connections with “the East” that has been historically deemed as the other in the Age of Reason.

Keywords: Rousseau, Mencius, Comparative Political Thought, Education, Compassion

Bio: Alexandra Oprea is a Research Assistant Professor (PPE program) at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. She specializes in political theory and political economy.

Wenqing Zhao is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Whitman College. She specializes in moral psychology, Chinese philosophy, and applied ethics.

Marie Wuth (University of Aberdeen)
“The power of affect: Re- thinking political participation with Spinoza”

Email: marie.wuth@abdn.ac.uk

Abstract: Until a few years ago political theorists and politicians attested to a certain disenchantment with politics, especially in Western democracies. But the rise and increasing political presence of conservative, right-wing populist parties and groups shifted the political landscape. These movements and political actors were able to mobilise large parts of the population, motivating former non-voters, protest voters as well as resistance. Their success can be explained by their ability to address people not as rational beings but instead appealing to their resentments, fears, and hopes. By doing so, these movements and political actors treat emotions and affects as a central part of politics and human action, influencing the way people think and act. Regarding these recent developments, it is obvious, that we need to re-think political concepts and take affects and emotions into account. In this paper I will argue, that in terms of political participation it is productive to focus on affects rather than emotions. The approach I develop does not focus on single, autonomous subjects or subjective emotional states but on transindividual relations because, as I will show, the conditions and possibilities of participation are determined by the individual's relations to its surrounding, and power structures, respectively. In contrast to emotions, affects refer to the dynamic encounter between individuals, describing the effects and impacts they exert on one another. In terms of affects, emphasis is placed on the relations between individuals and their corresponding ideas of these relations. My starting point is the argument that human beings are not per se defined as political beings, but yet always involved in political processes, either in an active or passive way. I advance this argument on the background of the immanent ontology of substance Spinoza proposes in the Ethics according to which every single being is connected to others, yet part of a community, of nature and the whole. From this point of view one can assume a fundamental participatory dimension in the structure of being. Applying the hermeneutics of Spinoza's metaphysics on a political level shows that the question at stake is not whether or not people are participating in political processes, but rather how people are participating, how they become active or passive and how we can understand the very notions of activity and passivity. I will argue, that being active or passive is a question of knowledge and self-determination, viz. heteronomy. Following this I claim that causes and motives of actions, activity and passivity depend on the individual's affective relations and insight in those. An affect-theoretical approach towards political participation might help to explain why people join political bodies and in how far being part of a political movement shifts the individual's mode of participation. Overall, I will show, that affects play a crucial part in political processes and that forms of active or passive political participation are affective reactions towards and within political processes.

Keywords: Political Participation, Affect, Spinoza

Bio: Marie Wuth is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Aberdeen and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow. Her research focuses on the role of affects for political agency and for the formation and dynamics of political bodies.

5.B FEMINIST APPROACHES TO POLITICAL EMOTIONS

Wednesday, 30, 11:45 – 13:15

Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Virginia Fusco (University Carlos III, Madrid)

“Love talks: Notes on love as a political emotion in feminist theory”

Email: vfusco@hum.uc3m.es

Abstract: In *Love. A question for Feminism in the Twenty-First Century*, Ann Ferguson and Anna Jónasdóttir identify three distinct perspectives that have historically framed feminist analysis on love: ‘Love as delusion/ideology’, ‘Love as a key element in epistemology’ and ‘Love as social human power’. In other words, love could be understood as a patriarchal ideology, as an epistemological device and, finally, as a socio/political energy that articulates individual and collective practices in contemporary political scenarios. In this brief contribution, I wish to discuss the work of those feminist thinkers that conceived love as an emotion with clear political implications and that removed their analysis from traditional interpretations of love that tend to relegate it to the ‘private’ and to intimacy. In particular, I will consider Aleksandra Kollontai’s work that emblemizes an understanding of the ‘political economy of love’ as essential to women’s becoming political subjects and to their fight for emancipation. Far from a mere discursive ideology that ‘constructs’ women as ‘objects’ of male desires, at the beginning of the Twentieth century, the Bolshevik conceived it as a social energy that entails a strong creative power and that must be exploited collectively in the struggle against the domineering class and its ideology. So, in contrast with the overall descriptive format of most Marxist analysis of the origin of the family and women subjugation, Kollontai offers a first approximation to the strategies that the international working class movement and those politically committed to social justice must adopt to overcome the hierarchical organization of the sexes in the context of a capitalist mode of production that appears to be intimately bonded to women subordination.

Keywords: Engels, Materialist Feminist, Kollontai, Love, Social Justice.

Bio: I am a junior member of staff at the Carlos III University in Madrid. I have been teaching Contemporary Philosophy and Gender Studies for the past 7 years in this same institution. Two years ago I have presented my thesis - *distinction cum Laude*- ‘Monstrous Figurations’, which constitutes a cultural studies analysis of the forms in which female monstrosity works in contemporary fiction. I have graduated in Modern Literature and Philosophy in Italy (Università degli Studi di Padova) and then I have enrolled in a Master at Soas (School of Oriental and African Studies) where I have obtained my title analyzing the complex interplay between identity, gender and nationalist politics in contemporary India. I have been a visiting scholar at some prestigious institutions such as the Centre for Historical Studies at JNU, University of Delhi in New Delhi and at the Centre for the Humanities, University of Utrecht under the supervision of the feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti. My research focuses primarily on Colonial/Postcolonial/Decolonial theories and Feminist Philosophy.

Alicia García Álvarez (University of Oviedo)

“Emotions as tools for political subversion: an epistemic approach on feminism”

Email: aliga95@gmail.com

Abstract: The political role of emotions as vehicles not only for reasoning and deliberation, but also for belief and knowledge is a matter of current discussion in Political Philosophy, specially concerning the Feminist Theory. According to the latter, Western moral and political tradition has been configured according to a di-

chotomy between emotion and reason that has shaped the institutions, beliefs and social meanings of the liberal democracies producing a politically accepted mode of reasoning which seems to support men's interests while systematically denying female experiences and feelings. Following this view, the political marginalization of women is the consequence of their traditionally having been defined as over-emotional subjects who could not fit into the rational foundation of the public sphere. In this sense, the Feminist Philosophy of the past decades has been enhancing and reassessing the status of emotions in relation with the dominant modes of reasoning while claiming the necessity to politicize them in order to include the voice of women in the public discourse. My PhD thesis consists in showing that at least a significant part of those feminist claims can be made clearer through the notion of epistemic injustice given by Miranda Fricker. According to her hybrid, both epistemological and political account, there is a layer of a specifically epistemic injustice that operates in the form of identity and systematic prejudices against some social groups and that lays often implicit in our current political orders. The perception of women as emotional subjects would be operating as an identity prejudice that distorts their perception and produces a deficit of credibility of their discourse in the hearer's part. The two kinds of epistemic injustice characterized by Fricker –testimonial and hermeneutical- would be the result of the impact of the prejudice in the hearer's credibility judgment, making the female narratives appear as 'illogical or 'exaggerated.' Denying the meaning of certain emotive modes of expression does not only produce epistemic injustice against certain groups through the act of silencing or under-rating their claims. According to Fricker, emotions have an ineludible expressive power that is not reducible to some associated judgment, but grants them with a meaning in themselves. Since emotions are intentional responses to the world, they express preferences about different possible conclusions, which means that what we take as rational necessarily presupposes emotion. Moreover, contrarily to reason, some emotions have a subversive role as they are not wholly determined by the accepted form of rationality and can thus instigate new forms of interpretation and political change. The traditional conception focuses solely on one aspect and forgets that emotion must also regulate reason in order to question the forms of interpretation and rationality that deny the political meaning of people's emotions. Learning to recognize, share, articulate and politicize certain emotions will enable us to understand the meaning of some silenced claims. This presentation aims to explore the connections between Fricker's concept of emotions and contemporary feminist claims in order to show that such learning would be a matter of epistemic justice concerning the case of women.

Keywords: Epistemic, Injustice, Feminism, Emotion, Reason

Bio: Graduated in Philosophy and Classical Philology, Masters Degree in Education and currently PhD student in Political Philosophy in the University of Oviedo (Asturias, Spain).

Laura Luz Silva (University College London)

“Outlaw emotions: How philosophy of emotion neglects the political domain of emotions”

Email: laura.silva.13@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract: Contemporary philosophy of emotion takes emotions to be contentful reason-responsive states that can make positive epistemic contributions (Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016). These epistemic contributions can have moral and political value. For them to do so, emotions must be capable of justifying evaluative beliefs. How do emotions justify evaluative beliefs? The contemporary debate on the epistemology of emotions centres around the dominant perceptual theories of emotion and whether the strong epistemic role they afford emotions is plausible. Perceptual theories take emotions, much like perceptions, to provide immediate justification for relevant beliefs. In other words, so long as you have no reason to distrust your emotional experience of say fear of a dog, then the perceptual theory holds that you are justified in believing that the dog is dangerous. Let's call this view Epistemic Perceptualism (EP). I raise a novel objection to this view, concerning the epistemic role of what have been called outlaw emotions (Jagger, 1989). Outlaw emotions are recalcitrant emotions that go against most or many of our internalized as well as explicitly held beliefs. Take for example a woman that suffers ongoing domestic abuse at the hands of her husband in a society that normalizes such abuse as the expected and encouraged form of female disciplining. Let us suppose that

the woman in question has internalized her subservient role and has no conscious reasons to feel anger at her situation. Despite believing her husband to be entitled to treat her this way, she is enraged by her predicament. Outlaw emotions are considered crucial to gaining knowledge that is otherwise unavailable in ideological settings. Feminist philosophers have highlighted outlaw emotions as importantly politically subversive (Friedman 1986; Jagger 1989). I argue that as EP stands, it cannot account for the epistemic role of outlaw emotions. This is because such cases will be ones where one likely always has reason to distrust one's emotional experience, given the internalization of dominant oppressive ideology. EP would therefore have the beaten women's anger incapable of justifying her belief that she is being treated unjustly, because her explicit beliefs to the contrary would act as epistemic defeaters. I consider two moves the perceptual theorist can attempt in response to my objection, and highlight why they fail to quiet my worry. I argue that only a modified version of EP, one informed by a social epistemology, where the social standing of the agent is key to the justificatory story told, can survive this challenge. I end by sketching such an account. This paper involves a novel challenge to the dominant framework of emotional epistemology in the philosophy of emotion literature. It highlights a crucial instance of a common trend in the emotion literature, namely, an individualistic focus, and relatedly, a lack of attention to the social and political dimensions of emotions. Remedying such failures will lead to better theorizing about the emotions as well as their place in our political lives.

Keywords: Outlaw Emotions, Feminism, Epistemology, Anger, Oppression

Bio: I'm a PhD candidate in Philosophy at University College London (UCL). I work primarily on philosophy of emotion, at the intersections of moral psychology, feminist philosophy and philosophy of mind. I also have research interests in ethics and epistemology. My work is often empirically informed in two distinct senses: I strive to take social reality seriously, and I engage with experimental work in the brain and behavioral sciences. Website: <https://www.lauraluzsilva.com>

6.A RHETORIC AND POLITICAL EMOTIONS

Wednesday, 30, 15:00 – 17:00

Room: Auditorium ILCH

Giovanni Damele (University Nova, Lisbon)

“‘Sentiments’, ‘sophisms’ and ‘derivations’: Vilfredo Pareto as an argumentation theorist”

Email: giovanni.damele@fcsh.unl.pt

Abstract: According to Talcott Parsons, Pareto's sociology focuses on discourses instead of actions [Parsons, 1937: 236]. The reason of this choice is expressed by Pareto himself in a note to the “Index of Topics” of his *Trattato di Sociologia Generale*. His work – Pareto states – is a research of the stable, common element which can be discovered in social actions. This research moves from the analysis of “documents”, that is, “verbalized activities” and its main tenet is Pareto's well known distinction between “residues” and “derivations”. According to Pareto, in the social context, nonlogical (or non-rational) conduct are associated with words. This connection between verbal and non-logical conduct raises the problem of deception. Nonlogical actions can be reconducted to a finite set, a small number of constant factors, which he calls “residues” (*residui*). A residue correspond to some permanent human “sentiment”. While these factors are constant and change very little over time and across cultures, the verbalized activities which justify, legitimize or simply explain these factors are variable, changing from context to context. These “variables” are called by Pareto “derivations” (*derivazioni*). “Political formulas” such as “divine will” or “the People's mandate” belong precisely to the realm of the “derivations” [Burnham, 1944]. As Norberto Bobbio [1961] emphasized, Pareto's theory, based on an analysis of pseudo-rational verbalizations, can be interpreted as an “argumentation theory”, opposed to the classical, “perelmanian” [Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958] approach. Pareto's focuses are the deceptive and self-deceptive processes of pseudo-rationalization of irrational behaviors (“sen-

timents”, in Pareto’s words). From this viewpoint, Pareto’s theory of “residues” and “derivations” can be interpreted as a “theory of fallacies” or “sophisms”, opposed to the traditional, illuminist view (represented, for example, by Bentham’s *Book of Fallacy*). Pareto’s aim is not to present a “therapy” of argumentation, identifying fallacies as “pathologic” conditions. From a descriptive viewpoint he emphasizes the instinctual and ineluctable relations – through verbalization – between the emotional or irrational substrate of human actions and its façade legitimization. Thus, Pareto’s sociology can be reinterpreted in the language of argumentation theory, focusing on his interest on language and emotions.

Keywords: Argumentation Theory, Fallacies, Emotions, Rhetoric, Pareto

Bio: Giovanni Damele (Ph.D. Università di Torino, Turin, 2006) works as a researcher and invited auxiliary professor at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa. His main fields of academic interest include philosophy of law, philosophy of politics, argumentation theory and rhetoric. He is particularly interested in legal argumentation and, more in general, in the persuasive and strategic dimension of practical argumentation. From this point of view, his interests cover all aspects connected with legal argumentation, including philosophy and history of law, political philosophy, history of political thought, law and literature, law and economics, judicial rhetoric.

Rob Goodman (McGill University) / Samuel Bagg (McGill University)
“Preaching to the choir? Persuasion, conversion, and the politics of identity”

Email: rob.goodman@mcgill.ca / samuel.bagg@mcgill.ca

Abstract: A great deal of political communication in contemporary democracies takes place under conditions of “hyperpolarization,” in which political orientations are experienced not merely as sets of opinions, but as deep-seated identities. Under such conditions, political messages are often delivered “to the choir” (to reinforce identities aligned with the speaker’s) or “to the unconverted” (to transform non-aligned identities). Our use of these metaphors is deliberate. We argue that the concept of preaching captures important features of actually-existing political communication, and that homiletics, the study of preaching, can offer normative resources for contemporary politics. As Teresa Bejan argues, “evangelism—more so than deliberation or persuasion—more aptly describes much of what the citizens of modern liberal democracies actually do in the public sphere.” We agree; while important recent work on deliberation has attempted to expand its range of admissible “registers,” we argue that political theorists have generally neglected the register of preaching. Turning to the history of homiletics, we first ask whether preaching, as a form of communication, has distinctive aims. We find a promising point of departure in the work of the scholastic writer Alan of Lille: preaching aims at “formation.” Preaching as formation aims to alter our conceptions of identity in a more fundamental way than rhetoric aimed at persuasion with respect to opinions or interests. Formation encompasses both speech that aims at conversion and speech that aims to explicate or strengthen the identity of the already-converted. Second, we turn to the more recent homiletics literature to investigate preaching’s relation to the emotions and its distinctive communicative means. These means include efforts to reshape hearers’ “narrative identities” by implicating them in a broader narrative, and reliance on imagery and metaphor. Preaching is often directly linked to, and attempts to justify, disruptive symbolic action. Preaching is also often characterized by what the homiletics scholar Fred Craddock calls “distance,” or “a non-contingent, unconditional quality.” While other modes of speech may employ some of these means, we argue that preaching is a distinctive combination. Third, we consider the promises and pitfalls of preaching as a mode of political communication. As a mode that aims to alter or create identities, it can challenge approaches to politics that presume that identities are fixed; it might, for instance, be an important ingredient in building the solidarity necessary for a multiethnic social democracy. On the other hand, its “unconditional quality” means that preaching is ill-suited to give-and-take; from a democratic perspective, it may be a necessary but insufficient mode. Fourth and finally, we consider the objection that preaching is an inherently religious (or even inherently Christian) activity that is incompatible with secular politics. We argue the contrary, drawing on instances of

preaching directed toward social change in the United States, including the Civil Rights movement and the contemporary Poor People's Campaign. Further, we claim that "secular preaching" is not necessarily a contradiction in terms. Finally, we argue that further comparative work can illuminate the political value and pitfalls of preaching in other religious contexts.

Keywords: Preaching, Rhetoric, Polarization, Identity, Political Communication

Bio: Rob Goodman is an Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral Researcher at McGill University. His forthcoming book manuscript investigates the development of models of eloquence in classical antiquity, as well as their translation into modern institutional settings. His work has been published in journals including the American Political Science Review, History of Political Thought, and Redescriptions.

Samuel Bagg received his PhD in Political Science from Duke University in 2017, and is now a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Constitutional Studies at the Yan P. Lin Centre at McGill University. His primary line of research develops an account of democracy that is grounded in the dispersion of power rather than collective self-rule, and has recently appeared in the American Political Science Review.

Benedetta Romano (Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich)
"Propaganda and the ethics of emotional appeals"

Email: benedettaromano@gmail.com

Abstract: The traditional view holds that appeals to emotions in politics are harmful, because they exert a manipulative function, by undermining rational reasoning. In this paper, I propose a novel account of emotional appeals, by distinguishing persuasive from propagandistic ones, and by attributing the manipulative character of the latter to the impact that they have, not on the agent's rational reasoning, but on her emotional processing of political objects. First, I argue that both kinds of appeals put forward evaluative kinds of arguments, and the emotions that they elicit, intervene in these arguments by making salient certain goals/values. However, whereas persuasive appeals promote the assessment and the coherent integration of this goal/value with the agent's further values and appropriate beliefs, the propagandistic ones do not do so. This epistemic distinction, I claim, result in a moral distinction. Specifically, I adopt the notion of political sophistication as a normative ideal, and I include as a key element of it, what I call "evaluative knowledge", that is, the knowledge concerning how one's own goals and values are evoked by concrete political matters. In this framework, I claim that persuasive emotional appeals are morally worthy, because they have a positive impact on the agent's evaluative knowledge, while propagandistic emotional appeals can only have a negative impact on it, and this is what makes them morally despicable.

Keywords: Political Propaganda, Emotional Appeals, Ethics of Persuasion, political Sophistication, Evaluative Knowledge

Bio: Benedetta Romano is a PhD candidate in the department of Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience at the LMU in Munich. She is interested in the emotions, specifically in the kind of knowledge that they provide, and their role in reasoning, about issues with political and ethical relevance.

Mauro Serra (University of Salerno)
"Political emotions: why we need (ancient) rhetoric"

Email: maserra@unisa.it

Abstract: As is well known, the relation between emotions and politics is problematic. In fact, the role of emotions in the public sphere is usually considered in a negative light. Emotions are considered to be the expression of prejudices and vested interests so that it tends to be held that they should be neutralized in order to exercise decisional and deliberative activity in the most appropriate way. In fact, in this sphere, only the adoption of an impartial perspective is able to guarantee the correctness and validity of the decisions taken. On the other hand, however, if it is true that the history of political thought in the West has been dominated by the conviction that an adequate way of combining reason and passions does not exist, the most recent acquisitions of the cognitive sciences and neuroscience seem to seriously question the possibility of using practical rationality in the absence of emotions and feelings, however. Hence a stalemate well represented by the relationship between the two main conceptions of democracy, agonistic democracy, and deliberative democracy. The former appeals to the emotions but without being able to explain how to urge them without being a victim of them, the latter describes a reason free from emotions, but has the problem of engaging citizens and can be susceptible to the charge of motivational impotence. Faced with this situation, I will try to argue, rhetoric can provide a theoretical framework to connect fruitfully reason and emotions in the political sphere. This framework, that I derive from ancient Greek thinking, and more specifically from Gorgias and Aristotle, has three distinctive features: the role of belief (*doxa*) as link between reason and emotions, an agonistic conception of truth, a tragic view of world based on a deep awareness of the limits of human reason and the belief that rhetorical action is the means by which identities become temporarily enacted and forged in response to the needs of a specific contingent situation.

Keywords: Emotions, Rhetoric, Agonistic Truth, Deliberation, Belief

Bio: Mauro Serra teaches Philosophy of Language at the University of Salerno. His current research focuses on the relationship between language, violence, and politics.

6.B EMOTIONS: LANGUAGE, MEDIA, AND STYLES OF GOVERNMENT

Wednesday, 30, 15:00 – 17:00

Room: CEPS Seminar Room

Maurício Amaro (Porto University)

“This is America: an analysis of hate speeches by Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro to understand the rise of far-right politics in the American continent”

Email: mauriciopachecoamaro@gmail.com

Abstract: The speech given by Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor in 1933 became famous for his nationalism. While he promised to raise German people again to a position of glory and greatness, he grounded this rise in the elimination of an enemy common to all Germans. Almost a century later, America witness the exponential growth of the far right on the continent, represented by two central figures: Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States of America, and Jair Bolsonaro, 38th President of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Both Presidents began their pre-campaigns as underdogs, not only because of their little or no political experience, but because they supported their candidacies through totalitarian hate speeches, similar to those of Nazism. Hanna Arendt (1951: 308) states that "totalitarian movements aim at and succeeded in organizing masses [...] not classes [...] not citizens with opinions about, and interests in, the handling of public affairs". Trump and Bolsonaro elections can be explained by populations disbelief with the political panorama of their countries. They wanted changes, although they did not show interest and knowledge about public life. Arendt (1951: 313) is clear when she says, however, that "indifference to public affairs, neutrality in political issues, are in themselves sufficient cause for the rise of totalitarian movements." How, then, can we explain the rise in power of both Presidents? Just as Hitler, Bolsonaro and Trump directed their speeches of hatred

against minorities, as well as against the "enemies of the people", namely the supposed " Communist threat " and left-wing ideologically oriented nations. According to Aristotle (1354a), it is important for persuasion how the speaker presents himself and makes his ideas understood by his listeners. And it is necessary that the listeners have a certain receptivity to the speaker's ideas. The present research will analyze the two actors of Trump and Bolsonaro's hate speeches: the speakers and the listeners. To do so, we will first focus on two videos present on YouTube platform, which compile racist, misogynist and prejudiced speeches from both elected governors. In a second moment, we will look at how these speeches are received by people in the comments made upon the two videos. The analysis will take place from Aristotle's perspective about oratory, presented in his work *Rhetoric*. We hope to understand how discourses of hatred were able to persuade entire masses in favor of far-right politics in the two largest countries of America in terms of social minorities.

Keywords: Politics, Far-right, Rhetoric, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro

Bio: Maurício Pacheco Amaro is a Master's student in Estudos Literários, Culturais e Interartes, at Universidade do Porto. He is also a Game Studies researcher.

Alba Baro Vaquero (Autonoma University of Madrid)

“Bandits’ stories and the feeling for justice. The power of narrative stories in traditional popular culture against power.”

Email: alba.barovaquero@gmail.com

Abstract: This paper departs from the question of what is the role of collective emotions in the processes of questioning and subversion of the political order. Specifically, the paper is dedicated to study the image of the “righteous” or “social bandit” as an interesting point to think about these issues. Consequently, we will center our attention on the feeling from justice, the sense of grievance and the emotions awakened by injustice situations. Bandits’ stories allow us to look at the other side of the history of power: of those who were out of (the decisions of) law and who have been marginalized and forgotten; and, also, to look at collective movements, revolts and revolutions without disregarding its subjective dimensions. Righteous bandits are not historical individuals rather than characters of popular culture, rooted in oral traditions of almost all peoples around the world, heroes of many stories where often imaginary and fantasy elements are mixed with historical facts and events of the past. This last dimension will lead us to discuss, in a second place, about the role of stories, narrations, tales... (against purely rational discourses and political calculation) in the capacity of oppressed people to develop their own comprehension of reality and their own ways of resistance and acting. For this reason, in order to develop our argument, we will not only turn to the ideas of some thinkers (Benjamin, Nussbaum) and historians (Hobsbawm, Thompson), but also we will analyze some tales about bandits (Kleist). Righteous bandits are themselves objects of different feelings of admiration, passion or even fear. They are seen by public opinion as heroes or fighters for justice and, therefore, as persons worthy of help and support. In this way, this kind of characters are able to reveal that injustices are not just a particular problem and of awakening a sense of disagreement. However, it has been typically maintained that these revolts guided by righteous feelings are only able to denounce the current order and of producing violence or destruction against it, but unable of creating a new one. We will suggest that is its literary form what brings bandits’ stories its universal dimension and its capacity to mobilize emotions and transform it into action. The authentic victory of bandits occurs only after his death because it is from this moment that they can become an ideal and a literary archetype, and, therefore, part of collective memory (surviving across generations) reminding grievances of the past, the true nature of power and the possibility of a different order. Thus, liking for bandits would be in a certain way, a hidden liking against power and existing law. Bandits’ stories could be interpreted as containing a popular demand for their right to political participation and as ways of articulating their own wisdom out of elites’ hegemony over common imaginary and quotidian language. This kind of narrations embodied a justice feeling without which the most complex political theories about justice would result completely meaningless.

Keywords: Bandits, "Feeling for Justice", Narration, Revolts.

Bio: I graduated in Philosophy from the University of Valladolid. Then I studied a Master Degree of Advanced Studies in Philosophy and another one in Philosophy of History. Now, I am PhD student at the Autónoma University of Madrid.

Elena Falletti (Università Carlo Cattaneo-LIUC, Italy)

“Character assassination and fake news dissemination from Marie-Antoinette to Facebook: What could we learn from the historical experience?”

Email: efalletti@liuc.it

Abstract: Experiencing the spread of false news that has assumed a value of unquestionable truths has many authoritative historical precedents. Richard III, Lucrezia Borgia, and Marie-Antoinette might have so much to say if they could only tell what was the collective defamation in the destruction of their personal character. Indeed, all of them endured the ruin of their reputation at the hands of Shakespeare for the first, bad family company for the second, and the ultimate enlightenment pornographic libellists for the third. Today, in order to obtain similar results, we have social networks, but they work in different ways. Indeed, social networks have two innovative elements: the immediacy of information circulation, and the simultaneous possibility of forming groups among their members, who can count and recognize themselves, to act together towards a common goal. This can be positive, for instance crowdfunding, aid, organizing a social campaign, or negative: pressuring, bullying, defamation, and so on. In the past, mainly only rich and famous people could be attacked by media, while now even a teenager can be widely bullied online. On the one hand, the widespread dissemination of the net and the enormous number of social network users has led to the explosion of such distorting effects, especially as regards self-referencing, lack of control, and critical thinking. On the other hand, the phenomenon of the closure of individuals in groups is manifested in polarized opinions and focused on specific narratives, which ignore other possible dissonant voices. The combination of these factors mainly results in two effects: on the one hand, similar opinions, albeit false, circulate faster, even in a few hours; on the other hand it becomes almost useless and impossible to counteract them. This is due to the polarization of the groups, which find confirmation not in comparison, but exclusively in themselves, since when people find that others agree with them, they become more confident and therefore more extreme, producing an apparently endless vicious circle. However, could there be a different cultural approach to addressing this issue? Does everyone share the same values? Even if in the American perspective, free speech is a basic constitutional value, as traditionally established by the US Supreme Court, the European perspective focuses on the protection of personal dignity, as demonstrated by the Google vs Spain decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union. These are two opposing approaches, even if social networks have deleted national boundaries, but they cannot change these cultural mindset issues. The aim of this abstract is to verify what the management strategies of these phenomena in a comparative legal perspective are.

Keywords: Fake News, Democracy, Freedom of Expression, Defamation

Bio: Elena is full-tenured lecturer of comparative private law at the School of Law of the University "Cattaneo – LIUC", Castellanza (VA), Italy. She carried out her PhD in Comparative Law at the University "Statale" in Milan in 2006. When she was PhD candidate she gained a DAAD Stipendium and a Marie Curie Fellowship at the Westfälische Wilhelm-Universität Münster (Germany). After that, she gained a post - doctoral Fellowship at the Max Planck Institut für Geistiges Eigentum of Munich (Germany). She published several articles in peer-reviewed journals and publications and undertook experiences of teaching and research in Australia (2013), Austria (2003, 2014), China (2010), France (2003, 2007), Germany (2012, 2013), Iceland (2011), Israel (2015, 2017), Japan (2018), Latvia (2013), Luxembourg (2006), Mozambique (2008), Netherland (2006, 2013, 2017), Poland (2016), Slovenia (2014), Spain (2007, 2009, 2014, 2018), Taiwan (2012), Turkey (2017),

United Kingdom (2003, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017, forthcoming 2019), United States (2009, 2011, 2014, 2018).

Pedro Góis Moreira (Catholic University, Lisbon) / José Colen (CEPS, University of Minho)
“Ruling Styles’: Household management and city rule in Xenophon's Oeconomicus”

Email: pedrogoismoreira@gmail.com / jacolen64@gmail.com

Abstract: Albert Hirschman famously suggested that, over time, society oscillate between intense interest in public issues and an almost total concentration on private goals. These “shifting involvements” between (mostly peaceful and benefic) private interests and (emotional) public action define contemporary political history. However, to oppose (destructive) emotions to public deliberation and "rational" rule is to implicitly assume a dichotomy. By accepting such dichotomy, it follows that forms of governments are meant to curb popular (or mob) passions, or at the very least avoid its most dangerous effects. Despite the rational “new science” of business management, the ideal rational government should not mingle with (business) interests, however, because interests make rulers prey of another kind of emotion, clouding and distorting the dispassionate attention to the public interest. On the one hand, we would like to suggest that there is not a dichotomy, but variegated "styles" of ruling. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that the relationship between peaceful private interests and dangerously emotional public action is an age-old problem and that we have much to learn from past insights concerning that relationship. In fact, this is arguably not just an old-age question, but the question that triggers the opening of the most ancient treatise of “political science.” Aristotle begins his work and follows this thread to the end of Book I of his Politics: what is the nature of the power of those who rule the civic body? “Some,” he says, are mistaken and think that the household (Oikos) management is of the same nature as the public rule. These "others" remain unnamed. It is usually thought that this is a reference to Plato's Socrates who, in two different dialogues (Politicus and Hipparchus), supports that contention. The same "art" prepares for the rule both of the household and of the city. This contention in Plato work is however rather terse and brief. There is nonetheless another text where this thesis is expounded leisurely: Xenophon's Oeconomicus. This dialogue is, however, a very peculiar one. Despite Xenophon prestige among the ancients, renovated in the Renaissance, he is now more or less demoted to a less than intelligent disciple of Socrates and barely a philosopher. No one denies that he inaugurated the genre of the "mirrors of princes," but the Oeconomicus is his most mysterious work. According to Schumpeter and Moses I. Finley, Xenophon doesn't even deal with what we call now economy and it is, therefore, useless. Surprisingly, after falling out of grace from the late 19th century to the end of the 20th century, there is currently a new attention to this dialogue, given that both Michel Foucault and Leo Strauss put the text at the core of their own arguments. Xenophon tell us of a dialogue between Socrates and Critobolus, son of Socrates' wealthy friend, Crito. At some point in the conversation, Socrates recalls previous long conversation with an administrator who talks about how one rule should. In this dialogue, Ischomachus presents Socrates with the (ideal) model of the household, that also provides the standard for the rule of the city and of the army. Those who know how to rule the private house and how to manage the farm, he argues, will master the art of ruling the city. Moreover, the art of political ruling is the same as the art of household management, except for their size. The Oeconomicus is the largest text where this thesis is debated in great detail. Aristotle objects to this thesis because managing a house that includes women, children and slaves implies that the authority of the manager is necessarily "despotic" and therefore very different from ruling a city. We will discuss in the paper the permanent appeal of despotic rule or the need for "strong" statesmen, as a rational form of government, as opposed to a mere emotional appeal.

Keywords: Aristotle, Xenophon, Despotic Rule, Private Interests, Rational Government

Bio: Pedro Góis Moreira is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Political Studies of the Catholic University of Portugal and holder of a FCT grant (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology). He holds a MA in political science through the Catholic University of Portugal, and a MA on European History through the Europaeum program in European History and Civilisation between Leiden, Paris, and Oxford. His master thesis was on Ludwig von Mises' thought at the time of the First World War. He published on Thomas More's Utopia in *The Early Moderns* (Vienna, 2014) and Plato in *Platão Absconditus* (Lisbon, 2014), book that he also co-edited. Furthermore, he participated in the translation and revision of *Introduction à la pensée de Raymond Aron* (Lisbon-Paris, 2016, forthcoming). He also published, with José Colen, 'La Fuite en Avant? The Rhetoric of Fear and the European Construction,' in *Diacrítica* (2015). He is currently finishing his dissertation on political radicalism and political moderation in political thought.

For José Colen's bio, see p. [25](#)